United States of America v. Frank Washington , Iii

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-2379
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
F RANK WASHINGTON , III,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:25-cr-00027 — James T. Moody, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 24, 2026 — DECIDED J UNE 9, 2026
____________________
Before R IPPLE, K OLAR , and M ALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
PER C URIAM . Defendant Frank Washington, III, appeals his
sentence on procedural grounds, contending that the district
court failed to adequately explain his 70-month sentence for
possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
While we have little doubt the district court considered Wash-
ington’s individual circumstances, we agree that those con-
siderations were not articulated in the record. Because our

-- 1 of 7 --

2 No. 25-2379
precedents demand more, we vacate Washington’s sentence
and remand for resentencing.
I. Background
Washington pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a con-
victed felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), in February
2025. In his presentence report, Probation calculated a guide-
line range of 70 to 87 months of imprisonment (which neither
party disputes). The presentence report also noted that Wash-
ington had health concerns, including high blood pressure,
diabetes, and a recent heart attack.
At sentencing, Washington requested a below-guidelines
57-month sentence. His primary argument in mitigation was
based on his health concerns; he had an acute risk of cardiac
failure after the recent heart attack and required follow-up
care. He raised other mitigation arguments, including lack of
disciplinary issues in pretrial detention, lack of substance
abuse history, his close relationship with his family, and ac-
ceptance of responsibility.
The district court imposed a sentence of 70 months of im-
prisonment, the bottom of the guidelines range. In reaching
this sentence, the court first confirmed with the parties that it
had considered all the relevant materials and arguments. It
then explained its reason for imposing a 70-month sentence
as follows:
[The sentence] reflects the seriousness of the
crime of conviction; it promotes respect for the
law; it provides just punishment for the crime of
conviction; it is sufficient but not greater than
necessary to hold the defendant accountable for

-- 2 of 7 --

No. 25-2379 3
his criminal conduct; it does take into account
the circumstances and the nature of the crime of
conviction and the background, history, and the
personal characteristics of the defendant; it pro-
vides the defendant with correctional treatment
in the most effective manner; it affords adequate
deterrence to this type of criminal conduct; it
protects the public from further crimes of this
type by the defendant; and it avoids unwar-
ranted sentence disparities among defendants.
The court also recommended, at defense counsel’s request,
that Washington be placed in an institution with vocational
training and a prison industries program, and “that the de-
fendant be housed in a facility that can meet his need for car-
diac monitoring and treatment.”
II. Discussion
Washington argues we must remand for resentencing be-
cause the district court did not adequately explain why it im-
posed a 70-month term of imprisonment. See United States v.
Lyons, 733 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A sentencing court
commits procedural error by not adequately explaining its
choice of sentence.”). We review the procedural reasonable-
ness of a sentence—including whether a district court ade-
quately explained a sentence—de novo. United States v. Tyler,
139 F.4th 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2025).1
1 Because we resolve this case based on the adequacy of the district
court’s explanation, we do not reach Washington’s argument that the dis-
trict court’s explanation violated Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).

-- 3 of 7 --

4 No. 25-2379
Congress has provided courts with specific factors to con-
sider when determining an appropriate sentence. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). These include “the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the de-
fendant,” id. § 3553(a)(1); “the need … to reflect the serious-
ness of the offense” and “afford adequate deterrence to crim-
inal conduct,” id. § 3553(a)(2); and “the need to avoid unwar-
ranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” id.
§ 3553(a)(6).
While these factors are the guidepost for determining an
appropriate sentence, a sentencing court is also “required to
provide some explanation for the sentence imposed beyond a
rote and summary invocation of the § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Washington, 739 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 2014). The
district court “must make an individualized assessment based
on the facts presented.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50
(2007). This ensures “meaningful appellate review” and pro-
motes “the perception of fair sentencing.” United States v.
Wilcher, 91 F.4th 864, 871 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.
at 50).
To be sure, the court’s “individualized assessment” need
not be long or “exhaustive.” United States v. Shoffner, 942 F.3d
818, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2019); see Tyler, 139 F.4th at 603 (“We do
not demand artificial thoroughness in sentencing.”). “A short
explanation will suffice where the context and record make
clear the reasoning underlying the district court’s conclu-
sion.” Tyler, 139 F.4th at 603.
There are many ways a district court can provide an “in-
dividualized assessment,” but our caselaw is clear that a bare
recitation of the § 3553(a) factors is not one of them. In United

-- 4 of 7 --

No. 25-2379 5
States v. Washington, for example, we remanded where the
district court justified a sentence by merely stating it had
“considered all the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and noting
the defendant was “involved in a serious crime … in the sense
of what it is doing to so many people in our society, not only
the dealing of the drugs, but also the using of them.” 739 F.3d
at 1081. We held these “terse remarks d[id] not reflect ‘an in-
dividualized assessment based on the facts presented.’” Id. at
1082 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50).
Similarly, in United States v. Shoffner, we remanded for re-
sentencing where the district court stated it had considered
all relevant materials but “provided little explanation as to
how it applied the specific factors in § 3553(a)” or why it re-
jected the defendant’s arguments for leniency. 942 F.3d at 824.
And we have repeatedly cautioned against “rote” and “boil-
erplate” assurances that the court considered the § 3553(a)
factors without additional reasoning indicating “how the dis-
trict court weighed the various sentencing factors, or what
facts supported the exercise of its discretion.” Lyons, 733 F.3d
at 785; see Wilcher, 91 F.4th at 872.
Applying these precedents here, we conclude that the dis-
trict court’s explanation did not contain the individualized as-
sessment we require. The court listed the § 3553(a) factors but
did not explain how it “weighed the various sentencing fac-
tors.” Wilcher, 91 F.4th at 872 (quoting Lyons, 733 F.3d at 785).
And we cannot infer an individualized assessment from a list-
ing of factors alone. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325,
329 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A] talismanic recitation of the § 3553(a)
factors without application to the defendant being sentenced

-- 5 of 7 --

6 No. 25-2379
does not demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking or provide an
adequate basis for appellate review.”).2
We pause to emphasize that the district court was clearly
aware of Washington’s primary mitigation argument—his
health issues—as it recommended he be placed in an institu-
tion that could meet his needs. This recommendation removes
any doubt that the district court carefully considered Wash-
ington’s sensitive health concerns as to where Washington
would serve his sentence. But this does not confirm that the
district court considered Washington’s mitigation argument
in selecting how long his sentence would be. See Lyons, 733 F.3d
at 785 (“[C]ases in which we have remanded because of insuf-
ficient explanation of a sentence have usually involved a fail-
ure by the sentencing judge to respond to a principal, nonfriv-
olous argument in mitigation.”).
Absent a discussion of Washington’s mitigation argu-
ments or an individualized assessment of the § 3553(a) factors
2 The government argues that the district court’s reasoning was suffi-
cient under our opinions in United States v. Tyler and United States v Viz-
carra. But the sentencing explanations in those cases were more individu-
alized than the district court’s decision here. See Tyler, 139 F.4th at 601
(noting that “[t]he court thoroughly reviewed the sentencing factors and
reaffirmed its prior assessment”; “emphasized the profound impact on the
victims, Tyler’s attempt to flee, and his history of criminal behavior”; and
“also noted that Tyler’s post-sentencing conduct was mixed—he was in-
volved in an altercation with another inmate but also attended prison pro-
grams”); United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 528 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting
that the district court emphasized “the seriousness of the offense … as well
as the need for specific and general deterrence,” and “specifically ad-
dressed Vizcarra’s need to continue his education and vocational training,
and also mentioned his treatment needs”).

-- 6 of 7 --

No. 25-2379 7
as to the 70-month term imposed, we are left only with the
district court’s statement that it considered all the relevant
factors. And as we have explained, that is not enough to sur-
vive appellate review. See id. (remanding where the district
court “simply acknowledged that it had considered the
[presentence report], the guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors, and
both sides’ arguments”).
III. Conclusion
We VACATE Washington’s sentence and REMAND for
resentencing.

-- 7 of 7 --