United States of America v. Aijeigh T. McShan

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 9, 2026
Decided June 16, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2712
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AIJEIGH T. MCSHAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:21-CR-30011-DWD-2
David W. Dugan,
Judge.
O R D E R
Aijeigh McShan appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his
supervised release, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). A defendant who
appeals a revocation order does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel,
see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788–90 (1973), so the Anders safeguards need not
govern our review. Even so, our practice is to apply them. See United States v. Durham,
922 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2019). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2712 Page 2
addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because
counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and McShan did not respond to the motion,
see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United
States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
In November 2021, McShan pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit
bank fraud and two counts of aiding and abetting bank fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349,
1344(2). He was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment and 48 months’ supervised
release. While on release, McShan committed multiple violations and his supervision
was revoked. The district court sentenced him to another 12 months’ imprisonment and
48 months’ supervised release.
Six months into McShan’s second term of supervised release, his probation
officer petitioned for revocation, alleging that McShan violated the terms of his release.
At the revocation hearing, McShan admitted to multiple drug offenses and absences
from mandatory treatment programs. The government sought a 24-month prison
sentence—the statutory maximum and well above his 6- to 12-month guidelines range.
McShan’s attorney requested inpatient drug treatment and one year of supervised
release.
The court revoked McShan’s supervised release and imposed an 18-month
prison term to be followed by 12 months of supervision. While justifying its sentence,
the court mentioned videos, which were described in the presentence report for his
underlying conviction, that depicted McShan using drugs and displaying firearms. The
court spoke mostly about McShan’s violations of the conditions of supervised release
and drug addiction, emphasizing the need for deterrence, treatment, and separation
from society.
In his Anders brief, counsel considers whether McShan could raise a nonfrivolous
challenge to the revocation of his supervised release. Generally, the validity of a
revocation based on a defendant’s admitted supervised-release violations “is not a
potential appealable issue that must be discussed in an Anders brief, unless the
defendant wants” to challenge the revocation “after being informed by his lawyer of the
risks of doing so.” United States v. Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010). Counsel
does not say whether such a consultation occurred here. In any event, raising such a
challenge on appeal would be frivolous because the hearing transcript reflects that
McShan knowingly and voluntarily admitted to violating the conditions of his release.
Further, he confirmed that he understood the charges and the possible penalty, he was
represented by counsel at all times, and he was afforded an opportunity to make a

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No. 25-2712 Page 3
statement and present information in mitigation. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 32.1(b)(2); United
States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel next considers whether McShan could challenge the accuracy and
reliability of the videos that the court referenced when sentencing McShan. At
sentencing the court stated, “I’m aware of some videos of where there’s individuals,
you among them, handling firearms. You can’t do that. I’m surprised you weren’t
charged with that.” Sentences must be based on reliable evidence. United States v.
Campbell, 99 F.4th 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2024). We agree with counsel that any challenge to
the information the court considered at sentencing would be frivolous, because the
judge did not err in mentioning undisputed facts from the presentence report. And the
thrust of the court’s ruling was McShan’s second set of violations after receiving a 12-
month sentence (“This is by far the longest violation conduct that I have”) and his
disregard for the conditions of supervised release (“What I gleaned from this violation
conduct, sir, is that you made no real effort”).
Counsel also correctly determines that no plausible challenge could be made to
McShan’s sentence. We review a revocation sentence under a “highly deferential”
standard, overturning it only if “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Childs, 39 F.4th
941, 944–45 (7th Cir. 2022). We agree with counsel that the court adequately considered
the permissible sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court discussed deterring
McShan from criminal conduct, see § 3553(a)(2)(B), protecting the public from his drug
crimes, see § 3553(a)(2)(C), and providing him with mental health treatment,
see § 3553(a)(2)(D). The court also acted within its discretion to impose a 6-month
upward variance, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), because of McShan’s failure to comply with the
conditions of supervised release.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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