United States of America v. Daniel Quiggle

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued May 12, 2026
Decided June 18, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3081
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DANIEL QUIGGLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-CR-00217
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Daniel Quiggle was convicted of attempted production of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e), and sentenced to 332 months’ imprisonment.
Quiggle challenges his sentence on appeal, arguing that the district judge erred by
failing to consider unwarranted sentence disparities, failing to address certain
mitigation arguments, and imposing two invalid conditions of supervised release. For
the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand for the limited purpose of correcting
one supervised release condition and otherwise affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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I
In September of 2019, the FBI opened an investigation into Quiggle based on a
tip that he was uploading child pornography to a social media website. In August of
2020, after Quiggle sent undercover agents numerous child pornography videos, the
FBI executed a search warrant at his residence and seized three electronic devices that
contained over 1,000 videos and images of child pornography, including images and
videos of infants. Quiggle knew that child pornography was wrong, admitting that he
“tried to stop … but [kept] on going back.”
The FBI’s search did not deter Quiggle. Just months later, in February of 2021,
Quiggle used Instagram to share child pornography depicting a nude infant female.
And over the course of four months in early 2021, Quiggle engaged in sexually explicit
conversations with a 15-year-old girl on the phone and multiple social media platforms.
Quiggle knew that the girl was 15 years old and that it was “so wrong that [they]’re
even talking.” But still he did not stop. Quiggle sent her child pornography and
requested that she send him photographs of her breasts and vagina. He also arranged to
meet her in person, although it appears that meeting never occurred.
In April of 2021, the FBI executed an arrest warrant on Quiggle at his home.
Quiggle consented to a search of his cell phone, which contained more child
pornography. In May of 2021, a grand jury indicted Quiggle for one count of attempted
production of child pornography, see 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e); one count of
enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, see 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); one count of
possession of child pornography, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2); and two
counts of transportation of child pornography, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1).
Quiggle pleaded guilty to one count of attempted production of child
pornography. He also stipulated to committing the four other offenses charged in the
indictment for the purposes of calculating his sentence under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. Quiggle’s Guidelines offense level translated to a range of 30 years’ (360
months’) to life imprisonment. But because the statutory maximum sentence for the
count of conviction was 30 years’ imprisonment, the Guidelines range was capped at
the statutory maximum.
In a pre-sentencing written submission, Quiggle argued that he should receive a
below-Guidelines sentence of 15 years (the statutory minimum) for a number of
reasons, including his personal history of sex abuse, his acceptance of responsibility,
and his voluntary request for medical and psychological intervention. As relevant here,

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Quiggle also claimed that he had met with law enforcement regarding a potential
conspiracy to kill government attorneys, although he did not claim that investigation
led to any charges. He further argued that he should receive a below-Guidelines
sentence to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, given that data from the Sentencing
Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing Information (“JSIN”) database indicated that
similarly situated defendants received a median sentence of 240 months.
At the sentencing hearing, both the Government and Quiggle’s counsel
discussed mitigating factors. The Government acknowledged Quiggle’s childhood
history of sex abuse, and Quiggle’s counsel added on, mentioning Quiggle’s acceptance
of responsibility, his newfound faith, and his openness to treatment and rehabilitation.
Quiggle’s counsel did not raise his arguments about unwarranted sentence disparities
or assistance to law enforcement. Quiggle also spoke, discussing his childhood sex
abuse and accepting responsibility for his conduct.
The district judge considered the parties’ statements and the § 3553(a) factors,
and she sentenced Quiggle to 332 months’ imprisonment and 15 years of supervised
release. The district judge addressed Quiggle’s mitigating circumstances, including his
childhood sex abuse, family support, and faith, and found that they only warranted a
slight downward variance from the Guidelines sentence because she had to “protect the
public” and “deter others from doing what you did.” The district judge also ordered
Quiggle to pay $105,000 in restitution to his victims.
II
Quiggle’s first argument on appeal is that the district judge procedurally erred
by failing to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). While Quiggle did not raise this point at the sentencing hearing, the
district judge failed to follow our best practices and “inquire of defense counsel whether
they are satisfied that the court has addressed their main arguments in mitigation.”
United States v. Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2013). We therefore do not find
waiver and instead consider this argument on its merits.
On the merits, though, Quiggle’s argument about unwarranted sentence
disparities is a “pointless exercise” because he received a below-Guidelines sentence.
United States v. Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 541 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). We have
repeatedly held that a “sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range
necessarily complies with § 3553(a)(6).” United States v. Cui, 163 F.4th 1072, 1091 (7th
Cir. 2026) (quoting United States v. Perez, 21 F.4th 490, 491 (7th Cir. 2021)). That is

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because the Sentencing Commission “clearly considered” the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007), so when a district
judge “correctly calculate[s] and carefully review[s] the Guidelines range,” she
“necessarily g[ives] significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities.” Sanchez, 989 F.3d at 540. The district judge correctly
calculated and considered Quiggle’s Guidelines range and then gave him a below-
Guidelines sentence. That alone forecloses his § 3553(a)(6) challenge.
Quiggle nevertheless argues that the district judge did not consider whether his
sentence creates unwarranted disparities because she did not discuss the JSIN data cited
in his pre-sentencing filing. But Quiggle’s argument fails because the district judge was
“not required to consult data, or conduct an empirical analysis, to confirm that a
sentence is in fact consistent with similarly situated defendants.” United States v. Oregon,
58 F.4th 298, 305 (7th Cir. 2023); see id. at 304–05 (considering, and dismissing, JSIN data
cited by the defendant on appeal to support a § 3553(a)(6) argument). Instead, the “best
way to curtail ‘unwarranted’ disparities is to follow the Guidelines, which are designed
to treat similar offenses and offenders similarly.” Id. at 305 (quoting Sanchez, 989 F.3d at
541). That is exactly what happened here. And contrary to Quiggle’s suggestion, the
child pornography Guidelines are not exempt from that rule just because they are
based, in part, on congressional mandates. See, e.g., United States v. Halliday, 672 F.3d
462, 474 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have rejected the argument that district courts are
required to sentence below the Guidelines range in cases involving U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2[.]”).
Next, Quiggle claims that the district judge failed to consider his mitigation
argument relating to his assistance to law enforcement. We see no error. Quiggle only
briefly mentioned his assistance to law enforcement in his sentencing submission, and
not at all at his sentencing hearing. It “is hard to fault the court for not discussing in the
hearing a topic the defendant scarcely mentioned in that hearing.” United States v.
Stephens, 986 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2021). And on the merits, Quiggle’s efforts did not
amount to substantial assistance warranting a motion from the Government under
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a downward departure. Quiggle’s counsel provided no
“meaningful specifics” about his assistance, and even he “refrained from describing”
Quiggle’s efforts as “substantial assistance.” See United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 866
(7th Cir. 2015). In these circumstances, the district judge’s omission of this topic from
her sentencing remarks was not reversible error.
Finally, Quiggle argues that two of his conditions of supervised release are
invalid. He first challenges a credit limitation, which prohibits him from “incur[ring]

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new credit charges or open[ing] additional lines of credit without the approval of a
probation officer” unless he is up to date on his restitution payments. Quiggle claims
that the district judge failed to explain that condition, but that argument is frivolous.
The district judge did explain why she was imposing the credit limitation: to confirm
that Quiggle was “in compliance with [his] restitution” and “up to date in what [he
owes] before [he] go[es] out and get[s] new lines of credit.” Indeed, the Sentencing
Guidelines recommend credit limitations in any case where restitution is imposed, like
this one. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(3)(B); see, e.g., United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 840
(7th Cir. 2016) (finding similar condition “imposes a reasonable restriction on
defendants’ financial affairs while they fulfill their restitution obligations”).
Last but not least, Quiggle challenges Special Condition 13, a supervised release
condition stating that “if the probation officer determines that [Quiggle] pose[s] a risk to
another person (including an organization or members of the community), the
probation officer may require [Quiggle] to tell the person about the risk, and [Quiggle]
must comply with that instruction.” Quiggle argues that the condition is overbroad and
vague, and the Government agrees that its terms require clarification. We also agree.
We have repeatedly vacated “almost identically phrased supervisory release conditions,
concluding that the conditions’ undefined terms” are “impermissibly vague.” United
States v. McKay, 176 F.4th 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2026) (collecting cases); United States v.
Russell, 140 F.4th 430, 438 (7th Cir. 2025) (vacating near-identical condition). And we
require “sentencing courts to define with greater specificity the identities or categories
of individuals and the types of risks to which notification conditions such as this would
apply.” United States v. Canfield, 893 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2018). So too here.
We therefore VACATE Special Condition 13 and REMAND the case for further
proceedings consistent with this order. Quiggle’s sentence is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.

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