American Academy of Pediatrics v. JAMES UTHMEIER, Attorney General of the State of Florida

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 26-2238
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES UTHMEIER, Attorney General of the State of Florida,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No.1:26-cv-02401— Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
____________________
DECIDED JUNE 22, 2026
____________________
Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Cir-
cuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. In December 2025, James Uthmeier, the At-
torney General of the State of Florida, sued the American
Academy of Pediatrics, the World Professional Association
for Transgender Health, and the Endocrine Society in Florida
state court. General Uthmeier alleged and announced pub-
licly that through their policy statements and legal filings sup-
porting access to gender-affirming care, the organizations

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2 No. 26-2238
violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,
Florida’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act, and, later, Florida antitrust law. Three months
later, General Uthmeier had not yet even served the organiza-
tions with process, but the pending case was hanging over
those defendants. The American Academy of Pediatrics
(AAP), an Illinois non-profit, then sued General Uthmeier in
federal court in Illinois. AAP sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It
contends that the Florida enforcement action was brought in
bad faith in violation of the First Amendment to retaliate
against AAP’s advocacy for gender-affirming care.
The district court granted AAP’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, enjoining General Uthmeier from pursuing his
state court action against AAP. General Uthmeier has ap-
pealed and moved for a stay of the preliminary injunction
pending our full and expedited consideration of his appeal of
the preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. App. P. 8.
The issue before us is narrow. We do not decide the merits
of the preliminary injunction. We consider only whether we
should stay the district court’s injunction pending our expe-
dited consideration of the appeal. We deny the requested stay
pending appeal. We recognize that an injunction against a
pending state enforcement action like this raises serious fed-
eralism concerns that are the foundation of Younger absten-
tion. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (reversing injunc-
tion against criminal proceeding brought in good faith). The
Younger abstention doctrine, however, has always included an
exception for proceedings brought in bad faith. Id. at 46–50,
citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (reversing de-
nial of injunction against criminal proceedings brought in bad
faith). In this case, the district court made detailed findings

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No. 26-2238 3
indicating the Florida proceeding has been brought in bad
faith, so that Younger abstention should not apply. The district
court also explained why personal jurisdiction and venue in
Illinois are supported by law.
The district court’s decision finds strong support from de-
cisions by both the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, decisions
with which neither General Uthmeier nor our dissenting col-
league engages. See Defense Distributed v. Grewal, 971 F.3d 485
(5th Cir. 2020) (holding that Texas district court should have
enjoined bad-faith enforcement action brought in New Jersey
by state aĴorney general); Media MaĴers for America v. Paxton,
138 F.4th 563 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (affirming D.C. injunction
against bad-faith investigation by aĴorney general in Texas).
In light of those cases providing legal support for the injunc-
tion here, as well as AAP’s factual showings, General Uth-
meier has not made the required “strong showings” that he is
likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal or that the injunc-
tion will cause him irreparable harm while we consider his
appeal on an expedited basis. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
434 (2009).
I
A
The American Academy of Pediatrics is a non-partisan,
non-profit organization incorporated and headquartered in
Illinois. Founded in 1930, AAP contributes to the develop-
ment of pediatric medicine through conducting research,
providing educational materials, hosting events for medical
professionals, and publishing Pediatrics, a peer-reviewed sci-
entific journal. AAP also files amicus briefs, submits

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4 No. 26-2238
comments in response to agency rulemaking, and issues pol-
icy statements on issues affecting pediatric health.
In 2018, AAP published a policy statement titled “Ensur-
ing Comprehensive Care and Support for Transgender and
Gender-Diverse Children and Adolescents” in the Pediatrics
journal. According to its abstract, the policy statement re-
views concepts and challenges in the field of gender-affirming
care, providing suggestions for pediatric providers that are
“focused on promoting the health and positive development”
of transgender youth. The policy statement contains an im-
portant disclaimer: “The guidance in this statement does not
indicate an exclusive course of treatment or serve as a stand-
ard of medical care. Variations, taking into account individual
circumstances, may be appropriate.”
The policy statement provides an overview of various
forms of gender-affirming care with an overall supportive
tone. It notes that suppression of puberty comes with risks,
noting that some research suggests it may have long-term ef-
fects on bone metabolism and fertility and observing that the
current research is “limited and provides varied results.” The
statement favorably summarizes social affirmation, including
adapting one’s hairstyle, clothing, and pronouns. The state-
ment also describes different types of surgical approaches. It
observes that these changes are irreversible and typically are
reserved for adults, but that surgery is “occasionally pursued
during adolescence on a case-by-case basis.”
AAP’s policy statement concludes with several recom-
mendations, four of which the district court highlighted as
particularly relevant to this case: (1) “that youth who identify
as [transgender] have access to comprehensive, gender-af-
firming, and developmentally appropriate health care that is

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No. 26-2238 5
provided in a safe and inclusive space”; (2) “that insurance
plans offer coverage for health care that is specific to the needs
of youth who identify as [transgender], including coverage
for medical, psychological, and, when indicated, surgical gen-
der-affirming interventions”; (3) “that pediatricians have a
role in advocating for policies and laws that protect youth
who identify as [transgender] from discrimination and vio-
lence”; and (4) “that the medical field and federal government
prioritize research that is dedicated to improving the quality
of evidence-based care for youth who identify as
[transgender].” AAP affirmed this policy statement in 2023.
The statement is freely accessible online.
In early December 2025, General Uthmeier filed a lawsuit
in a state court in Florida against AAP, the World Professional
Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), and the Endo-
crine Society. His initial complaint alleged that AAP and its
co-defendants violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act by making “immoral, unethical, oppres-
sive, and unscrupulous” representations, misleading con-
sumers about the safety and reversibility of “sex intervention”
treatments in order to advertise memberships, goods, and ser-
vices.
The Florida complaint also alleged that the defendants vi-
olated Florida’s RICO Act. The criminal enterprise purport-
edly began when defendant WPATH issued a publication in
1998 that did not specify an age minimum for puberty-block-
ing hormones, allegedly with no credible supporting evi-
dence. Defendant Endocrine Society allegedly joined the
criminal enterprise in 2009 by publishing a guideline adopt-
ing most of WPATH’s recommendations, stating falsely that
puberty blockers were “fully reversible.”

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6 No. 26-2238
General Uthmeier alleged that AAP joined the supposed
criminal enterprise with its 2018 policy statement, described
above, which adopted and cited elements of the WPATH and
Endocrine Society reports. General Uthmeier alleged that the
three organizations furthered their supposed criminal enter-
prise by submiĴing comments opposing a rule proposed by
the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration that
would exclude gender-affirming treatments from Medicaid
coverage. Their later amicus briefs challenging the scientific
basis for the rule, General Uthmeier alleged, were further ev-
idence of their criminal enterprise based on a “formula” of
“co-signing amicus briefs that cite each other’s guidelines.”
General Uthmeier sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
as well as statutory penalties of $1 million against each de-
fendant and an additional $10,000 for each allegedly false rep-
resentation. Important for our analysis of personal jurisdic-
tion and venue, he also asked the Florida state court to grant
additional relief including “imposing reasonable restrictions
upon Defendants’ future activities,” “[o]rdering the dissolu-
tion or reorganization of Defendants’ enterprise,” and
“[o]rdering the forfeiture of Defendants’ charters.”
The day General Uthmeier filed the state complaint, he an-
nounced the enforcement action on X, formerly known as
TwiĴer: “In 2023, @GovRonDeSantis signed legislation to ban
so-called 'gender-affirming care' for kids. Now it's time for ac-
countability! Today, my office sued @wpath,
@AmerAcadPeds, and @TheEndoSociety for mutilating kids
and misleading families.” AAP alleges that two days later,
General Uthmeier was a guest on a podcast where he dis-
cussed the enforcement action and said: “we want to hurt
[AAP and its co-defendants] in their wallet,” “we want them

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No. 26-2238 7
to cough up millions,” and that his lawsuit would “end” gen-
der-affirming care “for once and for all.”
B
Despite the publicity about the filing, General Uthmeier
did not serve AAP and its co-defendants in the state enforce-
ment action for more than three months after filing the com-
plaint. He did so only after AAP filed this lawsuit in the
Northern District of Illinois alleging that General Uthmeier
had filed the state enforcement action to retaliate against AAP
for its advocacy in favor of gender-affirming care and to sup-
press its speech in violation of the First Amendment. AAP
sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally Chiles v. Salazar, 607
U.S. —, 146 S. Ct. 1010 (2026) (First Amendment protects
speech on issues of gender-affirming care and prevents state
from requiring therapists to adopt state’s favored viewpoint).
AAP moved for a preliminary injunction. General Uth-
meier moved to dismiss the federal lawsuit for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction, improper venue, Younger abstention, and
failure to state a claim. On the same day he filed his motion to
dismiss, General Uthmeier filed an amended complaint in the
Florida court. The amended complaint added an antitrust
claim, alleging that the three defendants restrained trade or
commerce by “employing biased standards-seĴing proce-
dures designed to promote their members’ ‘gender-affirming’
model of care.” The amended complaint seeks an additional
$1 million penalty for each alleged antitrust violation.
After holding a hearing and assessing the record, the dis-
trict court denied General Uthmeier’s motion to dismiss,
granted AAP’s motion for a preliminary injunction against

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8 No. 26-2238
General Uthmeier’s pursuing the Florida enforcement action
against AAP pending further proceedings. The court
acknowledged General Uthmeier’s argument that his service
of process on AAP in Illinois was likely insufficient on its own
to establish personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded
that the combination of service in Illinois, the chilling effect
on AAP in Illinois, and General Uthmeier’s stated intent to
halt AAP’s operations in Illinois and nationwide, including
dissolving AAP and forfeiting its charter, was likely sufficient
to establish personal jurisdiction in Illinois. The district court
found that venue, too, was likely proper because the chilling
effect of the enforcement action, as well as AAP’s conduct and
publications giving rise to the state enforcement action, oc-
curred in the Northern District of Illinois.
The district court also found at this preliminary stage that
AAP’s suit appears likely to meet the Younger exception al-
lowing injunctions against bad-faith litigation. Based on the
facts before it, the court found that General Uthmeier ap-
peared to have filed the enforcement action with no reasona-
ble expectation of success. All three state-law claims require
General Uthmeier to prove that AAP’s activities are commer-
cial. AAP is a nonprofit scientific organization that does not
sell or provide gender-affirming care. In addition, the court
found, several other factors supported an inference of bad
faith: General Uthmeier’s delay in prosecuting the enforce-
ment action, the Florida complaint’s inaccurate portrayal of
AAP’s stance on age limits and side effects of gender-affirm-
ing care, and General Uthmeier’s inflammatory public com-
ments.
The district court further found that AAP was likely to suc-
ceed on the merits of its First Amendment retaliation claim.

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No. 26-2238 9
General Uthmeier had offered no arguments to rebut AAP’s
position that its scientific publications about gender-affirming
care were protected by the First Amendment. Also, there was
liĴle doubt that AAP’s protected speech was the impetus for
the Florida enforcement action. The monetary and injunctive
penalties threatened by the suit also appeared to be severe
enough to deter future First Amendment activity. Irreparable
harm is presumed in First Amendment violations. The district
court also credited AAP’s evidence that the enforcement ac-
tion was chilling scientific discourse, undermining security
and aĴendance at AAP’s events, and burdening AAP employ-
ees with threats to their safety.
Consistent with the reasoning in Younger, the court found
that raising a First Amendment defense in state court would
likely not provide an adequate remedy for AAP because the
right it sought to protect was the right not to be subjected to a
bad-faith prosecution in the first place. See Younger, 401 U.S.
at 48–49 (injunction would be justified where “defense of the
State’s criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindica-
tion of constitutional rights,” and “substantial loss of or im-
pairment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants
must await the state court’s disposition and ultimate review
in this Court of any adverse determination”), quoting Dom-
browski, 380 U.S. at 485–86 (reversing denial of injunction
against bad-faith prosecution); Netflix, Inc. v. Babin, 88 F.4th
1080, 1097 n.51 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirming injunction against
state-court prosecution for actions protected by First Amend-
ment because criminal defendant sought to protect federal
right not to be subjected to bad-faith prosecution, and that
right could not be vindicated by undergoing prosecution).

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10 No. 26-2238
General Uthmeier appealed the injunction. He moved for
a stay pending appeal and an immediate administrative stay
as to the district court’s order to file a prompt status report
detailing his compliance with the preliminary injunction. This
court denied the motion for an immediate administrative
stay. General Uthmeier then filed his status report in the dis-
trict court showing that he had notified the Florida state court
of the preliminary injunction. He described the injunction as
“lawless” and “illicit” and told the state court that “[t]he in-
junction does not bind [it] in any way.”
II
When considering whether to stay an injunction pending
appeal, this court applies a standard parallel to the prelimi-
nary injunction standard while keeping in mind “the district
court’s exercise of equitable discretion.” Illinois v. Trump,
155 F.4th 929, 936 (7th Cir. 2025), quoting Camelot Banquet
Rooms, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 14 F.4th 624, 628 (7th Cir.
2021). We take a “fresh look at the legal issues but review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error.” Id. at 936–37.
To justify a stay, the moving party must make a “strong show-
ing that he is likely to succeed on the merits,” and that he will
be “irreparably injured” absent a stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418, 434 (2009). If he makes such a “strong showing,” then this
court considers the balance of harms and the public interest.
The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing it is
justified. Id. at 433–34.
General Uthmeier argues he is likely to succeed on the
merits for three reasons: the district court lacks personal

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No. 26-2238 11
jurisdiction, venue is improper, and Younger v. Harris de-
mands abstention. We address each in turn.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
First, General Uthmeier argues that he is likely to succeed
on the merits because the Illinois district court lacks personal
jurisdiction over him. He argues that the effects of the state
enforcement action felt by AAP in Illinois are not contacts be-
tween himself and Illinois and that the fact that he served pro-
cess on AAP in Illinois does not establish sufficient minimum
contacts with the state.
General Uthmeier has not made the required strong show-
ing that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction. Illinois’s
long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction coextensive
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hou.
Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, General
Uthmeier is subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois if he has
“certain minimum contacts” with Illinois such that this law-
suit “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.’” Id., quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
The simple fact of injury in the forum is not enough by
itself to establish jurisdiction, but it can be sufficient when a
defendant’s intentional conduct in a foreign state is “calcu-
lated to cause injury” to the plaintiff in the forum state. Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984). Under Calder, personal juris-
diction based on the location of a plaintiff’s injury is appro-
priate when a defendant “expressly aims its actions at the
state with the knowledge that they would cause harm to the
plaintiff there.” Mobile Anesthesiologists, 623 F.3d at 445.

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12 No. 26-2238
“Express aiming” requires some “evidence beyond the plain-
tiff’s mere residence in the forum state.” Id. at 447.
General Uthmeier maintains that exercising personal juris-
diction over an out-of-state aĴorney general is unprecedented
overreach. But the Fifth and D.C. Circuits have each affirmed
findings of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state aĴorneys
general in analogous circumstances. General Uthmeier does
not engage with those cases and identifies no contrary author-
ity.
As the district court noted, Defense Distributed v. Grewal,
971 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2020), is particularly instructive. De-
fense Distributed, a Texas company that promotes popular ac-
cess to firearms, produced and made accessible online infor-
mation related to the 3D printing of firearms. Id. at 488. New
Jersey AĴorney General Grewal sent a cease-and-desist leĴer
to Defense Distributed in Texas threatening legal action if it
published its files online, and he brought a civil lawsuit
against Defense Distributed in New Jersey. Defense Distrib-
uted filed suit in federal court in Texas alleging the aĴorney
general’s actions violated the First Amendment. Id. at 489. The
Fifth Circuit determined that the aĴorney general had suffi-
cient minimum contacts with Texas to subject him to the juris-
diction of Texas courts.
Notably, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that General Grewal
purposefully directed conduct at Texas because, rather than
“cabin his request by commanding the plaintiffs to stop pub-
lishing materials to New Jersey residents; he instead demands
that the plaintiffs cease publication of their materials gener-
ally.” Id. at 492. The Fifth Circuit also noted that General
Grewal’s conduct beyond sending the cease-and-desist leĴer
confirmed his intent to “crush Defense Distributed’s

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No. 26-2238 13
operations and not simply limit the dissemination of digital
files in New Jersey,” citing his public comments threatening
to “come after” “anyone who is contemplating making a
printable gun.” Id. Those facts closely track the situation here.
General Uthmeier seeks to block AAP’s speech nationwide
and to dissolve it and cause its operations to cease.
The District of Columbia Circuit found personal jurisdic-
tion in another similar action in Media MaĴers for America v.
Paxton, 138 F.4th 563 (D.C. Cir. 2025), where a district court in
the District of Columbia enjoined the Texas aĴorney general
from pursuing an investigation of a reporter and a nonprofit
media watchdog organization. They had published an article
asserting that the owner of X.com was endorsing an antise-
mitic conspiracy theory on its internet platform. Id. at 571. The
D.C. Circuit rejected the Texas aĴorney general’s aĴack on
personal jurisdiction: “The point is that the censorship-based
effects of the allegedly retaliatory investigation [have] con-
nected [Texas AĴorney General] Paxton to the District [of Co-
lumbia], rather than to just Appellees.” Id. at 578, citing De-
fense Distributed, 971 F.3d at 495–96.
As the circuit courts did in Defense Distributed and Media
MaĴers, the district court here reasonably found that General
Uthmeier’s actions appear calculated to cause injury to AAP
in Illinois. General Uthmeier has asked the Florida state court
to impose “restrictions upon [AAP’s] future activities” and
even to order “the forfeiture of [AAP’s] charter” in Illinois.
Further, his amended state complaint identifies the “relevant
market” of AAP’s allegedly misleading advertisements as
“the treatment of children and adolescents experiencing gen-
der dysphoria in the United States” and notes that AAP and
its co-defendants “have thousands of members across the

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14 No. 26-2238
country and wield considerable power in the Relevant Mar-
ket.” This evidence, beyond AAP’s presence in Illinois, sup-
ports the conclusion that General Uthmeier intends to “crush”
AAP’s operations in Illinois and to chill its speech there rather
than simply to limit the dissemination of AAP policy reports
in Florida. See Defense Distributed, 971 F.3d at 493. General
Uthmeier has not shown a strong likelihood that these find-
ings were clearly erroneous. See Illinois v. Trump, 155 F.4th at
936–37. And he does not otherwise distinguish the authority
of the Fifth and D.C. Circuits in Defense Distributed and Media
MaĴers, let alone show a strong likelihood of success on his
challenge to personal jurisdiction at this preliminary stage.
B. Venue
General Uthmeier next argues that venue is improper be-
cause AAP cannot show a substantial part of the events giving
rise to its First Amendment claim occurred in the Northern
District of Illinois. He has also failed to show a strong likeli-
hood of success on this defense.
For venue to be proper, a “substantial” part of the events
giving rise to the claim needs to occur in the venue, but not all
parts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The location of the plaintiff’s
harm is not irrelevant in the venue analysis. Other circuits
have considered the locus of injury a relevant factor in venue
for tort actions. See, e.g., Myers v. BenneĴ Law Offices, 238 F.3d
1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001).
The fact that the allegedly retaliatory enforcement action
is in a Florida state court is not the only event giving rise to
the First Amendment claim. General Uthmeier served AAP in
the Northern District of Illinois, but even more important, the
intended “ensuing adverse effects” occurred there. See Media

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No. 26-2238 15
MaĴers, 138 F.4th at 583 (venue proper in District of Columbia
to enjoin bad-faith investigation in Texas). Further, the en-
forcement action is based on allegations concerning the devel-
opment and strategy behind AAP’s policy statement and legal
filings, including accusing AAP of publishing policy reports
to mislead consumers about the efficacy of gender-affirming
treatments despite supposedly knowing that its recommen-
dations were not backed by medical evidence. These allega-
tions address discussions, knowledge, and publications based
in the Northern District of Illinois. In sum, then, General Uth-
meier has failed to make a strong showing that venue in Illi-
nois is improper in this case.
C. Younger Abstention
It is a well seĴled principle that federal courts have a “vir-
tually unflagging obligation” to hear and decide cases within
their jurisdiction. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). The Younger abstention
doctrine established an important exception to this principle.
Younger v. Harris 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Under the Younger doc-
trine, federal courts refrain from issuing injunctions that
would keep state courts from hearing state criminal cases, as
well as civil proceedings akin to criminal cases and other civil
cases that implicate a state’s interest in enforcing the orders
and judgments of its courts. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571
U.S. 69, 72–73 (2013).
Younger abstention is grounded in concerns of federalism
and comity. In our federal system of dual sovereigns, federal
courts must respect the balance between state and federal ju-
diciaries. We pay due respect to the legitimate interests that
state governments have in enforcing their law in their own

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16 No. 26-2238
institutions and in allowing their own courts to apply federal
law. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45.
Younger itself recognized, however, that its limits on fed-
eral jurisdiction are not absolute. Younger abstention does not
prevent a federal court from honoring its obligation to hear
and decide cases when the pending state case involves “bad
faith and harassment.” Id. at 49; accord, Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (“Younger, and its civil counter-
part which we apply today, do of course allow intervention in
those cases where the District Court properly finds that the
state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is con-
ducted in bad faith …”).
The Supreme Court did not find bad faith in Younger itself,
but the Court described the exception in terms of its decision
in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); see generally 17A
Moore’s Federal Practice § 122.73[2] (2026) (describing bad-
faith exception and Younger’s reliance on Dombrowski). The
plaintiffs in Dombrowski were civil rights activists in Louisi-
ana. They had been facing prosecution in state court for vio-
lating the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist
Control Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law.
They sued in federal court to challenge the constitutionality
of those statutes and to enjoin state officials from continuing
to prosecute or threatening to prosecute them. 380 U.S. at 481–
82.
A three-judge district court had dismissed the complaint,
concluding that it should abstain from intervening in the state
criminal proceedings. Id. at 482–83. The Supreme Court

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No. 26-2238 17
reversed and held that an injunction was appropriate, with its
precise terms to be determined on remand. Id. at 497–98.
Dombrowski’s logic, as described in Younger, had not devi-
ated from “seĴled doctrines that have always confined very
narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state
criminal prosecutions.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53. Unlike in ear-
lier cases, the Dombrowski plaintiffs made “substantial allega-
tions” and offered to prove several instances of bad faith and
harassment. See id. at 47–48. They had been subject to raids
and had their files and records seized pursuant to warrants
later vacated for lack of probable cause. Id. at 48. Further, de-
spite a state judge “quashing the warrants and suppressing
the evidence seized,” the prosecutor threatened to continue
prosecution and held “public hearings” where “copies of the
illegally seized documents were being used.” Id.1
The bad-faith exception in Younger provides a critical
safety valve for protecting federal rights while also respecting
states and their courts. We have explained that “[t]he harm
posed by bad faith prosecution is both immediate and great.”
Collins v. Kendall County, 807 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1986). When
state officials bring suits in bad faith or to harass, comity con-
cerns are at their weakest. A state “does not have any legiti-
mate interest in pursuing a bad faith prosecution brought to
retaliate for or to deter the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights. Perhaps the most important comity rationale
1 Younger was careful to note that Dombrowski did not imply that “the
federal courts may give equitable relief, without regard to any showing of
bad faith or harassment, whenever a state statute is found … in violation
of the First Amendment.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 50. A “chilling effect” on
First Amendment–protected speech is not enough on its own to justify en-
joining a state proceeding. See id. at 51–52.

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18 No. 26-2238
of Younger deference—that of respect for the State’s legitimate
pursuit of its substantive interests…—is therefore inapplica-
ble.” Id. at 98 n.5, quoting Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375,
1382–83 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing denial of injunction; plain-
tiffs showed bad faith, so Younger abstention did not apply);
accord, e.g., Netflix, Inc., 88 F.4th at 1091 (“While states cer-
tainly have a legitimate interest in the enforcement of their
criminal laws, they have no such interest when the enforce-
ment of those laws is carried out in bad faith. … Comity …
gives way once good faith does.”).
Federal courts do not apply the bad-faith exception to
Younger lightly, or often. A plaintiff must allege and ulti-
mately prove specific facts to support an inference of bad
faith. See Collins, 807 F.2d at 98. But the exception is a critical
feature of the federalism balance struck in Younger doctrine.
The Supreme Court has framed the exception in both sub-
jective and objective terms. In Perez v. Ledesma, the Court
noted that the bad-faith exception is implicated when harass-
ment or prosecution is undertaken “without hope of obtain-
ing a valid conviction.” 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971). Several years
later, in Kugler v. Helfant, the Court defined the exception in
more objective terms, explaining that bad faith requires that
state officials undertook a prosecution “without a reasonable
expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.” 421 U.S. 117, 126
n.6 (1975), citing Perez, 401 U.S. at 85. This court has described
bad faith as the use of prosecutions “as instrumentalities for
the suppression of speech” or prosecutions brought “with no
expectation of convictions.” Collins, 807 F.2d at 101, quoting

-- 18 of 36 --

No. 26-2238 19
first Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699, 706 (5th Cir. 1969), then
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 621 (1968).
The district court in this case discussed factors relevant to
both subjective and objective bad faith on the part of General
Uthmeier. Based on extensive factual findings, the court con-
cluded that together the facts at this preliminary injunction
stage of the case support an inference of bad faith. See Collins,
807 F.2d at 98.
General Uthmeier argues in his motion to stay, as he did
in the district court, that the bad-faith exception applies only
in circumstances of repeated prosecutions. He has not identi-
fied any substantial authority imposing such a multiple-pros-
ecution requirement. Younger itself did not impose such a re-
quirement. The Court wrote that the exception did not apply
in Younger because the plaintiff did not suggest the prosecu-
tion was “brought in bad faith or [was] only one of a series of
repeated prosecutions.” 401 U.S. at 49 (emphasis added); see
also Fiĵgerald v. Peek, 636 F.2d 943, 944 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he
threat of multiple or repeated prosecutions is not necessary to
establish bad faith prosecution.”); Wilson, 593 F.2d at 1381
(“Nearly every Supreme Court case addressing the bad faith
exception has described it in terms which indicate that it is not
limited to situations of repeated or multiple prosecutions.”).
General Uthmeier also argues that the district court was
wrong to consider the merits of the Florida enforcement ac-
tion’s claims in its bad-faith analysis. He asserts that, regard-
less, he has a reasonable expectation of obtaining a judgment
on his claims under the FDUTPA, Florida RICO Act, and Flor-
ida antitrust laws. We disagree.

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20 No. 26-2238
The objective framing of the bad-faith inquiry in Kugler at
least invites and probably requires some consideration of the
likelihood of success on the underlying state claims. See 421
U.S. at 126 n.6. Even a purely subjective test would invite con-
sideration of the merits as circumstantial evidence of the state
actor’s good or bad faith. Consideration of the merits features
prominently in many cases addressing the exception. E.g.,
Netflix, Inc., 88 F.4th at 1094–95 (affirming preliminary injunc-
tion against state prosecution, and concluding that bad-faith
exception applied in part because “presumably,” as to the
merits, “there are none”); Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
970 F.2d 82, 83–84, 88 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming preliminary
injunction; bad-faith exception applied, in part because city
seized video and computer equipment even though all offi-
cials “were fully aware” of recent court decision narrowing
relevant statute’s construction); see also Collins, 807 F.2d at
101 (holding that district court did not err in applying Younger
abstention when defendants had “successfully prosecuted the
plaintiffs on three obscenity charges”). But see Fiĵgerald, 636
F.2d at 945 (a prosecution “brought for the purposes of har-
assment and retaliation … will justify an injunction regardless
of whether valid convictions conceivably could be obtained”).
At this preliminary stage, the merits of the Florida claims
against AAP appear weak. The district court found that Gen-
eral Uthmeier’s theory—that AAP’s policy statements were
commercial in nature, a prerequisite for all three state
claims—lacked any merit because AAP is a nonprofit that
does not sell or provide any gender-affirming care, and be-
cause its policy statement resembled “scientific and medical
advocacy, not a money-making scheme.”

-- 20 of 36 --

No. 26-2238 21
General Uthmeier now counters that the state claims are
meritorious because, despite its nonprofit status, AAP is a
“standards-seĴing” association that derives benefits from its
standards, including influence and memberships. In doing so,
he relies on Wilk v. American Medical Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 357–
58 (7th Cir. 1990), where this court explained that the AMA’s
“standards-seĴing” speech implicated antitrust laws based
on its labeling of chiropractors as an “unscientific cult” and
instruction to its members that it was unethical for medical
practitioners to associate with chiropractors. Id. at 356. This
speech prevented physicians from referring patients to chiro-
practors and therefore imposed higher costs on chiropractors
by forcing them to pay for their own x-ray equipment and
preventing medical physicians from teaching chiropractors.
Id. at 360. AAP’s policy statement in Pediatrics, surveying the
field of gender-affirming care, and its comments and amicus
briefs opposing regulation of gender-affirming care, do not
appear to have a similar boycoĴing effect that implicates an-
titrust principles. At the very least, General Uthmeier has not
made a strong showing that the district court erred in its as-
sessment, which is what would be required to obtain a stay
pending appeal.
General Uthmeier asserts that AAP’s statements are
“false.” He argues they were published in the conduct of
“trade or commerce” because AAP intends to induce pur-
chase of puberty blockers, surgeries, and “social transition-
ing” services from its members. This argument does not re-
fute the district court’s findings that the AAP does not sell
gender-affirming care and that its policy statements appear to
discuss scientific research and advocacy debate, “not a
money-making scheme.” Accord, Endocrine Soc’y v. Federal
Trade Comm’n, No. 26-512, 2026 WL 1257289 (D.D.C. May 7,

-- 21 of 36 --

22 No. 26-2238
2026) (granting preliminary injunction against FTC’s civil in-
vestigative demands on First Amendment grounds; “clinical
guidance, education, and policy advocacy clearly fall on the
‘ideas’ rather than ‘products’ side of the line”); accord, Chiles
v. Salazar, 607 U.S. —, 146 S. Ct. 1010, 1029 (2026) (state may
not censor speech on gender-affirming care based on view-
point). Moreover, the alleged intended commercial induce-
ment of gender-affirming care would not even materialize in
the state of Florida. Since May 2023, it has been a crime to pro-
vide gender-affirming care to minors in Florida.
The district court found that other facts also contributed to
the finding of bad faith at this preliminary stage. The court
observed that General Uthmeier’s complaint in state court
made misleading allegations, including that AAP knew scien-
tific evidence did not support lowering age minimums for
gender-affirming surgery yet deliberately provided no age
minimum in its policy statement. On the contrary, the district
court found, the evidence instead showed that AAP had not
omiĴed a specific age minimum to encourage surgery for mi-
nors. AAP had instead tried to avoid broadly approving of sur-
geries for minors. AAP had noted that surgery is generally ac-
ceptable only for adults and should be available to minors
only on a case-by-case basis.
The district court found that General Uthmeier’s three-
month delay in pursuing the state enforcement action, despite
his public statements about the lawsuit in the interim, also
contributed to a finding of bad faith. So, too, did General Uth-
meier’s public comments opposing gender-affirming care and
vowing to hold AAP accountable for “mutilating children.”
The district court acted within its discretion in drawing “un-
favorable inference[s]” based on this conduct, and we see no

-- 22 of 36 --

No. 26-2238 23
clear error in its factual findings. See Netflix, Inc., 88 F.4th at
1092 (relying on similar delay to support application of bad-
faith exception to Younger).
The bad-faith exception to Younger is difficult to establish,
but as noted, it provides an important safety valve for protect-
ing federal rights. Other circuits have applied it in circum-
stances comparable to this case. See, e.g., Netflix, Inc., 88 F.4th
1080, 1095–96; Nobby Lobby, 970 F.2d 82, 88; Lewellen v. Raff,
843 F.2d 1103, 1112–13 (8th Cir. 1988); Krahm v. Graham, 461
F.2d 703, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1972); Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524,
529 (11th Cir. 1982).
The federalism and comity foundations of Younger call for
restraint, not a wholesale prohibition on federal protection of
federal rights. See 401 U.S. at 44 (“The concept [of federalism]
does not mean blind deference to ‘States’ Rights’ any more
than it means centralization of control over every important
issue in our National Government and its courts. … What the
concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity
to the legitimate interests of both State and National Govern-
ments.”). Federal courts are permiĴed and even required to
intervene when a state official wields state power out of bad
faith or a desire to harass—when federalism and comity con-
cerns are at their low ebb. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 48–49, quot-
ing Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 485–86; Collins, 807 F.2d at 101 (ac-
knowledging that bad-faith exception could have applied if
there had been evidence of a “concerted publicity campaign
aimed at puĴing the plaintiffs out of business for exercising
their first amendment rights”).
Based on the available record at this preliminary stage of
this case, the district court did not clearly err in finding that
AAP has presented a rare case of a state official acting in bad

-- 23 of 36 --

24 No. 26-2238
faith to use his powers to silence protected speech. General
Uthmeier has not made a strong showing that the district
court erred in applying the bad-faith exception to Younger.
D. Equitable Factors
To justify a stay of the preliminary injunction pending ap-
peal, General Uthmeier would also need to show that he
would face irreparable harm while this appeal is pending. He
has not met this burden. He asserts: “Any time a State is en-
joined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by repre-
sentatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury,”
quoting Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J., in chambers). We do not disagree with the general point,
but it is not enough to carry the day here, given both the facts
of General Uthmeier’s Florida action and the evidence of
more concrete harm to AAP’s First Amendment rights.
First, assuming the purpose of the Florida enforcement ac-
tion is to prevent AAP from advertising the provision of gen-
der-affirming care to Florida pediatricians and families, it will
have no immediate effect in Florida. Florida law has made it
a crime to provide gender-affirming care to minors since May
2023. General Uthmeier asserts an interest in holding AAP ac-
countable for earlier alleged violations of the FDUTPA, Flor-
ida antitrust law, and the Florida RICO Act, before passage of
the criminal ban. We do no irreparable harm to that retrospec-
tive interest by leaving the preliminary injunction in place
while we consider this appeal on an expedited basis.
General Uthmeier’s own delay in prosecuting the state en-
forcement action further undercuts any argument that he
would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. He did not serve
AAP and its co-defendants in the state enforcement action

-- 24 of 36 --

No. 26-2238 25
until after AAP filed this federal lawsuit, about three months
after he filed his complaint and publicly announced the state
enforcement action. He points out that such a delay was per-
missible under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. We as-
sume that’s correct, but the months’-long delay shows a lack
of urgency that is inconsistent with the current claim of irrep-
arable harm. That reasoning applies generally when a party
seeks emergency injunctive relief. See Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group,
Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 903 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that a “delay in
pursuing” an action “may raise questions regarding the plain-
tiff’s claim that he or she will face irreparable harm.”)
Because General Uthmeier has not made a strong showing
of either a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits or
irreparable harm, we touch only briefly on the balance of eq-
uities and public interest. At this stage, the balance of harms
favors AAP. The harm General Uthmeier may experience
from a delay in pursuing the state enforcement action does
not outweigh the First Amendment harm to AAP if the alleg-
edly unconstitutional enforcement action is allowed to pro-
ceed while we consider this appeal. AAP has, at this prelimi-
nary stage, made a convincing showing that Uthmeier’s en-
forcement action is retaliation for exercise of its First Amend-
ment rights. See Chiles, 607 U.S. at —, 146 S. Ct. at 1024–25
(First Amendment does not permit state to ban free expres-
sion, including on subjects of sexual orientation and gender
identity, under guise of regulating medicine). AAP has a
strong interest in not being subjected to retaliatory enforce-
ment actions from state officials who disagree with its re-
search and advocacy. The public interest—the interests of
those not before the court—also does not require a stay pend-
ing this appeal. We see no harm to third parties from staying

-- 25 of 36 --

26 No. 26-2238
Florida’s prosecution of its case against AAP in Florida while
we consider this appeal.
III
We emphasize that our conclusions are preliminary and
based on our review of the record before the district court.
Our conclusions on these issues may differ after full briefing
and argument. But at this stage, General Uthmeier has not
made the required “strong showing” of likelihood of success
on the merits and irreparable harm. See Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). We therefore DENY the motion for a
stay pending appeal. An expedited briefing schedule will is-
sue separately.

-- 26 of 36 --

No. 26-2238 27
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Today’s decision in-
flicts a grievous blow to federalism. The Younger abstention
doctrine generally requires federal courts to refrain from ex-
ercising jurisdiction when doing so would interfere with a
state court proceeding. But the majority today invokes a nar-
row exception—not applied by the Supreme Court since
1965—to permit a federal court in Illinois to enjoin the Florida
Attorney General from enforcing Florida law in a Florida state
court. The decision licenses federal intrusion and casts a vote
of no confidence in the Florida judiciary. In my respectful
view, we should grant the motion to stay the injunction pend-
ing appeal.
I
A
This story begins in state court. In December 2025, Florida
Attorney General James Uthmeier sued the American Acad-
emy of Pediatrics and two other medical organizations in a
Florida circuit court, alleging that they “initiated a coordi-
nated campaign to develop ‘clinical guidelines’ recommend-
ing sex intervention for pediatric gender dysphoria” to “con-
vince patients, insurance companies, regulators, and judges”
that there is “credible evidence that sex interventions alleviate
pediatric gender dysphoria.” According to Uthmeier, gender-
affirming “drugs and surgeries are extremely profitable for
[the defendants] and their members.” The Academy pub-
lished its relevant guidelines in 2018, stating among other
things that certain puberty blockers have been used since the
1980s and are “reversible.” This seemed to contradict the Flor-
ida Department of Health’s later guidance that puberty block-
ers may cause “long-term, irreversible effects.”

-- 27 of 36 --

28 No. 26-2238
Uthmeier claimed that the Academy and its co-defendants
violated Florida law in two ways. First, he claimed that they
engaged in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the con-
duct of any trade or commerce,” in violation of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. See Fla. Stat.
§ 501.204(1); see also PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842
So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003) (suggesting that “deception occurs
if there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely
to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circum-
stances, to the consumer’s detriment” (cleaned up)). Second,
he claimed that the defendants participated in an “enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity,” or at least con-
spired to do so, in violation of the Florida RICO Act. See Fla.
Stat. § 895.03(3)–(4). In his view, their allegedly misleading
advertisements constituted racketeering activity. See id.
§ 895.02(8)(a)(36) (defining “[r]acketeering activity” to in-
clude crimes listed in Chapter 817 of the Florida Statutes); id.
§ 817.41(1) (prohibiting misleading advertisements).
B
The Academy turned to federal court for relief. On March
4, 2026, it sued Uthmeier in the Northern District of Illinois,
alleging that he brought the state court case to retaliate
against its protected speech, in violation of the First Amend-
ment. It also moved for a preliminary injunction, asking the
district court to order Uthmeier to stop pursuing his enforce-
ment action in Florida.
As the federal court considered the motion, the state court
proceedings continued. On March 16, 2026, Uthmeier
amended his complaint in Florida to add a third claim. Build-
ing on his initial complaint, he alleged that the Academy and
its co-defendants “contracted, combined, and conspired in

-- 28 of 36 --

No. 26-2238 29
restraint of trade or commerce,” in violation of the Florida An-
titrust Act. See Fla. Stat. § 542.18. More specifically, he
claimed that their guidelines were “the result of panel stack-
ing, failure to manage conflicts of interest, and other proce-
dural biases designed to promote the sex interventions of-
fered by [the defendants’] members and to ignore evidence
supporting” contrary views.
In May 2026, the Academy moved to dismiss the amended
state court complaint, raising the same First Amendment re-
taliation defense. That motion remains pending before the
Florida court.
A month later, in June 2026, the district court in Illinois
granted the Academy’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
It issued an order preventing Uthmeier “from pursuing [his]
Enforcement Action against” the Academy and “from taking
further unlawful action interfering with or retaliating against
[the Academy’s] exercise of its First Amendment rights, such
as pursuing a substantially similar enforcement action in vio-
lation of [the Academy’s] First Amendment rights.”
Uthmeier now asks us to stay the preliminary injunction
pending appeal.
II
A
“In deciding whether to stay an injunction pending ap-
peal, we apply a standard that parallels the preliminary in-
junction standard but also keeps in mind the district court’s
exercise of equitable discretion.” Illinois v. Trump, 155 F.4th
929, 936 (7th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). “Thus, a party seeking a
stay must show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, and
(2) a threat of irreparable harm absent a stay.” Id. “If the

-- 29 of 36 --

30 No. 26-2238
moving party makes such a showing, this court must consider
(3) the balance of harms, primarily in terms of the balance of
risks of irreparable harm in case of a judicial error, as well as
(4) the public interest.” Id. (cleaned up) (citing Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)).
B
Attorney General Uthmeier is likely to succeed on appeal
because of insurmountable jurisdictional barriers. He con-
tends that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction, that
venue was improper, and that the district court should have
abstained from exercising its jurisdiction under Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The first two issues present substan-
tial questions worthy of further consideration. But the
Younger issue is open and shut in his favor. Cf. Sinochem Int’l
Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431, 436 (2007)
(identifying Younger abstention as one of several “threshold
grounds” warranting dismissal even before a district court
determines it has “subject-matter or personal jurisdiction”).
Younger abstention roots itself “in the traditional princi-
ples of equity, comity, and federalism.” SKS & Assocs. v. Dart,
619 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2010). The doctrine “ordinarily re-
quires federal courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction
over federal constitutional claims that seek to interfere with
or interrupt ongoing state proceedings.” Courthouse News
Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1071 (7th Cir. 2018). It is “de-
signed to allow the State an opportunity to ‘set its own house
in order’ when the federal issue is already before a state tri-
bunal.” Ohio Bureau of Emp. Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479–
80 (1977). The Supreme Court has described the doctrine as
giving effect to the principle of “Our Federalism” at the

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No. 26-2238 31
cornerstone of our constitutional structure. Younger, 401 U.S.
at 44.
But Younger abstention is not absolute. The Supreme
Court has recognized a “narrow” exception when “the state
proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted
in bad faith.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975);
see also Younger, 401 U.S. at 49–50 (similar). “‘[B]ad faith’ in
this context generally means that a prosecution has been
brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid
conviction.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975).
Indeed, the bad-faith exception is so narrow that “[t]here
is no case since Younger was decided in which the [Supreme]
Court has” applied it. 17B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4255 (3d ed. 2026).
Younger itself described the exception by reference to Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), where federal plaintiffs
claimed that police raided their offices and seized their files
pursuant to warrants “that were later summarily vacated by
a state judge for lack of probable cause,” only for state officials
to continue threatening prosecution despite “the state court
order quashing the warrants and suppressing the evidence
seized.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 48. Dombrowski “held that an in-
junction against the enforcement of certain state criminal stat-
utes could properly issue under the circumstances presented
in that case.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 47.
Today’s majority opinion incorrectly extends the bad-faith
exception to the Academy’s lawsuit. Like the district court,
the majority concludes that Attorney General Uthmeier can-
not reasonably expect to prevail in a Florida court because his
state law claims are very weak on the merits. But very weak
claims are not uncommon. Younger’s exception requires much

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32 No. 26-2238
more: the Attorney General’s claims must be “so facially mer-
itless as to connote bad faith.” Yelp Inc. v. Paxton, 137 F.4th
944, 953 (9th Cir. 2025); see also Netflix, Inc. v. Babin, 88 F.4th
1080, 1095 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]here was never any remote
chance of Babin obtaining a valid child-pornography convic-
tion against Netflix for a scene involving an adult.”).
Uthmeier’s claims are not so plainly lacking merit that we
should infer bad faith. According to the majority, all three
claims require proving that the Academy’s 2018 guidelines
are somehow commercial in nature, which it sees as a tall or-
der given the Academy is a nonprofit. But the Florida Decep-
tive and Unfair Trade Practices Act expressly applies to non-
profits. See Fla. Stat. § 501.203(8) (“‘Trade or commerce’ shall
include the conduct of any trade or commerce, however de-
nominated, including any nonprofit or not-for-profit person
or activity.”). The Florida Antitrust Act likewise seems to ap-
ply to nonprofits. See id. § 542.16 (instructing that Florida Stat-
ute § 542.18 should “be liberally construed” to “complement
the body of federal law prohibiting restraints of trade or com-
merce in order to foster effective competition”); Am. Soc’y of
Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982)
(“[I]t is beyond debate that nonprofit organizations can be
held liable under the antitrust laws.”).
As the district court recounted, Uthmeier provides two
theories for why the 2018 guidelines may be commercial. He
first contends that the Academy issued the guidelines to make
more people want to join its organization, thereby increasing
its income from membership dues. He also alleges that the
Academy published the guidelines recommending gender-af-
firming care so that its members who provide that type of
care, including the authors of the guidelines, could make

-- 32 of 36 --

No. 26-2238 33
more money because of increased demand. Cf. Am. Soc’y of
Mech. Eng’rs, 456 U.S. at 573–74 (“ASME contends that it
should not be held liable unless its agents act with an intent
to benefit the Society …. [But] whether they act in part to ben-
efit ASME or solely to benefit themselves or their employers,
ASME’s agents can have the same anticompetitive effects on
the marketplace.”).
The majority views these theories as so implausible and
beyond the pale that they must reflect bad faith on the part of
the Florida Attorney General. The district court thought the
same thing, reaching that conclusion without a single citation
to Florida case law. But these are just the sort of allegations
routinely evaluated in ordinary motion-to-dismiss practice or
ultimately proved through discovery.
The majority also points to Uthmeier’s litigation conduct
as evidence of bad faith. It highlights that he waited three
months to serve process. The district court also observed that
he amended his complaint to add the state antitrust claim
only after the Academy filed its federal lawsuit. No doubt “a
burst of prosecutorial alacrity” after a state defendant asserts
its First Amendment rights may cut in favor of finding bad
faith. Netflix, Inc., 88 F.4th at 1092. But that is not enough on
its own, especially where, as here, the state official’s behavior
falls within the bounds of the state’s procedural rules.
The majority additionally highlights Uthmeier’s incendi-
ary public statements. With respect to gender-affirming care,
for example, he promised to “aggressively fight this radical
ideology anytime it threatens women, kids, and our Florida
way of life.” And when he announced his enforcement action,
he accused the Academy of “mutilating kids and misleading
families.” The majority blesses the district court’s finding that

-- 33 of 36 --

34 No. 26-2238
these statements reveal that Uthmeier’s personal convictions
drove his enforcement action. But that does not mean that he
sued the Academy “without a reasonable expectation of ob-
taining” a favorable judgment. Kugler, 421 U.S. at 126 n.6. The
Florida Constitution establishes the Florida Attorney General
as the state’s chief legal officer. See Fla. Const. art. IV, § 4(b);
see also Fla. Stat. § 16.01 (outlining the duties of the office). A
federal court finding he has enforced Florida law in bad faith
is very serious constitutional business.
Finally, the majority suggests that we must engage with
Defense Distributed v. Grewal, 971 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2020), and
Media Matters for America v. Paxton, 138 F.4th 563 (D.C. Cir.
2025). But those cases do not purport to apply Younger’s bad-
faith exception. Indeed, neither decision even mentions
Younger. Perhaps that is why the majority similarly says noth-
ing about these two decisions in the Younger portion of its
own opinion.
C
The remaining stay factors favor Uthmeier as well. “Any
time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes
enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of
irreparable injury.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303
(2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (cleaned up). The balance
of harms and the public interest tell the same story. If we stay
the district court’s injunction, the Academy will still be able
to vindicate its First Amendment rights in Florida court. But
if we decline to stay the injunction, the Attorney General will
be unable to pursue his state law claims against the Academy
in Florida state court all because a federal court in Illinois
found the merits of his claims unpersuasive, threatening en-
trenched principles of federalism and comity.

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No. 26-2238 35
III
“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.” Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17 (1999). “It was the genius of their idea
that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state
and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”
Id. Younger gives effect to this principle. But today’s decision
expands an eye-of-the-needle doctrinal exception into a broad
license for federal court intrusion into matters pending—and
belonging—in state court. The Florida courts are fully capable
of ruling on the Academy’s pending motion to dismiss and
swiftly resolving the Attorney General’s claims.
Make no mistake about the legal magnitude of what is at
stake here. A federal court in Illinois has enjoined a state’s
chief legal officer from proceeding in state court, all because
it doubts the merits of his state law claims. The implications
are grave. It is hard to see why future state defendants will
not turn to federal court whenever they think a state com-
plaint warrants dismissal and a public comment suggests
“bad faith.” This decision expands the narrowest of excep-
tions into a gap in “Our Federalism” that invites abuse.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. We are a long way from the quashed
warrants and threats of repeated prosecutions in Dom-
browski—the one and only time the Supreme Court has ever
found bad faith. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction
§ 13.5 (7th ed. 2016) (explaining that “commentators have ob-
served that the universe of bad-faith harassment claims that
can be established is virtually empty” and concluding that
“the bad-faith prosecutions exception appears limited to facts
such as those present in Dombrowski” (cleaned up)).
To be sure, maybe the Florida Attorney General’s enforce-
ment action lacks merit. Perhaps it even violates the First

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36 No. 26-2238
Amendment. But those decisions belong to the Florida courts.
Even if the Academy is right, that would not permit a federal
court to enjoin the Florida state court proceeding. See Yelp
Inc., 137 F.4th at 954 (unanimous opinion by Bress, J.)
(“Simply because a state court defendant may advance a re-
taliation-based defense to a state court lawsuit does not mean
it has established bad faith sufficient for a federal court to en-
join a state court action.”). The Academy has raised its First
Amendment defense in state court. And “[m]inimal respect
for the state processes … precludes any presumption that the
state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.”
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (cleaned up). We have no basis whatso-
ever to doubt that the Academy would get a fair hearing in
the Florida courts.
I respectfully dissent.

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