United States of America v. Dwight Hasberry

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 23, 2026
Decided June 24, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2287
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DWIGHT HASBERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-CR-00135(2)
Manish S. Shah,
Judge.
O R D E R
Dwight Hasberry pleaded guilty to carjacking, see 18 U.S.C. § 2119, armed
robbery, see id. § 1951(a), and brandishing a firearm during a violent crime, see id.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). The district court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. Hasberry
appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the
nature of the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to
involve. Because the analysis appears thorough, and Hasberry has not responded to
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2287 Page 2
counsel’s motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
raises. United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and
dismiss the appeal.
Hasberry entered a written plea agreement in which he admitted to the following
facts. Hasberry and two co-conspirators pointed guns at a driver in his parked car while
the driver’s infant child was in the backseat. One of the co-conspirators patted down the
driver and removed a firearm from his pocket. After the driver took his child from the
backseat, Hasberry and the two co-conspirators got into the car, which they drove
away. Hasberry and the two co-conspirators proceeded to a convenience store and
robbed it at gunpoint. One co-conspirator pointed a gun at the cashier, demanded that
he open the cash registers, forced the cashier into a back room, took his wallet, and then
used a gun to hit the cashier on the head. The co-conspirators all took cash from the
registers, as well as cigarettes and bottles of liquor from the store shelves, and fled in
the stolen car. Soon thereafter, they were apprehended by police. The cashier who was
struck in the head bled profusely and suffered a concussion requiring treatment at a
hospital.
After Hasberry entered his plea agreement, the probation office prepared a
presentence investigation report. For the carjacking count, the PSR calculated a total
offense level of 30, given Hasberry’s base offense level of 20, see U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a); a
six-level increase for using a firearm during the offense, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B); a two-
level increase for carjacking, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(5); a one-level increase for taking a
firearm, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(6); and a one-level increase for stealing property (namely, the
stolen car) worth more than $20,000, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(B). For the count that arose
from the armed robbery of the convenience store, the PSR calculated a total offense level
of 27, given the base offense level of 20, see id. § 2B3.1(a); a five-level increase for causing
an injury the degree of which was between serious bodily injury and permanent or
life-threatening bodily injury, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(E); and a two-level increase for
restraining the victim, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
Under the multiple-count adjustment of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, Hasberry’s combined
offense level was determined by taking the highest adjusted offense level (30, for the
carjacking count) and increasing that offense level by two levels (the applicable number
of units—one for the carjacking count, and one for the armed robbery count). The PSR
then subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1(a)–(b),
reaching a total offense level of 29. Given his criminal history category of III, Hasberry’s
guidelines range was calculated at 108 to 135 months for the carjacking and armed

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robbery counts, see id. § 5A, which combined with the mandatory 84-month term for the
firearm count, see id. § 2K2.4(b); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), to yield a total guidelines
range of 192 to 219 months.
Hasberry objected to the recommended five-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(E) for injury to the cashier who was struck in the head, which the
PSR categorized as being between “serious” and “permanent or life-threatening.” He
argued that the cashier’s injury, while serious, was not sufficiently severe or life-
threatening. The court agreed with Hasberry that the four-level enhancement for
serious bodily injury under § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B) was more apt under the circumstances,
adding that the adjustment did not affect the guidelines calculation.
Subject to this adjustment, the district court adopted the PSR’s factual findings
and proposed guidelines range. The government argued for a sentence within the
guidelines range, and Hasberry sought a below-guidelines 144-month sentence. The
court then weighed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced him
to 180 months, to be followed by three years’ supervised release. Acknowledging that
the parties needed further time to discuss and submit recommendations for the
appropriate amount of restitution, the court deferred entry of a restitution order.
Counsel informs us that Hasberry does not wish to challenge his guilty plea, so
he properly refrains from discussing the voluntariness of the plea. See United States v.
Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671
(7th Cir. 2002).
As for the district court’s calculations of Hasberry’s guidelines range, counsel
first considers whether Hasberry could plausibly challenge the district court’s
determination that the counts for the carjacking and the armed robbery of the
convenience store should not be grouped. But counsel correctly rejects this challenge as
frivolous because the robbery and carjacking counts involved different victims,
see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a)–(b); none of the conduct in either count was the basis for a
specific offense characteristic in the other count, see id. § 3D1.2(c); and § 3D1.2(d)
specifically excludes grouping offenses like robbery that are sentenced under
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. Relatedly, counsel rightly rejects as frivolous any argument that the
district court erred by imposing a two-level multiple-count adjustment under § 3D1.4.
The PSR properly assigned one unit for the carjacking count (the highest offense level)
and one unit for the armed robbery count (four levels less serious than the carjacking
count), see id. § 3D1.4(a), resulting in a two-level increase in the combined offense level,
see id.

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No. 25-2287 Page 4
Counsel next considers whether Hasberry could plausibly challenge three of the
enhancements applied for special offense characteristics and rightly rejects these
challenges as frivolous. First, counsel considers challenging the six-level enhancement
for use of a firearm during the carjacking. See id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B). But as counsel notes,
when a court imposes a sentence under § 924(c) “in conjunction with a sentence for an
underlying offense,” the court should not apply an enhancement for brandishing a
firearm to the underlying offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. n.4(A). The underlying
offense here for the count under § 924(c) is the armed-robbery charge, not the carjacking
charge, so we agree with counsel that any challenge to this enhancement would be
frivolous.
Second, counsel considers challenging the four-level enhancement that Hasberry
received for serious bodily injury on the armed robbery count. See id. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B).
But as counsel points out, Hasberry waived any argument about the four-level
enhancement for serious bodily injury when he objected to the PSR’s proposed five-
level enhancement, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(E), and explicitly sought the four-level
enhancement, see id. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(B). See United States v. Pugh, 147 F.4th 801, 807
(7th Cir. 2025).
Third, counsel considers challenging the two-level enhancement that was
applied because the cashier was physically restrained to facilitate the armed robbery.
See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). But counsel rightly rejects this challenge as frivolous
because forcing a person into a back room at gunpoint, as Hasberry’s co-conspirator did
here to the cashier, constitutes physical restraint within the meaning of § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
See United States v. White, 80 F.4th 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2023).
Counsel also rightly concludes that any challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of Hasberry’s sentence would be frivolous. We presume that a below-
guidelines sentence, such as Hasberry’s, is reasonable, see United States v. Oregon,
58 F.4th 298, 302 (7th Cir. 2023), and we agree with counsel that the district court
adequately justified the prison term under the applicable § 3553(a) factors. The court
emphasized the seriousness of the offenses (Hasberry’s conduct was a “crime spree”
that “[wreaked] havoc on innocent people” and gun brandishing during the offenses
was akin to “threatening [the victims] with murder”) and the need for the sentence to
deter others from committing similar crimes (sentence was intended to make people
“think twice before they pick up guns, steal cars, and rob people”). In mitigation, the
court considered that Hasberry’s conduct was less serious than that of his codefendant

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who struck the cashier with a gun, and that Hasberry had a difficult childhood marked
by violence.
Counsel considers whether there is any basis to challenge the conditions of
Hasberry’s supervised release. We agree that Hasberry waived any challenge when he
asserted at sentencing that he did not object to the proposed conditions. See United
States v. Gibbs, 130 F.4th 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2025).
Lastly counsel considers whether Hasberry could challenge any restitution
award but rejects this challenge as frivolous because (at the time of briefing) no final
judgment had yet been entered. The district court has since entered an amended
judgment ordering Hasberry to pay $2,150 in restitution. Hasberry filed a new notice of
appeal of the restitution order, No. 26-1389, and in that appeal remains free to pursue
any challenge he deems appropriate.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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