United States of America v. James Cooper

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 22, 2024
Decided July 23, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2298
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES COOPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 20-30078-004
Sue E. Myerscough,
Judge.
O R D E R
James Cooper pleaded guilty to a variety of drug-distribution and firearm-
possession offenses, and he was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He appealed,
but his appointed counsel asserted that the appeal is frivolous and moved to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel subsequently moved to
suspend proceedings pending resolution of United States v. Prince, 171 F.4th 1009
(7th Cir. 2026), and we granted that motion. Our opinion in Prince has since issued, and
counsel has filed a position statement on the case’s relevance to this appeal. We now
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2298 Page 2
Cooper was charged with conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine and 280 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846;
using a communication facility to facilitate a felony, id. § 843(b); aiding and abetting the
distribution of crack cocaine, id. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); distribution of cocaine, id.;
maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing cocaine and
crack cocaine, id. § 856(a)(1); possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); possessing a firearm as a felon, id. § 922(g)(1); and possessing
with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).
Cooper pleaded guilty to all counts, without a plea agreement. The district court
conducted a plea colloquy conforming to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It then accepted the plea and ordered the probation officer to prepare a
presentence report. The probation officer calculated a guidelines range of 322 to 387
months in prison (based on a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of
VI as a career offender, plus a mandatory consecutive 60 months in prison under
§ 924(c)). Cooper did not object to the probation officer’s calculations.
At sentencing, the government moved to amend Count 11 of the indictment. As
originally drafted, the indictment cited “Title 18, United States Code, Sections
924(c)(1)(A)(i); (c)(1)(B)(i), and (c)(1)(A)(i)” as the basis for the charge. The government
explained that the citation was a scrivener’s error. Cooper was charged for possessing a
handgun in violation of § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), while § 924(c)(1)(B)(i) concerns specific
weapons irrelevant to Cooper’s crime. The government thus requested that the citation
to § 924(c)(1)(B)(i) be struck. Cooper’s lawyer stated that there was no objection, and the
court thus amended the indictment.
Cooper asked for a below-guidelines sentence of 180 months, the combined
mandatory minimum under § 841 and § 924(c). He argued that the Guidelines for a
career offender did not comport with the goals of sentencing and that his criminal
history category was overstated. The government asked for 360 months. After
considering the mitigating and aggravating factors of Cooper’s offense, the court
sentenced him to a 180-month prison term and 5 years of supervised release.
Counsel first considers whether Cooper could challenge the validity of his guilty
plea. After consulting with Cooper, counsel confirms that he wishes to challenge only
the validity of his guilty plea to the § 922(g) charge. Counsel properly concludes that
such a challenge would be frivolous. Cooper did not move in the district court to
withdraw his plea, so review would be for plain error. See United States v. Schaul,
962 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2020). A review of the plea colloquy does not suggest any

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No. 22-2298 Page 3
plain error under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court
determined that Cooper was competent to enter a plea, and it ensured that he knew the
nature of each of the charges against him, the possible penalties, and the rights he
would waive by pleading guilty. See F ED. R. CRIM . P. 11(b).
Cooper replies that he was not fully informed of his option to plead guilty to
certain counts and plead not guilty to others, and therefore he did not knowingly and
voluntarily plead guilty. But Rule 11 requires only that the district court explain a
defendant’s right to persist in a plea of not guilty generally; it does not require the court
to parse a guilty or not-guilty plea for each count. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(B). The
district court complied with this rule, explaining that Cooper had the right to plead not
guilty. Regardless, the district court explained the elements of each charge, confirmed
that Cooper understood these elements, and determined that he had discussed the
nature and elements of the charges with counsel. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(G). Thus,
Cooper could not plausibly argue that the court plainly erred in accepting the plea.
Counsel next considers whether Cooper could argue that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. But this issue is better reserved for collateral review, because
“[u]nless the issue was raised and a full record developed in the trial court, an appellate
court cannot determine on direct appeal whether counsel’s assistance was ineffective.”
United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2020).
Counsel then addresses and properly rejects potential sentencing arguments,
beginning with possible procedural errors. Cooper’s base offense level was correctly
calculated to be 34 based on his unquestioned status as a career offender, see U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(b)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and his acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1. His career-offender status also established a criminal history category of VI.
See id. § 4B1.1(b). Cooper did not object to either of these calculations at sentencing, and
no plausible argument could show plain error.
Counsel next determines, again correctly, that any challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of Cooper’s sentence would be frivolous: His sentence is the mandatory
minimum. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Finally, counsel correctly concludes that Cooper could not raise any reasonable
challenges to the terms or the conditions of his supervised release. Imposing supervised
release was mandatory, and he received the statutory minimum term of five years
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). In addition, because the term is within the guidelines
range, it would be presumed reasonable. See United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 621

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No. 22-2298 Page 4
(7th Cir. 2019). Further, as counsel explains, Cooper confirmed at the sentencing hearing
that he had read the proposed conditions of supervised release, and he raised no
objections. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449–50 (7th Cir. 2019).
In his response brief, Cooper proposes raising two further arguments. He first
contends that the court improperly amended Count 11 of the indictment. But Cooper’s
lawyer said he had no objection to the amendment, so any challenge would be
reviewed, at best, for plain error. See id. at 447–48 (“certain fundamental rights” may be
waived only by defendant personally). A district court is permitted to amend an
indictment to correct “obvious clerical or typographical errors,” United States v. Field,
875 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted), such as the one identified by the
government here. There is no plausible argument that the court plainly erred in doing
so.
Finally, Cooper proposes arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates his rights
under the Second Amendment. Counsel moved to suspend these proceedings pending
the resolution of United States v. Prince, in which this court was presented with the
question whether that statute is facially unconstitutional. Our opinion in Prince, along
with its companion case, United States v. Watson, 171 F.4th 1012 (7th Cir. 2026), have
since issued, and counsel has filed a position statement. She correctly concludes that
any facial or as-applied challenge to his conviction on this basis would be frivolous. We
held in Prince that § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional on its face, 171 F.4th at 1011–12, so
Cooper could not plausibly raise a challenge on that basis. And as for an as-applied
challenge, we said in Watson that Congress could lawfully disarm felons based on prior
convictions for drug dealing. 171 F.4th at 1024. Cooper’s criminal history includes two
prior felony convictions for drug delivery, foreclosing any as-applied challenge.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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