Claudette Jordan v. M&tbank Corporation

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued December 8, 2025
Decided July 24, 2026
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1482
CLAUDETTE JORDAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M&T BANK CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:22-cv-00268
Susan L. Collins,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Claudette Jordan cosigned a car loan for her then-boyfriend’s son. When the son
defaulted on the loan, the lender, M&T Bank, repossessed the car and reported Jordan
as liable for the debt to the major credit reporting agencies (CRAs). Jordan concedes she
was liable for the initial loan. But she contends that M&T should not have reported the
debt to the CRAs because, in her view, the repossession and sale discharged that debt,
and the remaining balance is a new loan for which she isn’t liable. Jordan thus sued
M&T for reporting inaccurate information to the CRAs in violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The district court granted summary
judgment to M&T. We affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 6 --

No. 25-1482 Page 2
I.
We present the following facts in the light most favorable to Jordan as the party
appealing summary judgment. Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 176 F.4th 994, 1002
(7th Cir. 2026). In March 2017, Jordan cosigned a $43,000 loan from M&T for her then-
boyfriend’s son, Kade Kinnaley, to buy a Dodge Charger. M&T took a security interest
in the Charger and assigned the loan account number *******0001 (hereinafter 0001). As
a cosigner, Jordan was responsible for the loan payments if Kinnaley did not pay.
Jordan made one loan payment in May 2018, but otherwise relied on Kinnaley to
make the payments for the Charger. Unfortunately, her reliance was misplaced.
Kinnaley defaulted on the loan in November 2018, and M&T repossessed the Charger.
Ashamed of the situation, Kinnaley did not inform Jordan of the default or
repossession. M&T sold the Charger at auction in December 2018, and after the
proceeds were applied to the loan, a deficiency balance of $16,630 remained.
Unbeknownst to Jordan, Kinnaley then enrolled in M&T’s Deficiency Balance
Program (DBP) to pay off the remaining $16,630. The DBP is a program that M&T offers
borrowers who still owe money after the repossession and sale of their vehicle. When
Kinnaley enrolled in the DBP and made an initial payment, M&T closed the original
0001 account number and assigned a new account number, *******2001 (hereinafter
2001), to the deficiency balance. But Kinnaley failed to make any additional payments
under the DBP, so the deficiency balance assigned to account 2001 fell into default in the
summer of 2019.
Because M&T still considered Jordan a cosigner for the DBP balance, M&T
reported Jordan to the CRAs as having defaulted on account 2001. So Jordan called
M&T to complain about the debt appearing on her credit report when she did not agree
to a new loan. M&T told Jordan that although 2001 was a new account number, it
reflected the same loan as the one she cosigned, which was still in default.
After her discussions with M&T reached an impasse, Jordan sent eight Notices of
Dispute to the CRAs in 2020 and 2021. In each of these notices, Jordan informed the
CRAs that M&T had inaccurately reported that she was liable for account 2001 and
described the grounds for her dispute. The CRAs in turn sent M&T an Automated
Consumer Dispute Verification (ACDV) form for each dispute, which “contains the
account payment data the credit reporting agency possesses and the relevant data items
the consumer disputes.” Frazier v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 112 F.4th 451, 453–54 (7th Cir.
2024); see 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2)(A) (requiring CRAs to transmit to the furnisher “all

-- 2 of 6 --

No. 25-1482 Page 3
relevant information regarding the dispute”). M&T’s receipt of each dispute triggered
its statutory duty to reasonably investigate the accuracy of the information it reported
to the CRAs. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).
M&T investigated and found each dispute without merit. The first dispute coded
Jordan’s claim as “116: Disputes Compliance Condition.” M&T’s investigator
interpreted this to mean that the CRA was requesting confirmation that the compliance
code field on Jordan’s credit report was properly left blank. M&T’s investigator
confirmed this was correct and matched Jordan’s name, date of birth, social security
number, and address on the credit report to the information on account 2001.
Accordingly, M&T’s investigator verified to the CRA that Jordan’s credit report was
accurate.
The second through sixth disputes all coded Jordan’s claim as alleging identity
fraud or identity theft. The second through sixth disputes did not attach documents
supporting Jordan’s claims of identity theft. Nevertheless, M&T’s investigators referred
Jordan’s identity theft allegations to the bank’s financial crimes department, which
investigated the claims and found them unsubstantiated. M&T sent Jordan a denial
letter explaining these findings and offering to speak with her or review any additional
evidence she could provide that supported her identity theft claims.
Jordan did not respond to the letter. Instead, she submitted two more disputes
with the CRAs (the seventh and eighth disputes). The seventh and eighth disputes also
alleged identity fraud or identity theft. To these disputes Jordan attached two
documents in support of her fraud claims: an identity theft affidavit Jordan had filed
with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and a police report in which Jordan claimed
Kinnaley stole her identity. Upon receiving the seventh and eighth disputes, M&T’s
investigator reviewed the allegations in the FTC affidavit and police report and
determined they referred to the same incident that M&T’s financial crimes department
already had investigated and determined non-meritorious.
Jordan sued M&T under FCRA, claiming M&T provided inaccurate information
to the CRAs about her liability for account 2001, and failed to accurately report account
2001 as “disputed.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).*
* In her complaint, Jordan also pleaded that M&T accessed and used her credit report without a
permissible purpose in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. The district court held she had abandoned that
theory because she failed to discuss it in her response to M&T’s summary judgment motion or in her

-- 3 of 6 --

No. 25-1482 Page 4
The district court granted summary judgment to M&T on two grounds. First, the
district court held that Jordan had failed to create a genuine dispute of fact as to
whether the information M&T provided was inaccurate. In the district court’s view,
there was no genuine factual dispute that account 2001 was the same loan as account
0001, so it was not wrong for M&T to notify the CRAs that Jordan was responsible for
the default or to not mark the debt as “disputed” in its notifications. Alternatively, the
district court held that M&T’s investigation of each of Jordan’s disputes was reasonable
as a matter of law, so M&T could not be liable under § 1681s-2(b) even assuming M&T
had provided the CRAs inaccurate information when it reported Jordan as liable for
account 2001.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment to M&T de novo.
Chitwood v. Ascension Health All., 168 F.4th 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2026). We will affirm only if
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
Jordan’s § 1681s-2(b) claim has two elements. First, she “must make a prima facie
showing that [M&T] provided incomplete or inaccurate information.” Frazier v.
Dovenmuehle Mortg., Inc., 72 F.4th 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2023) (the inaccuracy element). And
second, she must “show that the incompleteness or inaccuracy was the product of an
unreasonable investigation—that is, had [M&T] conducted a reasonable investigation, it
would have discovered that the data it provided was incomplete or inaccurate.” Id. (the
reasonable investigation element). Jordan needs to demonstrate a genuine dispute of
fact on both elements to survive summary judgment. Id.
Although the district court held M&T was entitled to summary judgment on
both elements, Jordan’s arguments on appeal focus exclusively on the inaccuracy
element. In particular, she argues the district court brushed aside factual disputes that
would allow a reasonable jury to find that account 0001 and account 2001 were different
loans. She points out that M&T’s own documents provide conflicting statements about
whether the deficiency balance under the DBP program is, in fact, a “new loan.” She
also highlights that M&T coded the 0001 account as a “refinance” and “paid in full” in
its internal coding system, which is consistent with her theory that account 2001 was a
cross-motion for summary judgment. We follow suit and discuss this theory no further. Mosher v. Dollar
Tree Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We have long refused to consider arguments that were
not presented to the district court in response to summary judgment motions.” (citation omitted)).

-- 4 of 6 --

No. 25-1482 Page 5
new loan. Thus, as Jordan sees it, a reasonable jury could agree with her that M&T was
inaccurate in reporting that she was liable for that new loan.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Jordan has shown a genuine dispute of
fact about whether M&T’s reporting was inaccurate, M&T nevertheless is entitled to
summary judgment on the reasonable investigation element. Although the district court
also granted summary judgment to M&T on that ground, Jordan fails to address the
reasonableness of M&T’s investigation at all in her appellate briefs. She therefore has
“forfeited any challenges to the district court’s ruling[]” on that element. Protect Our
Parks, Inc. v. Buttigieg, 97 F.4th 1077, 1098 (7th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Protect Our
Parks, Inc. v. Duffy, 145 S. Ct. 2787 (2025); see Hacker v. Dart, 62 F.4th 1073, 1080 (7th Cir.
2023) (“Ordinarily, we will not consider arguments forfeited by a civil litigant.”).
Even setting aside forfeiture, summary judgment for M&T is proper because, on
this record, M&T conducted a reasonable investigation. The reasonableness of an
investigation “is a factual question normally reserved for trial” but “summary judgment
is proper if the reasonableness of the defendant’s procedures is beyond question.” Westra
v. Credit Control of Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005). And “[w]hat counts as a
reasonable investigation depends on the content of the [dispute] the furnisher receives.”
Woods v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 27 F.4th 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2022).
Like the district court, we conclude it is “beyond question” that M&T conducted
a reasonable investigation of Jordan’s disputes. M&T submitted unrebutted declarations
from its investigators that explain the bank’s procedures for investigating disputes and
describe how the investigators handling the disputes at issue followed those
procedures. The declarations include detailed descriptions of the steps the investigators
took to corroborate the information M&T sent to the CRAs.
Jordan does not offer any evidence to contradict the investigators’ testimony.
Rather, Jordan argues that the investigation was not reasonable because it merely
confirmed that M&T’s information matched the CRAs’ information without checking
whether M&T’s information was correct in the first place. Jordan insists that the bank
should have gone beyond reviewing its records to listen to the recordings of Jordan’s
calls with M&T and search for proof that Jordan authorized the DBP. Instead, she says,
the bank ignored red flags in the disputes and refused to take her identity theft claims
seriously.
The record does not support Jordan’s critique. Recall that Jordan did not provide
any supporting documentation with her first six disputes. Even so, M&T did not simply

-- 5 of 6 --

No. 25-1482 Page 6
dismiss her identity theft allegations out of hand. It cross-referenced the information in
the ACDVs against the information in Jordan’s M&T account history and referred her
fraud allegations to the bank’s financial crimes department. That department conducted
its own investigation and notified Jordan by letter that it found no basis for her claims.
Importantly, in that letter, M&T offered to discuss the results of the investigation with
Jordan and pledged to re-investigate if Jordan submitted additional information
supporting her claim. Jordan admits that she did not follow up with the bank to provide
additional information supporting her fraud allegations. On this record, no reasonable
jury could find M&T’s investigation of the first through sixth disputes inadequate. See
Woods, 27 F.4th at 550–51 (finding investigation reasonable as a matter of law where
furnisher invited plaintiff to submit additional information supporting his identity theft
claims and plaintiff “responded to th[e] letter with silence”); Gorman v. Wolpoff &
Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Congress could not have intended
to place a burden on furnishers continually to reinvestigate a particular transaction,
without any new information or other reason to doubt the result of the earlier
investigation....”).
M&T’s investigation of the seventh and eighth disputes, to which Jordan
attached the FTC affidavit and police report, was likewise reasonable as a matter of law.
M&T’s investigators testified that upon reviewing the affidavit and police report, they
concluded the allegations did not support Jordan’s fraud claim. Instead, M&T
determined the disputes reflected Jordan’s belief that she was not liable for the debt
after Kinnaley entered into the DBP. Given the little information M&T had to go on, and
Jordan’s failure to engage with M&T after its initial investigation, that determination
was reasonable. See Suluki v. Credit One Bank, NA, 138 F.4th 709, 723 (2d Cir. 2025)
(affirming summary judgment for bank where plaintiff “did not present evidence to
show that there were reasonable steps that [the bank] could and should have taken or
that there was additional evidence that it could or would have found that would have
shown that [a third party] opened the account without [plaintiff’s] permission”).
The district court’s judgment is therefore
AFFIRMED.

-- 6 of 6 --