Selene Danielle Arriaga v. Thomas J. Dart

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued September 17, 2025
Decided July 28, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2573
SELENE DANIELLE ARRIAGA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THOMAS J. DART, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-cv-04498
Virginia M. Kendall,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Selene Danielle Arriaga, a transgender police officer, sued Northeast Illinois
Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation d/b/a Metra, Cook County, Thomas J. Dart,
in his official capacity as Cook County Sheriff, and six individuals (collectively
“Defendants”) for disclosing her transgender status and failing to protect her from
workplace discrimination and harassment. Defendants moved for summary judgment,
arguing there was no evidence for a reasonable jury to find for her on any of her claims.
Defendants also moved for sanctions against Arriaga and her counsel. The district court
granted both motions, and Arriaga now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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I. BACKGROUND
We recount the following facts in the light most favorable to Arriaga and draw
all reasonable inferences in her favor as the nonmoving party. See Bostic v. Murray, 160
F.4th 831, 836 (7th Cir. 2025).
A. Factual History
Arriaga, a transgender woman, applied to be a Metra police officer in 2018. She
also authorized Metra to obtain and release information related to her application for
employment reasons. Metra required her to undergo a background check, a
psychological evaluation, and a medical evaluation. As part of the background check,
Metra received, among other things, a copy of Arriaga’s birth certificate, which showed
she was born male. Metra Police Chief Joseph Perez reviewed the background check,
interviewed Arriaga, and recommended Metra hire her as a police recruit. Perez
maintains he never discussed Arriaga’s transgender status with anyone other than
Metra Deputy Police Chief Paul Riggio.
Metra requires recruits to complete training at the Cook County Sheriff’s Office
Training Academy. Before Arriaga entered the Academy, Riggio ordered Metra Police
Commander H. Ross Fuller to inquire into whether Cook County Sheriff’s Office had
policies to accommodate transgender recruits during training. Fuller then contacted
Academy Sergeant David Cammack and explained that an incoming Metra recruit was
transgender. The two discussed how the Sheriff’s Office would evaluate Arriaga under
the POWER test, which tests recruits’ endurance to determine if they meet the physical
qualifications to become a police officer, because the POWER test has different
standards for evaluating men and women. It was later confirmed that a transgender
recruit would be given the POWER test consistent with the recruit’s gender identity.
Around that time, in April 2018, Cammack and Academy Director Marie Rangel
took steps to ensure there were accommodations available for transgender recruits at
the Academy, including gender neutral restrooms and shower facilities if the recruit
required or requested them. Cammack also told his staff there was a transgender recruit
starting with the incoming class and instructed that the confidentiality of such
individual must be maintained. In doing so, Cammack “[a]t some point,” during this
time frame, disclosed Arriaga’s identity. The purpose of these discussions with staff,
according to Cammack, was to ensure Arriaga’s safety, protection, and education,
which Arriaga does not dispute.

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Arriaga began training at the Academy in May 2018. By the end of June, she had
disclosed her transgender status to three recruits. Also in June, Arriaga reported to the
Academy that Officer Robert Devogelear, a Sheriff’s Office employee, had shared her
transgender status with two Waukegan Police Department recruits in Arriaga’s class
and that a Mount Prospect Police Department recruit had learned Arriaga was
transgender from Facebook. Arriaga discussed these events with Riggio and Cammack.
Pursuant to the Sheriff’s Office policies prohibiting discrimination and
misconduct, Cammack filed a complaint against Devogelear with the Office of
Professional Review (“OPR”). This referral resulted in an investigation into Devogelear
and the other recruits Arriaga reported. The Sheriff’s Office assigned as lead
investigator Deputy Chief Theodore Stajura, who received assistance from Timothy
O’Donnell with the Office of Discipline, Compliance, and Inspections. They submitted
the completed investigative file to OPR in December 2018 but, as of August 2018, that
year’s class of recruits had graduated and transitioned to their respective agencies. For
the non-Sheriff’s Office recruits, this meant the Sheriff’s Office no longer had authority
to discipline them.1 As a result of the investigation, however, the Sheriff’s Office
recommended terminating Devogelear’s employment.
After graduating from the Academy, Arriaga began working at Metra. Metra’s
policies prohibited discrimination, and Metra instructed employees subjected to
discrimination to file complaints with its Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)
office. In October 2018, Riggio asked Arriaga how her training was going. She
responded that “everything [was] great.” Later that month, though, Arriaga reported to
her sergeant that rumors were circulating within Metra about her transgender status.
The sergeant elevated her concerns to Riggio and Perez, both of whom met with
Arriaga a few weeks later. Perez then contacted EEO and asked it to provide additional
training to Metra’s police department. Arriaga did not elevate her complaints beyond
the chain of command to the EEO during this period. When Perez later followed up
with Arriaga, she told him everything was going well. Arriaga resigned from Metra in
2022, at which time she began training for a job with the Chicago Police Department.
1 Rangel testified that the Academy can, in some circumstances, discipline recruits from
outside agencies if the recruits violate Sheriff’s Office policies while at training. (See
District Ct. Dkt. 218-7, Rangel Dep., at 65:14–67:3).

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B. Procedural Background
Arriaga sued Defendants in July 2020. She brought two claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against all Defendants, alleging deprivations of her substantive due process
rights for disclosing her confidential medical information and failing to protect and
supervise. She asserted an Illinois Civil Rights Act claim against Dart and Metra. And
she raised an indemnification claim against Cook County and Metra.2
Defendants later moved for summary judgment.3 Metra and Perez also moved
for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against Arriaga and
her counsel, contending, in relevant part, that Arriaga was untruthful under oath and
pressed claims she knew were time barred.
The district court granted both motions. The court concluded Defendants were
entitled to summary judgment, reasoning that Arriaga’s § 1983 claim for unlawful
disclosure of her confidential medical information was time barred and that, in any
event, no reasonable jury could find for Arriaga on any of her claims. It also granted the
motion for sanctions. With respect to that motion, the court concluded Arriaga
committed perjury when she testified during her deposition that she did not disclose
her transgender status online because Arriaga had, in fact, posted in My Trans Life, a
private Facebook group, with the following caption: “Been in transition 4 yrs now. Just
got accepted to police Academy.” The court also inferred Arriaga’s intent was to
provide false testimony because she left the My Trans Life group 45 minutes after her
deposition. The court additionally determined that Arriaga and her counsel failed to
dismiss the disclosure claim despite knowing it was time barred and that Arriaga
thwarted the Defendants’ efforts to obtain social media information. Those
2 She also raised three other claims that the district court dismissed that are not relevant
to this appeal. Additionally, on appeal, Arriaga’s brief references an “equal protection
argument.” (App. Dkt. 16, Arriaga Br., at 26). When asked at oral argument if she had
raised an equal protection claim, her counsel did not know. (See Oral Argument at
12:42–13:06). Because Arriaga did not assert an equal protection claim in her complaint,
(see generally District Ct. Dkt. 47), we do not address this theory of liability any further.
3 By the time of the court’s ruling, Riggio had deceased, so the court removed him as a
defendant. (District Ct. Dkt. 151, Min. Entry).

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considerations persuaded the court to grant the motion and dismiss the case with
prejudice as a sanction.
Arriaga appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Arriaga lodges a bevy of arguments against the district court’s
decisions. We conclude only two warrant discussion. First, we must evaluate whether
the district court erred when it granted summary judgment on the merits of Arriaga’s
claims to Defendants. Second, we must decide whether the district court erred when it
sanctioned Arriaga and her counsel. We address these in turn.
A. Section 1983 Claims
Arriaga, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contends Defendants violated her substantive
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in two ways. Arriaga argues a
reasonable jury could conclude Defendants disclosed her confidential medical
information and failed to protect and supervise her, both in contravention of her
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. In Arriaga’s view, the district court
therefore erred in granting summary judgment on these claims to the Defendants.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Paterakos
v. City of Chicago, 147 F.4th 787, 795 (7th Cir. 2025). Summary judgment is appropriate
where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). That is,
summary judgment must be granted where no reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmovant based on the evidence taken in the light most favorable to her and
with all reasonable inferences drawn in her favor. Paterakos, 147 F.4th at 795.
As relevant here, the Fourteenth Amendment’s “Due Process Clause is violated
by an infringement of a fundamental right through an abuse of government power that
shocks the conscience of federal judges.” Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2023)
(citation modified). Thus, to prevail on a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of
substantive due process, a plaintiff must, with “careful description,” establish a
fundamental right or liberty that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition” and the “conduct under color of state law that violated [that] fundamental
right or liberty” was conscience shocking. Nelson v. City of Chicago, 992 F.3d 599, 604 (7th
Cir. 2021) (citation modified).

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That standard sets “a high bar.” Id. An abuse of government power that is merely
tortious or even abhorrent does not shock the conscience. See Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d
899, 902–03 (7th Cir. 2005). Only “the most egregious official conduct will satisfy this
stringent inquiry.” Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citation modified). “[B]ehavior that is shocking enough to sustain a substantive due
process claim typically involves the use of intentional force against an individual’s
person or the threat of such force.” Robbin v. City of Berwyn, 108 F.4th 586, 591 (7th Cir.
2024); see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (concluding that opening the
petitioner’s mouth and forcibly extracting evidence he swallowed from his stomach
shocked the conscience); Hess, 72 F.4th at 766 (concluding that an officer’s sexual assault
under color of law is conscience shocking).
1. Disclosure of Confidential Medical Information
Arriaga contends she presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find that Defendants’ disclosures of her transgender status in April 2018, June 2018, and
October 2018 shocked the conscience. We disagree.
As an initial matter, this claim is likely time barred because, in this case, the
applicable statute of limitations for a claim brought under § 1983 is two years and the
alleged disclosures in April 2018 and June 2018 fall outside the two-year window given
Arriaga filed suit in July 2020.4 See Mitchell v. Donchin, 286 F.3d 447, 450 n.1 (7th Cir.
2002). And while the alleged October disclosure would be timely, Arriaga is unable to
rely on it because she only complained to her sergeant that rumors were circulating
within Metra about her transgender status and did not present evidence that any of the
Defendants disclosed her transgender status.
In any event, assuming a fundamental interest is implicated, Arriaga has not
shown that Defendants’ disclosures shocked the conscience. Not only did Arriaga
authorize Metra to release information related to her employment application,
Defendants who disclosed her transgender status did so for compelling reasons related
to her employment. First, after Arriaga applied to Metra, Perez consulted with Riggio
about her application. Second, Metra, through Fuller, spoke with Cammack and
inquired about what accommodations the Academy had available for transgender
recruits. The two discussed how Arriaga would be classified for evaluation under the
4 We review de novo whether an action is time-barred under a statute of limitations. See
Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 932 F.3d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 2019).

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POWER test, which differentiates based on gender. Finally, Cammack told his staff that
a transgender recruit was starting with the incoming class for the purpose of
guaranteeing her safety and appropriate accommodations.
Arriaga did not present evidence demonstrating that these individuals, or any
other Defendant, otherwise disclosed her transgender status. We would be remiss if we
also did not emphasize that Arriaga, herself, disclosed her transgender status on a
variety of occasions. On this record, no reasonable jury could find that Defendants’
disclosures shocked the conscience.
2. Failure to Protect and Supervise
Next, Arriaga asserts that she presented evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find that Defendants’ failure to supervise and protect her from workplace
discrimination and harassment shocked the conscience.
Even if we assume Arriaga identified a fundamental interest with sufficient
clarity, see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, we conclude no reasonable jury could find that
Defendants’ conduct shocked the conscience. With respect to Perez, after learning about
Arriaga’s concerns in October 2018, he reached out to her, met with her, and spoke with
EEO about providing more training to Metra’s police department. He then later
followed up with Arriaga, and she told him everything was fine. This shows Perez
acted reasonably in the face of Arriaga’s concerns. To the extent she argues that Perez’s
failure to stop rumors from circulating at the Academy shocked the conscience, such
inaction does not satisfy that high standard. See, e.g., Robbin, 108 F.4th at 591; Hess, 72
F.4th at 765–66.
We reach the same conclusion with regard to defendants Cammack, Rangel,
Stajura, and O’Donnell. Cammack and Rangel ensured accommodations were available
for Arriaga at the Academy. Cammack also initiated an investigation into Arriaga’s
allegations. Stajura and O’Donnell investigated the allegations, performed interviews,
and their investigation resulted in the termination of Devogelear’s employment. As for
Arriaga’s contention that these defendants should have removed the recruits at the
center of her allegations from the Academy, it also fails. By the time Stajura and
O’Donnell completed their investigation, the recruits had already graduated from and
transitioned out of the Academy, which meant the Sheriff’s Office could no longer
discipline them.

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Still, Arriaga maintains that Defendants created the vulnerable situation she
experienced at the Academy and Metra. Generally, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause “does not impose upon the state a duty to protect individuals from harm
by private actors.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015). But
the “‘state-created danger exception’… applies when a state actor’s conduct ‘creates, or
substantially contributes to the creation of, a danger or renders citizens more vulnerable
to a danger [than] they otherwise would have been.’” Id. (quoting Reed v. Gardner, 986
F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Johnson v. Edwards, 164 F.4th 1074, 1081–82 (7th
Cir. 2026). To prevail under this theory, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the state’s
failure to protect shocks the conscience. See Johnson, 164 F.4th at 1081–82. For reasons
already explained, Arriaga did not present evidence from which a jury could find that
Defendants’ conduct shocked the conscience. So, her state-created danger argument
fails on that element, too.
***
Because Arriaga has failed to demonstrate that she suffered a constitutional
violation at the hands of the individual defendants, her § 1983 Monell claims against
Metra and Dart also fail. See Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 775 F.3d 953, 962 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“If the plaintiff fails to prove a violation of h[er] constitutional rights in h[er] claim
against the individual defendants, there will be no viable Monell claim [for municipal
liability] based on the same allegations.”); see generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978). As such, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to
Defendants on all of Arriaga’s § 1983 claims.
B. Illinois Civil Rights Act Claim
Arriaga also asserts an Illinois Civil Rights Act claim against Dart and Metra. To
prevail under the Act, a plaintiff must show that a unit of local government subjected
her to discrimination based on that person’s race, color, national origin, or gender. See
740 I LL. C OMP . S TAT. 23/5. Illinois courts look to “federal civil rights statutes when
interpreting the” Act. Howard v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 989 F.3d 587, 609 (7th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Cent. Austin Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 1 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2013)). Federal law—namely, Title IX and Title VII—prohibits discrimination based
on gender. Under these statutes, liability lies only if a plaintiff shows “an official who at
a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute
corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination …
and fails adequately to respond,” Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290
(1998) (Title IX), or an employer “knew or should have known about an employee’s acts

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of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action,” Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile
Commc’ns., Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1992) (citation modified) (Title VII).
The district court correctly granted summary judgment on this claim to Dart and
Metra. As discussed above, Arriaga did not present evidence that any individual
defendant failed to adequately respond to her alleged discrimination. Rather, the record
reveals that each time Arriaga raised concerns, officials reasonably addressed them. So,
her claims against Dart and Metra on this score fail too.
C. Sanctions
Finally, Arriaga challenges the district court’s decision, pursuant to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to sanction her and her counsel by dismissing her
case with prejudice. Recall that the district court imposed the sanction for three reasons:
Arriaga (1) was untruthful in her deposition, (2) brought the disclosure claim despite
knowing it was time barred, and (3) thwarted Defendants’ efforts to collect social media
posts. We review a district court’s decision to impose sanctions for abuse of discretion.
Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dep’t, 197 F.3d 256, 264 (7th Cir. 1999). A district court abuses
its discretion in imposing sanctions “when it fails to explain the basis for the sanctions;
when it does not properly notify the offender that it is considering sanctions; or when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment
of the evidence.” Vega v. Chicago Bd. of Ed., 109 F.4th 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2024).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed its sanction here.
The court properly notified Arriaga and her counsel that it was considering sanctions,
reasonably assessed the evidence, and concluded that Arriaga lied in her deposition.
When asked if she disclosed her transgender status on social media before May 2018,
Arriaga answered in the negative. But the evidence showed that Arriaga had posted
about her transition in the My Trans Life Facebook group in April 2018. Moreover, the
court inferred Arriaga’s intent was to provide false testimony from the fact that Arriaga
left that group 45 minutes after her deposition. The court also reasonably concluded
that Arriaga interfered with Defendants’ efforts to collect social media information.
Arriaga does not disagree; instead, she merely clarifies it was SMS text messages, not
social media posts, that she failed to turn over. This does not help her cause. And while
we do not necessarily agree that bringing a time-barred claim warrants a sanction, we
cannot conclude, when we consider all this, that the district court abused its discretion.

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III. CONCLUSION
We have considered Arriaga’s remaining arguments, but none merits discussion.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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