United States of America v. Jonathan Kassay

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 28, 2026*
Decided August 3, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2472
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN KASSAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:20-cr-31 DRL
Damon R. Leichty,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jonathan Kassay challenges the denial of his motion for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied the motion after
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2472 Page 2
determining that the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against early release.
Because the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, we affirm.
Kassay pleaded guilty in 2020 to producing child pornography. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a), (e). His guidelines range called for a life sentence, and he was sentenced to the
statutory maximum of 30 years’ imprisonment.
After serving almost three years in prison, Kassay moved for compassionate
release based on his being the only available care giver for his aging and infirmed
parents; his own health issues (irritable bowel syndrome and an enlarged prostate); and
contaminated drinking water at the prison where he is incarcerated.
The district court denied the motion. First, the court noted that Kassay did not
exhaust his administrative remedies for his own health-conditions claim because he did
not raise it in his email to the Bureau of Prisons; and even if he had, those conditions
were not extraordinary and compelling because they were managed effectively in
prison. The court then determined that Kassay’s remaining arguments—concerning his
aging parents and the prison’s water supply—also were not extraordinary and
compelling reasons for release.† But the court’s “primary reason” for denying Kassay’s
motion was that the § 3553(a) factors did not support early release. The court
highlighted the circumstances of the offense (producing child pornography of his two
minor children—barely of kindergarten age—and distributing the images across state
lines); the seriousness of the offense (“exploitation of a heinous nature,” “tragic,” and
“difficult to find a case much worse”); and the need for the sentence to protect the
public from Kassay (whose harm to the victims was “potent and lasting” and “cannot
be understated”). The court concluded that early release would neither deter Kassay
nor protect the public.
On appeal, Kassay first challenges the district court’s assessment of the § 3553(a)
factors and argues that the court inadequately considered his military service record,
lack of criminal history, and steps towards rehabilitation in prison. But the court
expressly acknowledged these considerations yet still determined that the § 3553(a)
factors weighed against early release. The court needed to identify “just one good
reason” for denying the motion, United States v. Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2022),
† In a recent decision, the Supreme Court defined “extraordinary and
compelling” reasons for release as “those that are especially unusual and convincing.”
Rutherford v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1330 (2026).

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No. 24-2472 Page 3
and here the court provided several. Kassay’s “heinous” crime and the need to protect
the public and deter his criminal conduct sufficed to deny the motion.
As for his need to care for his aging parents, Kassay now asserts that their
medical conditions have deteriorated. But our review is limited to the evidence
presented in the district court. Hirmiz v. New Harrison Hotel Corp., 865 F.3d 475, 476
(7th Cir. 2017). And regardless, the court was aware of his parents’ medical conditions
yet exercised its discretion in determining that Kassay’s early release would not deter
him or protect the public.
Regarding his own health conditions, Kassay argues that he exhausted his
administrative remedies for his arguments by emailing the warden about inadequate
treatment in prison for his post-traumatic stress disorder. He contends that this is a
similar ground to the health conditions he asserted in his motion for compassionate
release—his irritable bowel syndrome and an enlarged prostate. But any similarity in
these conditions is beside the point because Kassay concedes that he is healthy enough
to care for himself in prison, in effect undermining the argument that his health is an
independent basis for early release.
Finally, Kassay argues that the district court erred in not appointing him counsel.
He asserts that counsel would have obtained his parents’ medical records, the absence
of which prevented him from proving that they need him as a caretaker. But the court
acted well within its discretion in denying his request, explaining that Kassay already
had filed his motion for compassionate release, and “ably” could submit pertinent
medical records without the aid of counsel. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir.
2007) (en banc).
AFFIRMED

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