United States of America v. Thomas E. Johnson, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-1745
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Thomas E. Johnson, Jr.
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
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Submitted: January 9, 2023
Filed: March 2, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Law enforcement found Thomas E. Johnson nonresponsive in a car accident.
In the car, they found marijuana, crack cocaine, a loaded firearm, and over $4,000.
He pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, over Johnson’s objection, the district

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court1 increased his offense level by four levels for possessing a gun “in connection
with” a felony drug offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.l(b)(6)(B). The district court
sentenced him to 57 months in prison. He appeals his sentence. Having jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
Johnson contests the district court’s application of the sentencing
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a gun in connection
with a felony drug offense. This court reviews for clear error. United States v.
Mitchell, 963 F.3d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 2020) (“This court reviews for clear error a
district court’s finding that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with
another felony offense.”). A defendant possesses a gun in connection with a felony
drug offense if the gun “facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating” the drug
offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), cmt. 14(A).
Johnson argues the enhancement was improper because his drug offenses
were not trafficking offenses, and the government failed to establish the firearm
facilitated or had the potential of facilitating another felony offense. But this court
“repeatedly” has held that “a defendant’s possession of a firearm with a personal-
use amount of illegal drugs can meet [the facilitate] standard.” United States v.
Quinn, 812 F.3d 694, 700 (8th Cir. 2019).
Johnson also contests the enhancement arguing the court failed to make a
“facilitate” finding, and more than just proximity between the firearm and the
controlled substances is necessary. At sentencing, the court stated it had reviewed
Johnson’s argument and the Walker case he cited. See United States v. Walker, 900
F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that the “enhancement is improper when the
government’s only evidence is a generalized connection between a gun and a user
1 The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska.

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quantity of drugs”). Even though the court did not make a specific finding that the
gun facilitated the drug offense, the court’s discussion of Johnson’s objection and
the Walker case shows the court understood the standard and properly applied it.
See Mitchell, 963 F.3d at 732 (“If the record makes clear the district court understood
and properly applied the ‘facilitate’ standard of note 14(A) in finding possession of
a firearm in connection with a felony drug offense, there is no error of law.” (cleaned
up)). See also United States v. Two Hearts, 32 F. 4th 659, 666 (8th Cir. 2022)
(stating this court has “never reversed a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement merely
because a specific ‘facilitate’ finding was not made”).
The court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement. United States v.
Bullock, 35 F.4th 666, 670 (8th Cir. 2022) (“This standard may be met when a
defendant concurrently possesses drugs and a firearm while in public, like in a car,
because when a drug user chooses to carry his illegal drugs out into public with a
firearm, there are many ways in which the weapon can facilitate the drug offense
and dangerously embolden the offender.” (cleaned up)).
II.
Johnson asserts the court substantively erred in imposing his within-
guidelines sentence. This court reviews for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Nelson, 982 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 2020). “A sentencing court abuses its
discretion if it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant
weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only
the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those
factors.” Id. “[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court
sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as
substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir.
2009) (en banc).

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Johnson believes the court should have granted his request for a variance
because of his family, mental state, and medical conditions. The court stated, “I
have taken into consideration those things that [Johnson] asked for in terms of
variance.” The court reviewed the § 3553(a) factors, which was why it sentenced
him at the “low end instead of the high end” of the guidelines. The district court did
not abuse its discretion. See United States v. San-Miguel, 634 F.3d 471, 476 (8th
Cir. 2011) (“The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in
each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an
appropriate sentence.”).
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The judgment is affirmed.
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