Jennifer Porter v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 22-3270
___________________________
Jennifer Porter
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v.
Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
____________
Submitted: May 22, 2023
Filed: May 25, 2023
[Unpublished]
____________
Before COLLOTON, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.

-- 1 of 3 --

Jennifer Porter appeals the district court’s1 order affirming the denial of
disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. We agree with the
court that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the adverse decision.
See Swarthout v. Kijakazi, 35 F.4th 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2022) (standard of review).
Specifically, we find that the administrative law judge (ALJ) properly declined
to address the state Medicaid report. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c), 416.920b(c)
(adjudicator will not provide any analysis about how decisions by other governmental
agencies are considered). While the ALJ erred in considering the statement of
Porter’s husband “inherently neither valuable nor persuasive,” this error was
harmless. See Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 559-60 (8th Cir. 2011) (ALJ’s failure
to explicitly address statement of claimant’s girlfriend did not require remand, as
same evidence that ALJ relied on in discrediting claimant’s allegations also
discredited hers); Dewey v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 447, 449-50 (8th Cir. 2007) (error is
harmless when it would not affect ALJ’s decision).
We find no reversible error in the ALJ’s failure to include chronic pain
syndrome among Porter’s severe impairments, as this condition was closely related
to the spinal and mental impairments the ALJ found severe. See Trenary v. Bowen,
898 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1990) (critical question in disability claim is not
diagnosis, but functional limitations imposed by impairment). Further, the ALJ
properly evaluated Porter’s subjective complaints. See Bryant v. Colvin, 861 F.3d
779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2017) (ALJ appropriately assessed claimant’s subjective
complaints by considering his previous ability to work despite allegedly disabling
condition, his daily activities, and lack of medical evidence supporting his alleged
conditions); Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 739 (8th Cir. 2004) (ALJ properly
1The Honorable Billy Roy Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Joe
J. Volpe, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
-2-

-- 2 of 3 --

discredited claimant’s pain complaints, in part by noting that objective tests showed
only mild to moderate abnormalities and that her reported activities were inconsistent
with extreme pain complaints).
Finally, we find no merit to Porter’s argument that the ALJ was required to
defer to her treating physician’s opinion in accordance with this court’s prior
precedent regarding the treating-source rule, despite the intervening rule change that
abrogated such deference. See Austin v. Kijakazi, 52 F.4th 723, 730 (8th Cir. 2022)
(under revised regulations, treating physician rule no longer applies, rendering prior
precedent applying that rule inapposite).
The judgment is affirmed.
______________________________
-3-

-- 3 of 3 --