United States of America v. Phillip Vincent Ridings

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-1586
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Phillip Vincent Ridings
Defendant - Appellant
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No. 22-1649
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jody Douglas Davis
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville
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Submitted: January 12, 2023
Filed: July 28, 2023
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Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
Jody Davis and Phillip Ridings appeal their convictions for conspiracy to
commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; wire fraud and aiding and
abetting wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2; money laundering, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957; and money laundering and aiding and abetting money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2. On appeal, both Davis and
Ridings claim the district court1 erred when it admitted a redacted plea agreement
that Ridings signed, but which did not ultimately result in a guilty plea. By the terms
of the plea agreement, Ridings waived his rights under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Davis also appeals his sentence, asserting that the district court
imposed a sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines range based on his religious
beliefs in violation of the First Amendment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Davis and Ridings convinced numerous people to invest in a wind generator
concept invented by Ridings named “Dragonfly.” Davis and Ridings represented
that the Dragonfly was a revolutionary, jet engine-shaped wind turbine generator
that could produce 60% more power than a traditional wind turbine generator.
Ridings and Davis hired Belcan Engineering Group to make the Dragonfly design
operational, agreeing to pay Belcan $574,000. Belcan required a downpayment of
$58,000 before beginning any work. Belcan concluded that the design was not
feasible and returned $15,766.50 of the original $58,000 payment.
Ridings also retained DAR Corporation to assist with prototyping the
Dragonfly concept. DAR reported that Dragonfly was not commercially viable.
1 The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Arkansas.

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Notwithstanding this, Ridings and Davis utilized materials indicating that DAR had
performed a computational fluid dynamics validation of the Dragonfly.
Ridings also discussed Dragonfly with Jeffrey Marchetta, a professor at the
University of Memphis’ Engineering Department. Marchetta’s response was, at
best, lukewarm, but Ridings altered a letter from Marchetta indicating Marchetta had
“validated” Dragonfly. Ridings used letterhead containing the University of
Memphis logo and did not include a faculty name or signature. Marchetta testified
at trial that he considered the altered letter “a gross misrepresentation of [his] work.”
This altered letter was shown to numerous investors.
Davis met Uchenna Obi through a prayer line. Davis represented to Obi that
Dragonfly was superior to current wind turbines, and that he would receive exclusive
Dragonfly rights in Africa if he was willing to invest enough money in the project.
Obi invested in Dragonfly and testified that he trusted Davis because he was “a
Christian brother.” Obi also recruited his business partners and brother-in-law into
the scheme. Davis and Ridings showed the Obi investors the altered University of
Memphis letter, stating they needed money to finish a working model. The Obi
investors ultimately delivered $73,500 to Ridings.
Ridings and Davis made similar misrepresentations to a number of other
investors, ultimately obtaining $1,138,845.28 from numerous victims. One investor
reported that Davis frequently spoke of being a Godly and religious person and
another stated that he felt a connection with Davis because of their shared Christian
faith.
Ridings and Davis were indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire fraud, money laundering, and
engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity and aiding and abetting.

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Ridings signed a plea agreement with the United States, but the plea
agreement fell through at the change of plea hearing and Ridings declined to change
his plea. The written plea agreement waived the protections of Federal Rule of
Evidence 410 and expressly allowed the factual statements made by Ridings in the
agreement to be used against him. The district court granted a motion by the
government to admit at trial a redacted factual stipulation from Ridings’ plea
agreement with all references to Davis removed. Davis also unsuccessfully moved
to exclude the redacted statement or to sever the trial. The court gave the following
limiting instruction: “You may consider that statement of Mr. Ridings only in the
case against him, but not in the case against Mr. Davis. You may not consider or
even discuss Mr. Ridings’ statement in any way when you are deciding if the
government proved beyond a reasonable doubt its case against Mr. Davis.”
Ridings and Davis were convicted on all counts. Ridings was sentenced to a
97-month term of imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently. The court
upward varied and sentenced Davis to a 180-month term of imprisonment on five of
the counts and a 120-month sentence on the remaining counts with all sentences to
run concurrently. Ridings and Davis were both ordered to pay restitution jointly and
severally in the amount of $1,138,845.28. Both defendants appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
1. Admission of the Plea Agreement
We first address whether the district court erred in receiving Ridings’ redacted
plea agreement into evidence at the joint trial. Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a)
provides that “a guilty plea that was later withdrawn . . . or . . . a statement made
during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the
discussions did not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty
plea” is not admissible. The protections offered by the rule are waivable. See United
States v. Washburn, 728 F.3d 775, 779-80 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Young, 223 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2000)). Ridings does not dispute the district

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court’s conclusion that his plea agreement waived the protections under Rule 410.
Rather, he claims the statement should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
A court may exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403 if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, risks confusing the
issues or misleading the jury, causes undue delay, wastes time, or amounts to
cumulative evidence. Rule 403 prejudice is something different than simply being
evidence that is detrimental to a party’s case; instead, the “rule protects against
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is, if it tends to suggest decision on an
improper basis.” United States v. Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 682 (8th Cir. 2007). District
courts have broad discretion under Rule 403, and we generally review for an abuse
of discretion. Id. If the defendant fails to object, we review for plain error. See
United States v. Jumping Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). To establish
plain error, the party who failed to object must establish error that is both obvious
and affected his substantial rights. United States v. Combs, 44 F.4th 815, 818 (8th
Cir. 2022) (per curiam).
Even though Ridings objected to receipt of the factual statement, he did so on
different grounds than he raises on appeal, thus we review for plain error. See
Ludwig ex rel. McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1407 (8th Cir.
1994) (“An objection on one ground does not allow a party to argue on appeal that
the evidence should have been excluded on different grounds.”). Here, the
admission of Ridings’ statement was not unfairly prejudicial as against Ridings as it
did not suggest decision on an improper basis. While Ridings argues that proposed
plea agreements are not signed under oath and plea agreements are frequently
accepted to minimize the consequences, he nonetheless admitted to the facts at issue,
which, while unhelpful to his defense, were relevant and proper to consider in
arriving at a verdict. They are in their nature no different than any number of
statements or admissions that a defendant may make and are routinely received into
evidence. The purpose of Rule 410 is to carve out an exception for statements made
in plea negotiations, the knowing waiver of which leaves the statements exactly

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where they would have been in the absence of the Rule. There is no error here, plain
or otherwise.
Davis contends that receipt of the statement against Ridings violated his rights
under the Sixth Amendment, and that receipt of the statement was more prejudicial
than probative towards Davis and the trial should have been severed. In Bruton v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that admitting a co-defendant’s confession in
a joint trial violates the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See 391 U.S.
123, 126 (1968). That said, Bruton is not implicated when a non-testifying
defendant’s statement inculpates a co-defendant “inferentially-through linkage to
other evidence.” United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 2003);
see Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. ___, 2023 WL 4139001, *11 (June 23, 2023)
(determining that admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession that did
not directly inculpate the defendant and the court offers a limiting instruction telling
the jurors they may consider the confession only with respect to the confessing co-
defendant does not violate the Confrontation Clause). Thus, Bruton violations “may
be avoided through redaction if a cautionary jury instruction is given, if the
redactions are neutral, and if they do not obviously directly refer to the defendant.”
Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1085.
Davis argues that the admission of the statement in his joint trial violated Rule
403, Bruton, and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Crawford
question is easily disposed of because Crawford is concerned with the inability to
cross-examine a person who made a testimonial statement. See Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 38, 68. In this case, Ridings testified, was subject to cross-examination, and no
Crawford problem exists. Consistent with Rule 403, the statement as received and
presented to the jury was entirely silent about Davis or any conduct that could be
attributed to Davis. The district court fully instructed the jury regarding the limited
use of the plea statement and the redactions to the document do not refer to Davis,
nor were the redactions such that they drew an inference to Davis, as the entire
document never mentioned Davis or any conduct attributable to him. The district

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court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sever the trial. See Samia, 2023 WL
4139001, at *10.
Finally, even if Bruton was implicated, there was an overwhelming quantum
of evidence received at trial that was consistent with Ridings’ statement, rendering
admission of the factual statement, even if it was error, harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1086 (stating there is no Bruton problem if the
evidence erroneously received is cumulative of overwhelming and largely
uncontroverted evidence).
2. Davis’s Sentence
We review the imposition of a sentence, including an upward variance and the
substantive reasonableness of the particular sentence, applying a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard. See United States v. John, 27 F.4th 644, 651 (8th Cir. 2022)
(citations omitted). Unobjected-to procedural sentencing errors are forfeited, and
reviewed only for plain error. United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted). Since Davis did not object below to the sentence on First
Amendment grounds, we review his procedural claims for plain error.
Here, the district court specifically stated that its sentence was not based on
Davis’s faith, but rather, the district court considered that Davis used faith to
manipulate people who were susceptible to such manipulation and lull people into a
false sense of security. This Court has upheld sentences where the district court took
into account a defendant’s abuse of a religious connection. See, e.g., United States
v. Gunderson, 211 F.3d 1088, 1089 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming sentence when the
district court was concerned the defendant’s crime reflected a moral failure and the
court did not punish the defendant or hold him to a higher standard based on his
professed faith); United States v. Hoffman, 626 F.3d 993, 998-99 (8th Cir. 2010)
(determining the district court’s statements that victims were frightened into
believing they risked a loss of their salvation if they did not surrender and that

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defendant abused his power as the girls’ pastor were permissible sentencing
considerations).
A “district court’s rationale for granting [a] variance does not need to be
extraordinary, only substantively reasonable.” United States v. Davis, 20 F.4th
1217, 1221 (8th Cir. 2021). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
considering Davis’s abuse of others’ faith, nor is the sentence it imposed
substantively unreasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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