United States of America v. Jerome Moses Goodhouse, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-3467
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jerome Moses Goodhouse, Jr.
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Northern
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Submitted: June 16, 2023
Filed: August 28, 2023
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Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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KOBES, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Jerome Moses Goodhouse, Jr., of two counts of aggravated
sexual abuse of a child and one count of witness tampering. The district court1
sentenced him to life in prison for each sexual abuse count and 20 years for witness
1 The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.

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tampering, running concurrently. Goodhouse appeals both his conviction and
sentence. We affirm.
I.
Goodhouse sexually abused C.M. and E.A.H. in his mother’s basement on
separate occasions. L.M., the legal guardian of C.M. and E.A.H. and sister of
Goodhouse’s mother, often brought the two children to the house for visits. In 2017,
Goodhouse wrapped his arms around C.M.’s neck, making it difficult for her to
breathe, touched her breasts and vagina beneath her clothes, and inserted his fingers
into her vagina. He released her several minutes later and told her not to tell anyone.
C.M. was 12 years old; Goodhouse was 25. Around 2017 or 2018, E.A.H. was
playing by herself in the basement when Goodhouse came downstairs, kissed her,
touched her chest, and made her touch his penis. He then made her perform oral sex
on him before penetrating her anus with his penis. E.A.H. was between 9 and 11
years old, and Goodhouse was between 24 and 26.
At trial, the jury heard testimony from C.M., E.A.H., L.M., and a forensic
examiner. The Government introduced evidence, over objection, of Goodhouse’s
prior conviction from 2016 of abusive sexual contact of a person incapable of
consent. Goodhouse moved for judgment of acquittal, which the district court
denied, and was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and
one count of witness tampering. The district court sentenced him to life in prison
for each sexual abuse count and 20 years for witness tampering, running
concurrently.
On appeal, Goodhouse alleges insufficient evidence to support the verdict,
improper joinder of charges, improper introduction of evidence of his prior
conviction, and procedural and substantive sentencing errors.

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II.
Goodhouse argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal. We review de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict. See United States v. Paris, 816 F.3d 1037, 1038−39 (8th
Cir. 2016).
Rather than focusing on the elements of aggravated sexual abuse of a child
and witness tampering, Goodhouse argues that the testimonies of C.M. and E.A.H.
are inconsistent and uncorroborated.2 He notes that (1) C.M. claimed he sexually
abused her when she was 11 years old but later testified that it occurred when she
was 13; (2) C.M. testified that he inserted his fingers in her vagina rather than
touching it, as she reported during the forensic interview; (3) E.A.H. denied sexual
abuse when questioned in 2019 but later disclosed sexual abuse in a forensic
interview in 2021; and (4) E.A.H. testified that he forced her to perform oral sex
even though she did not disclose that during the forensic interview.
Goodhouse maintains that these inconsistencies are too significant for any
reasonable juror to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But “[a] jury's
credibility determinations are well-nigh unreviewable on appeal, even when the
standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Johnson, 39 F.4th
1047, 1052 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). And “[e]ven in the face of inconsistent
evidence, a victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.”
United States v. Seibel, 712 F.3d 1229, 1237 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We
only disturb the verdict “in extreme circumstances, such as when the witness
testified to facts that are physically impossible.” Johnson, 39 F.4th at 1052 (citation
omitted). Minor inconsistencies, like those identified by Goodhouse, “do not
warrant acquittal because it was within the jury’s province, as the finder of fact, to
2 The testimonies of C.M. and E.A.H. do not require corroboration. See United
States v. DeCoteau, 630 F.3d 1091, 1097 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A] victim’s testimony
alone can be sufficient to prove aggravated sexual abuse.”).

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resolve these inconsistencies and to accord what weight it desired to the testimony.”
United States v. Bradley, 643 F.3d 1121, 1126 (8th Cir. 2011).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient
to support Goodhouse’s convictions of aggravated sexual abuse and witness
tampering, so the district court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of
acquittal.
III.
Goodhouse argues that the charges relating to C.M. and E.A.H. were
improperly joined under Rule 8 and, in the alternative, that the failure to sever the
joined charges under Rule 14 was prejudicial.
“We review de novo the question of whether charges can be joined together.”
United States v. Garrett, 648 F.3d 618, 625 (8th Cir. 2011). “Under Rule 8, multiple
counts can be charged in a single indictment as long as the offenses are (1) of the
same or similar character; (2) based on the same act or transaction; or (3) constitute
parts of a common scheme or plan.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a)).
Goodhouse argues that, because the sexual abuses of C.M. and E.A.H.
involved different methods of penetration, victims of different ages, and different
occurrences, the charges were improperly joined. But the victims do not have to be
the same age. See United States v. Tyndall, 263 F.3d 848, 849–50 (8th Cir. 2001)
(affirming joinder for two similar counts of attempted aggravated sexual abuse—
one involving a 13-year-old victim and the other a 67-year-old victim). Nor do the
offenses have to occur at the same time. See United States v. Hastings, 577 F.2d 38,
40 (8th Cir. 1978) (affirming joinder for two offenses separated by a two-year
period); United States v. Rodgers, 732 F.2d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1984) (same for a 20-
month period). And “[t]he rules are to be liberally construed in favor of joinder.”
Garrett, 648 F.3d at 625 (citation omitted).

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Joinder was proper because the offenses are of a similar character. “In
applying the same or similar character standard, we have found joinder of offenses
to be proper when the two counts refer to the same type of offenses occurring over
a relatively short period of time, and the evidence as to each count overlaps.” United
States v. Robaina, 39 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Here, each
offense involved Goodhouse sexually abusing minor children in the same basement
sometime in 2017 or 2018. Each offense implicated the same evidence:
Goodhouse’s prior conviction and the testimonies of C.M., E.A.H., L.M., and the
forensic examiner.
In the alternative, Goodhouse argues that he was prejudiced by the district
court’s failure to sever. The district court has discretion to sever joined charges if
joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).3 A defendant is
prejudiced when “deprived of an appreciable chance for an acquittal, a chance that
the defendant would have had in a severed trial.” Garrett, 648 F.3d at 625−26
(cleaned up). Goodhouse bears the burden of establishing prejudice. See id. at 626.
Goodhouse argues that the jury considered the testimonies of C.M. and E.A.H.
collectively, which nullified the effects of each victim’s alleged testimonial
inconsistencies. But “a defendant does not suffer any undue prejudice by a joint trial
if the evidence is such that one crime would be probative and admissible at the
defendant’s separate trial of the other crime.” United States v. Little Dog, 398 F.3d
1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see Tyndall, 263 F.3d at 850−51
(affirming denial of motion to sever two attempted aggravated sexual abuse charges
3 Goodhouse failed to renew his motion to sever at the close of the
Government’s case. “We acknowledge what appears to be a split in authority on the
appropriate standard of review when a defendant moves to sever the counts during
a pretrial hearing, but fails to renew the motion at the close of the government’s case
in chief or at the close of the evidence.” Garrett, 648 F.3d at 625 n.5. “Reviewing
for either plain error or for an abuse of discretion, the outcome in this case remains
the same.” Id.

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because “the evidence of the later incident was admissible in the trial involving the
earlier one”).
Evidence of each of Goodhouse’s offenses would have been admissible in a
trial for the other. See Fed. R. Evid. 413(a) (“In a criminal case in which a defendant
is accused of a sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant
committed any other sexual assault. The evidence may be considered on any matter
to which it is relevant.”); United States v. Keys, 918 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 2019)
(“A prior sexual assault is relevant to a charged offense if it is committed in a manner
similar to the charged offense.” (citation omitted)).
Similar in character, the offenses involved related acts, locations, time
periods, and evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion—or plainly
err—by denying the motion to sever.
IV.
Goodhouse argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the
Government to introduce evidence of his prior conviction for sexual assault. See
United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133, 1139 (8th Cir. 2017) (standard of review);
Fed. R. Evid. 403. “We will reverse only when an improper evidentiary ruling
affected the defendant’s substantial rights or had more than a slight influence on the
verdict.” Johnson, 860 F.3d at 1139 (citation omitted).
Where a “defendant is accused of sexual assault, evidence of a prior sexual
assault is generally admissible . . . unless its probative value is substantially
outweighed by,” as relevant here, “the danger of unfair prejudice.” United States v.
Weber, 987 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “To constitute unfair
prejudice, the evidence must create an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis.” Id. (citation omitted). But evidence is not unfairly prejudicial
merely because it is unfavorable. See United States v. Henderson, 416 F.3d 686,
693 (8th Cir. 2005).

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Goodhouse’s prior sexual assault conviction was admissible because it was
“committed in a manner similar to the charged offense[s].” Keys, 918 F.3d at 986
(citation omitted). It occurred in the same city within a year of these charges and
involved Goodhouse touching the breasts and genitals of a female incapable of
consenting. The district court provided a limiting instruction that the prior
conviction was not offered to establish Goodhouse’s guilt of the crimes against C.M.
and E.A.H. See United States v. Crawford, 413 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“Limiting instructions decrease the danger of unfair prejudice.”). Though
unfavorable, evidence of the prior conviction was not unfairly prejudicial.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the Government to
introduce evidence of Goodhouse’s prior conviction for sexual assault.
V.
Finally, Goodhouse challenges his sentence on procedural and substantive
grounds. We first determine whether the district court committed any significant
procedural error and then whether the sentence was substantively reasonable. See
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Goodhouse argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
consider the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Godfrey, 863 F.3d 1088,
1094−95 (8th Cir. 2017). Because Goodhouse did not object to this alleged error
during sentencing, we review for plain error. See id. at 1098; United States v.
Maxwell, 664 F.3d 240, 246 (8th Cir. 2011).
“[T]here is no requirement that the district court recite every section 3553(a)
factor.” United States v. Bryant, 606 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010). All that is
required is evidence of the district court’s awareness of the relevant factors. See
United States v. Bevins, 848 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir. 2017). The district court
expressly acknowledged that it “must consider those statutory factors in any given
case” and discussed Goodhouse’s criminal history, risk to public safety, and effect

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on the victims. See Sentencing Tr. 14. The district court also listened to
Goodhouse’s arguments at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Johnson,
619 F.3d 910, 922 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district court was aware of [defendant’s]
arguments, and we therefore presume that the district court considered and rejected
them.”).
Absent procedural error, we turn to Goodhouse’s claims that the sentence was
substantively unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence for an abuse of discretion. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Because Goodhouse’s
sentence is within the Guidelines range, we may presume it is reasonable. See
United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 2008).
Goodhouse argues that the district court failed to consider that the offenses
occurred before his prior conviction and that serving his sentence for the prior
conviction rehabilitated him. But because Goodhouse presented these arguments at
sentencing, we presume the district court considered and rejected them. See
Johnson, 619 F.3d at 922; United States v. Keating, 579 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir.
2009); see also United States v. Moua, 895 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The
district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign
some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.”
(citation omitted)).
VI.
The judgment is affirmed.
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