United States of America v. James Alan Bennett

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-1542
___________________________
United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
v.
James Alan Bennett,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
____________
Submitted: October 20, 2023
Filed: January 26, 2024
____________
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
____________
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
James Bennett was convicted after a jury trial of conspiring to distribute
methamphetamine. The district court* sentenced Bennett to 300 months’
*The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.

-- 1 of 7 --

imprisonment. Bennett appeals and challenges both his conviction and sentence. We
conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the judgment.
I.
Based on seized evidence and testimony, prosecutors alleged that Bennett was
a partner with Khrista Erdman in a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy. On
October 1, 2021, officers executed a search warrant at Erdman’s house in Des
Moines. They seized over six kilograms of methamphetamine from the trunk of
Erdman’s car, and 747 grams of the drug from Bennett’s backpack. Erdman later
testified that she and Bennett acquired the drugs in Kansas City and returned to Des
Moines the night before the search.
A grand jury charged Bennett with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine
from March 2021 through October 1, 2021. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. The indictment
alleged a drug quantity of 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing
methamphetamine. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A).
At trial, Erdman testified that Bennett was her partner in a large-scale drug
distribution scheme. She testified that Bennett routinely accompanied her on out-of-
state trips to acquire methamphetamine. The partners returned to Iowa with between
4.5 and 30 kilograms of methamphetamine per trip. She testified that Bennett
distributed some of the methamphetamine to Kenneth Crook. Crook also testified and
confirmed Erdman’s account of their activities. The government introduced text
messages and location data from Bennett’s cellular telephone that further
corroborated the testimony of the co-conspirators. In total, there was evidence
suggesting that the conspirators trafficked around 120 kilograms of
methamphetamine.
-2-

-- 2 of 7 --

Some evidence also suggested that Bennett had been dealing smaller quantities
of methamphetamine to customers in the Des Moines area. Erdman testified that
Bennett acquired methamphetamine that he distributed to her from another source
before she informed him of a new, larger source in Kansas City. At the close of
evidence, Bennett requested that the jury be instructed on the potential for multiple
conspiracies. The district court denied the request but said that Bennett was
“certainly able to argue that point to the jury.”
The verdict form gave the jury three options on drug quantity and instructed
the jury as follows: “Check the drug quantity which the jury unanimously agrees was
involved in the offense. If you are unable to agree, check the lowest drug quantity.”
The jury did not convict Bennett of the charged quantity of 500 grams or the next
option of at least 50 grams. Instead, the jury selected “[s]ome quantity of a mixture
or substance containing methamphetamine.” See Id. § 841(b)(1)(C).
At sentencing, however, the district court found that Bennett was responsible
for at least 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine under the sentencing guidelines, and
calculated an advisory guideline sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment. The court
varied downward and sentenced Bennett to 300 months.
II.
Bennett first argues that the government produced insufficient evidence to
support his conviction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Bennett conspired with
others to distribute methamphetamine. Erdman testified that Bennett accompanied
her on interstate trips to acquire methamphetamine, and that Bennett later transferred
the drugs to Crook for further distribution. Crook’s testimony at trial and location
data recovered from Bennett’s cell phone corroborated Erdman’s account. Officers
seized drugs from the trunk of Erdman’s car and from Bennett’s backpack at the
-3-

-- 3 of 7 --

conclusion of the charged conspiracy. The combination of co-conspirator testimony,
seized drugs, and corroborating data were enough to support the verdict.
Bennett next argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining to
instruct the jury on multiple conspiracies. Bennett contends that evidence of his
involvement in making smaller distributions before he joined with Erdman and Cook
on larger-scale trafficking supported a finding of two separate conspiracies.
Bennett’s proposed jury instructions do not include an instruction on multiple
conspiracies, and the colloquy during trial does not set forth particular language
requested. On appeal, Bennett suggests that he wanted “the standard multiple
conspiracy instruction,” but still does not specify the proposed terms. There is a
model Eighth Circuit jury instruction providing that in some cases, a jury must decide
whether there were really two separate conspiracies, but may still convict the
defendant if he was a member of the conspiracy as charged in the indictment.
That Bennett also distributed drugs obtained from another source to persons
unknown to Erdman and Cook does not necessarily mean that he participated in two
conspiracies. A conspirator need not know all of her co-conspirators, and the
possibility that Erdman and Cook did not know some persons who dealt with Bennett
does not by itself necessitate a multiple-conspiracy instruction. United States v.
Simmons, 70 F.4th 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 2023). So too, “[a] single conspiracy is not
converted to multiple conspiracies simply because different defendants enter a
conspiracy at different times or perform different functions.” United States v.
Perez-Trevino, 891 F.3d 359, 372 (8th Cir. 2018).
But assuming for analysis that the evidence was substantial enough to support
a reasonable finding that Bennett participated in two conspiracies, we see no
prejudice to Bennett from the absence of an instruction. “[W]e will reverse a
conviction for failure to give a multiple conspiracy instruction only when the failure
to give the instruction causes substantial prejudice to the defendant.” United States
-4-

-- 4 of 7 --

v. Haslip, 416 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2005). Bennett was still able to argue the
multiple-conspiracies point and to contend that he was not a member of the charged
conspiracy. The principal concern with multiple conspiracies is the potential for
“spillover” of evidence from an uncharged conspiracy into a trial on the charged
conspiracy. United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 66 (8th Cir. 1989). Where, as here,
the defendant would be a member of both possible conspiracies, “the danger of
prejudice from [spillover] is minimal, if not non-existent.” Id. (quoting United States
v. Scott, 511 F.2d 15, 20 (8th Cir. 1975)). There was no reversible error in the jury
instructions.
III.
Bennett also raises claims of procedural error at sentencing. He first contends
that the district court erroneously denied him a two-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1. The court should apply a two-level reduction if
the defendant “clearly demonstrates” that he accepts responsibility for his offense.
USSG § 3E1.1(a). This adjustment generally “is not intended to apply to a defendant
who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential
factual elements of guilt.” USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.2). In “rare situations,”
however, a defendant who is convicted after trial may earn the adjustment, such as
when the defendant “goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to
factual guilt.” Id.; see United States v. Monds, 945 F.3d 1049, 1054 (8th Cir. 2019).
This case was not one of those rare situations. Bennett’s defense did not
merely preserve issues unrelated to factual guilt. To the contrary, he consistently
maintained that he was not factually guilty of the charged conspiracy. Although
Bennett successfully defended against the charge that he was responsible for 500
grams or more of methamphetamine, his position at trial was that he was not a
member of the charged conspiracy at all—not that he was a guilty conspirator who
was responsible for a lesser quantity of drugs. Bennett still complains that he did not
-5-

-- 5 of 7 --

conspire with Erdman and Cook, but the jury found him guilty of the charged offense.
There was no clear error in denying the downward adjustment.
Bennett next objects to the district court’s calculation of drug quantity. “In a
drug conspiracy, a defendant is held responsible for all reasonably foreseeable drug
quantities that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly
undertook.” United States v. Vinton, 429 F.3d 811, 817 (8th Cir. 2005); see USSG
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The district court determined that Bennett was responsible for
more than 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. The methamphetamine seized by
officers at Erdman’s residence on October 1, 2021, is sufficient by itself to support
the court’s finding. Erdman’s testimony that Bennett participated in other trips to
acquire large quantities of methamphetamine further buttresses the court’s
conclusion. Bennett objects that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt only that
he conspired to distribute a quantity of fewer than fifty grams of methamphetamine
mixture. But a sentencing court may attribute a larger drug quantity so long as the
court’s calculation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. United States
v. Johnson, 75 F.4th 833, 847 (8th Cir. 2023).
Bennett also contends that the 300-month sentence imposed by the district
court is unreasonable. Where, as here, the court varied downward from the guideline
sentence, “it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying
downward still further.” United States v. Espinoza, 9 F.4th 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2021)
(internal quotation omitted). Bennett complains that the court gave insufficient
weight to the median sentence imposed nationwide for his offense. The district court
properly observed, however, that the national median sentence does not account for
the unique circumstances of an individual case—such as Bennett’s prior serious drug
felony, his extensive criminal history that placed him in Category V under the
guidelines, and a large drug quantity. Even so, the district court considered
mitigating circumstances and varied downward from the guideline sentence by sixty
months. The court acted within its discretion by imposing a term that was below the
-6-

-- 6 of 7 --

guideline sentence but still represented a substantial measure of punishment for a
serious offense. See id.
* * *
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
______________________________
-7-

-- 7 of 7 --