Human Rights Defense Center v. Union County, Arkansas

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-1677
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Human Rights Defense Center,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,
v.
Union County, Arkansas; Ricky Roberts, Union County Sheriff, in his individual
and official capacities; Captain Richard Mitcham, Jail Administrator, in his
individual and official capacities; Lt. Paul Kugler, Assist. Jail Administrator, in his
individual and official capacities; John Doe, #1-10 in their individual and official capacities,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees,
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Clark-Fox Family Foundation; The Marshall Project; Prison Journalism Project;
Arch City Defenders; Missourians to Abolish the Death Penalty; Center for
Appellate Litigation; Florida Justice Institute; Just Detention International; Prison
Law Office; Rights Behind Bars; Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center;
Uptown People’s Law Center,
lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellant(s).
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - El Dorado
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Submitted: February 13, 2024

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Filed: August 6, 2024
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Before LOKEN, COLLOTON,1 and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) sued Union County and various
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. HRDC alleged that the defendants violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments when they refused to accept publications that the Center
mailed to detainees. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, and the
district court2 denied HRDC’s post-trial motion for relief. HRDC appeals, and we
affirm.
I.
HRDC is a “non-profit organization that advocates and seeks progressive
change in the criminal justice system.” As part of its advocacy work, the organization
publishes magazines and books for prisoners to inform them about their legal rights.
In 2017, HRDC began mailing copies of its publications to detainees at the Union
County Detention Center in El Dorado, Arkansas.
The Union County Detention Center houses approximately 185 persons, most
of whom are pretrial detainees. Approximately nine inmates participating in a state
1Judge Colloton became chief judge of the circuit on March 11, 2024. See 28
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
2The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Western District of Arkansas.
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work-release program are also assigned to the detention center. In 2012, the County
implemented a policy limiting incoming mail for detainees to postcards only. The
County adopted this policy to reduce avenues for contraband to enter the facility and
to conserve staff resources. The policy did not apply to inmates participating in the
work-release program.
In 2018, the County began scanning incoming mail for detainees. Detainees
access the scanned mail on tablet computers and kiosks in the detention center. The
County does not scan publications, but the tablets and kiosks contain an application
that allows detainees to access electronic books.
The executive director of HRDC knew about the County’s postcard-only policy
when it began mailing its publications to detainees at the detention center. The
County returned some of the mail with the message, “Return to Sender Reason: Post
Cards Only.” Most mailings were returned without explanation or were not returned
at all.
HRDC sued the County and several officials under § 1983, claiming that the
postcard-only policy violates the First Amendment. HRDC also alleged that the
defendants violated the Due Process Clause by rejecting mailings without explanation
and by failing to provide an appeal process for rejected mail.
At trial, HRDC presented the testimony of its executive director, the sheriff of
Union County, the administrator of the detention center, and an expert on jail
administration. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the
defendants on one claim, and the jury found for the defendants on the rest. The
district court denied HRDC’s motions for judgment as a matter of law, and HRDC
appeals.
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II.
Publishers have a limited right to communicate with prisoners under the First
Amendment. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989). “[T]here is no
question that publishers who wish to communicate with those who, through
subscription, willingly seek their point of view have a legitimate First Amendment
interest in access to prisoners.” Id. (emphasis added). Some courts have concluded
that this interest extends to unsolicited communications with prisoners, see Prison
Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 213-14 (5th Cir. 2012); Hrdlicka v. Reniff,
631 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2011), but this court has not addressed the point. Even
assuming that publishers have a First Amendment interest in sending unsolicited
communications to prisoners, we conclude that HRDC has not shown a constitutional
violation.
A prison regulation that impinges on a publisher’s protected communication
with prisoners is valid if “reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives.”
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 99 (1987); Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. Baxter County,
999 F.3d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir. 2021). That determination depends on (1) whether the
regulation is rationally connected to a legitimate and neutral governmental interest;
(2) whether the publisher has an alternative means of exercising the constitutional
right; (3) the impact that accommodating the publisher’s asserted right would have
on prison staff, prisoners, and resources; and (4) whether ready alternatives to the
regulation exist. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91; see also Abbott, 490 U.S. at 414-19.
The jury in this case considered those factors and found that the defendants did
not violate the First Amendment. The district court then denied HRDC’s renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review the denial of the motion de novo,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Structural
Polymer Grp., Ltd. v. Zoltek Corp., 543 F.3d 987, 991 (8th Cir. 2008). Viewing the
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facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assuming for analysis that we
consider application of the Turner standard de novo, we conclude that the postcard-
only policy did not violate the First Amendment.
The postcard-only policy is rationally related to legitimate penological
objectives. The County’s interests in reducing contraband and promoting institutional
efficiency are legitimate. Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (reducing contraband); Simpson v. County of Cape Girardeau, 879 F.3d 273,
279 (8th Cir. 2018) (institutional efficiency). The County presented evidence that the
postcard-only policy reduced avenues for contraband to enter the detention center and
reduced the time required for staff to check incoming mail.
HRDC also had alternative means of communicating with detainees. Since
2018, the County’s kiosks and tablets have supported an application for reading
electronic materials. The sheriff and the jail administrator testified that HRDC could
have worked with the application vendor to provide its publications to detainees.
While HRDC may prefer to mail paper copies of its publications, alternatives “need
not be ideal.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003). HRDC notes that the
kiosks and tablets were not available in 2017 when it first began mailing publications
to Union County detainees. But HRDC’s claim at trial concerned an undifferentiated
period from 2017 through 2023, and it is appropriate to consider the entire period
when evaluating the reasonableness of the County’s policy.
At trial, HRDC proposed an alternative policy: The County could allow
detainees to receive publications mailed by publishers but exclude publications
mailed by others. HRDC argues that adopting this policy would not require
reallocation of resources or additional expenditures. The organization points out that
the County already accepts publications addressed to inmates in the work-release
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program. And HRDC cites the sheriff’s testimony that the County does not search
publishers’ mailings.
The evidence, however, was inconsistent on the question of searching mail
from publishers. The sheriff testified at another point that the County does search
publishers’ mailings. The jail administrator testified that the County searches
publications. Assuming, as we must, that the jury resolved this factual dispute against
HRDC, it is evident that searching publications for 185 prisoners rather than just nine
would require reallocation of staff resources and impose “greater than de minimis
cost” on the County. Simpson, 879 F.3d at 281.
We thus conclude that the County’s policy was reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives and consistent with the First Amendment. The district court
correctly denied HRDC’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on that claim.
HRDC also alleges that the County violated the organization’s right to due
process of law by failing to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard
about rejected mailings. This court said in a prior decision that “[s]ome process was
due HRDC when its mailings were rejected,” but “due process does not require
copy-by-copy notice [if] later denials of identical publications amount to the routine
enforcement of a rule with general applicability.” Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr., 999 F.3d at
1167 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).
HRDC complains that not all publications that it mailed to Union County were
identical so it was entitled to something akin to “copy-by-copy notice.” But HRDC
received notice that some of its publications were rejected because they violated the
postcard-only policy. In fact, the executive director of HRDC testified that the
organization began mailing publications to detainees in Union County precisely
because it wanted to challenge the postcard-only policy. There was no need for the
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County to provide additional notice that different publications were rejected based
on the same postcard-only policy. And as in our prior decision, HRDC was not
entitled to a formal appeal process because the organization challenged the validity
of the postcard-only policy, not the rejection of individual mailings under that policy.
Id.
HRDC argues finally that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
give a curative instruction after the County’s attorney referred to the Turner standard
as a “rational basis” standard. The Turner standard is “‘very similar,’ if not identical,
to rational basis review.” Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation omitted); see United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 1998).
But even assuming there is a material difference between the two standards, the jury
instructions described the Turner standard, and no further instruction was necessary.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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