United States of America v. Keonte Akiwa Larel Martin

23-3440Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit31 de dez. de 2024

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United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-3729
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Keonte Akiwa Larel Martin
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
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Submitted: October 21, 2024
Filed: December 31, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Keonte Akiwa Larel Martin pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
machine gun. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The district court1 sentenced him to 60
months’ imprisonment. Martin appeals, arguing that the district court procedurally
1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Iowa.

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erred by increasing his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, which provides a two-
level enhancement for reckless endangerment while fleeing from an officer. We
affirm.
On July 5, 2022, law enforcement attempted to stop Martin’s vehicle in
Coralville, Iowa. When the officer activated his emergency lights, Martin fled in his
vehicle, reaching speeds of seventy-five miles per hour in a forty miles per hour
zone. He eventually abandoned his vehicle near an apartment complex and fled on
foot, dropping a loaded firearm later recovered by officers. When Martin was seized,
he smelled of alcohol and marijuana—officers found both marijuana and an open
bottle of liquor in his vehicle.
Months later, on January 3, 2023, law enforcement pulled over a vehicle on
Interstate 80 at night—this time, Martin was a passenger. After Martin proved
noncompliant, an officer handcuffed him and searched his backpack, where the
officer found 111 grams of marijuana, a large sum of cash, and a device that converts
a semiautomatic pistol into a machinegun. As the officer placed the contraband on
the hood of the vehicle, Martin fled on foot across the highway. He then fought
officers before they eventually apprehended him in the highway median, and he
continued struggling when they attempted to secure him in the patrol car. During
the altercation, Martin struck one officer in the face with his knee, and another
officer suffered cuts and scrapes which drew blood.
At sentencing, the district court determined that Martin’s conduct on both
occasions merited the two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during
flight.
“We review for clear error a district court’s findings with respect to reckless
endangerment during flight,” United States v. Williams, 30 F.4th 796, 799 (8th Cir.
2022), and its application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v.
Nyah, 35 F.4th 1100, 1109 (8th Cir. 2022). Section 3C1.2 of the sentencing
guidelines provides for a two-level increase when “the defendant recklessly created

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a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of
fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” The guidelines define “reckless” as “a
situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct and
the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such
a situation.” U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.4 cmt. n.1, 3C1.2 cmt. n.2.
We see no clear error in either of the district court’s findings. The record
establishes that during the July 2022 incident, Martin fled from police both on foot
and via car; Martin reached speeds of seventy-five miles per hour in a forty miles
per hour speed zone; and Martin discarded his gun while fleeing, creating the
possibility of the weapon accidentally discharging. That is more than enough to
support the application of § 3C1.2. See, e.g., United States v. Davidson, 933 F.3d
912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2019) (applying § 3C1.2 where defendant fled on foot,
discarded a firearm, scaled a fence, and struggled when officers attempted to arrest
him); United States v. Sykes, 4 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (applying
§ 3C1.2 when suspect fled in car, requiring officers to force him off the road).
As to the January 2023 incident, the undisputed facts show Martin fled across
three interstate lanes at night, then fought with officers in the median and on the side
of the road as they attempted to place him in a patrol car. Even once officers had
seized Martin in the median, it took them more than eight minutes to secure him in
the vehicle and shut the door due to his continued noncompliance. During the
entirety of Martin’s resistance to his arrest, dashcam and bodycam video shows
traffic traveling at high speeds—one officer attempting to assist had to pause to allow
a semi-truck and pickup truck to pass. By struggling with the arresting officers next
to moving lanes of traffic, Martin exacerbated the inherent danger officers face
whenever they pull somebody over next to a highly-trafficked road. See Davidson,
933 F.3d at 914 (struggling against officers created a substantial risk of serious
bodily injury beyond the minor injuries that actually resulted); see also United States
v. Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d 1481, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that defendant’s
flight on foot across three lanes of traffic on busy thoroughfare supported application

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of a § 3C1.2 sentencing enhancement). So, the court did not clearly err in finding
that Martin was aware of the risks created by his conduct, and that he grossly
deviated from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in that
situation—i.e., peaceful surrender. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.4 cmt. n.1, 3C1.2 cmt. n.2.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not commit procedural error in
calculating Martin’s sentencing guideline range.
We affirm.
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