Kyle Jerome Dalen, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Jodi Harpstead, Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, in her…

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1498
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Kyle Jerome Dalen, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Jodi Harpstead, Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services,
in her individual and official capacities
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: October 24, 2024
Filed: December 17, 2024
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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Kyle J. Dalen was ordered civilly committed, but not taken into any kind of
custody. Five months later, he was arrested for felony harassment and stalking, and
placed in the county jail. Dalen sued, alleging pretrial punishment, unreasonable

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restraint, and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court1
dismissed the complaint. Dalen appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, this court affirms.
I.
On May 20, 2021, Dalen was charged in state court with harassment and
violating a restraining order. He suffers from antisocial personality disorder,
narcissistic personality disorder, and chemical dependency.
The state court found him incapable of understanding the proceedings against
him, ordering him civilly committed on November 9, 2022. The court found that
Dalen was “unwilling to establish outpatient mental health care for either therapy or
psychiatric medication management.” Despite the order, and a Minnesota law
requiring admission to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours after a
commitment order, Dalen was not taken into any kind of custody. See Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.10, subd. 1.
Eventually, for later incidents of harassment and stalking, Dalen was arrested
on April 3, 2023. He remained in county jail until admitted to a regional treatment
center on June 6, 2023.
One month later, Dalen filed a class action complaint against Minnesota
Department of Human Services Commissioner Jodi Harpstead. He alleged she
violated his rights by failing to timely transfer him out of jail and into a treatment
facility.
The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding he failed to plausibly
allege his claims under federal law. We review de novo “the grant of a motion to
1 The Honorable Eric C. Tostrud, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.

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dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”
Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007). Courts require “only enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Courts accept a complaint’s allegations as true, but do
not accept “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). Legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id.
II.
Dalen argues that the district court improperly dismissed his claim of
deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, protecting
prisoners from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Jones v. Minnesota
Dep’t of Corr., 512 F.3d 478, 481 (8th Cir. 2008). The law requires Dalen to show:
(1) an objectively serious medical need; and (2) the defendants knew of the medical
need but were deliberately indifferent to it. Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 808–09
(8th Cir. 2006).
“The determination that a medical need is objectively serious is a factual
finding.” Jones, 512 F.3d at 482. An objectively serious medical need is one that
either has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or is so obvious that
even a “layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id.
at 481. “The prisoner must show more than negligence, more even than gross
negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation.” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094,1096 (8th Cir. 2000).
Dalen’s complaint lacks sufficient facts to support an objectively serious
medical need. The only medical conditions referenced in the complaint are that he
suffers from “antisocial personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and
chemical dependency.” These ailments, in his words, were “the same serious
medical needs that were addressed in the original commitment order.” Dalen ignores

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that the original commitment order was entered five months before his detention.
The complaint fails to plead with specificity which medical needs required attention
during his detention.
Dalen could prove an objectively serious medical need by showing he
received a physician’s diagnosis. See Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648
(8th Cir. 1999) (“The need or the deprivation alleged must be either obvious to the
layperson or supported by medical evidence, like a physician's diagnosis.”
(emphasis added)). As evidence of a doctor’s diagnosis, he relies on the civil
commitment order, which included “an evaluation and diagnosis from a court-
appointed medical examiner.” See generally Min. R. Crim. P. 20, subd. 4. But he
fails to show this diagnosis applied five months later when he was detained. He
must show not only that his condition is serious, but also urgent—one that “may
produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” See Carney v. Hess, 2007 WL
9752816 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 24, 2007), aff’d, 271 F. Appx. 543 (8th Cir. 2008). The
medical examiner’s five-month-old diagnosis here does not satisfy the standard.
Dalen’s other option is to show a medical condition so serious that “even a
layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Jones, 512
F.3d at 481. The complaint does not allege such a condition. Id. at 482
(summarizing serious medical needs that were obvious to a layperson where an
inmate: “was pregnant, bleeding, and passing blood clots, see Pool v. Sebastian
County, Ark., 418 F.3d 934, 945 (8th Cir. 2005); had swollen and bleeding gums and
complained of extreme tooth pain, see Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454, 457 (8th
Cir. 2004); experienced excessive urination, diarrhea, sweating, weight loss, and
dehydration related to known diabetes, see Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645,
647–48 (8th Cir. 1999); or exhibited signs of early labor and her medical records
clearly documented a history of rapid labor and delivery, see Rahija, 114 F.3d at
785.”).
The district court correctly dismissed the claim for deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.

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III.
Dalen alleges that the defendant’s failure to timely transfer him from jail to a
treatment facility was punitive. “The Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution prohibits the punishment of persons prior to a judgment of conviction.”
Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851, 853 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The government
may detain defendants pretrial so long as the “conditions and restrictions do not
amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 536–37 (1979).
To determine if a condition is punitive, courts analyze whether “the disability
is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some
other legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at 538. To prevail on a conditions-of-
confinement claim, the plaintiff must show the conditions were either:
(1) intentionally punitive; or (2) not “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
purpose or were excessive in relation to that purpose.” Stearns v. Inmate Servs.
Corp., 957 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2020).
Dalen’s first option is to show the conditions were intentionally punitive. He
argues in conclusory terms that jails and prisons are generally “severely detrimental
to the safety and wellbeing of individuals who suffer from disorders and
dependencies like Plaintiff.” He argues that the defendant’s delay to transfer him
from jail—absent a conviction—constituted punishment in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Dalen’s arguments fail because, as he acknowledges, he does not challenge
“some uniquely punitive condition in the jail where he was detained.” Instead, he
proposes that “the normal conditions of detention are particularly detrimental to
individuals with severe mental health conditions” and such conditions “becomes
unconstitutionally punitive when that detention is unreasonably and unjustifiably
prolonged.” To support his position, Dalen relies on cases suggesting a court

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examine the “totality of the circumstances” to decide whether conditions were
punitive. See, e.g., Villanueva, 659 F.2d at 854.
In the Villanueva case, the plaintiff pled with specificity the gross conditions
of his pretrial confinement: confined to a six-by-six-foot cell for 72-hour periods
without opportunity for exercise or showers; forced to eat meals in a cell infested
with insects and rodents; and, permitted one telephone call and one non-contact visit
per week. This court found that these conditions of confinement were
“unnecessarily excessive and bore no reasonable relation to a legitimate
governmental interest.” Id.
Dalen’s complaint alleges nothing like the Villanueva conditions. The only
specific allegation on appeal is the length of time he was in the county jail before
transfer to a treatment facility. This does not demonstrate a punitive condition of
confinement here, because his complaint fails to identify the specific condition of
confinement.
The district court correctly dismissed the claim for punitive conditions of
confinement.
IV.
Dalen challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim for unreasonable
restraint. Involuntarily civilly committed people have a protected liberty interest to
be free from unnecessary bodily restraint. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320–
22 (1982). Courts apply a “professional judgment” standard, providing deference to
the judgment of qualified professionals, whose “decision is presumptively valid.”
Id. at 323.
Dalen contends that the unreasonable restraint in question was his
“unnecessarily extended detention and the attendant conditions, including but not
limited to the complete lack of mental health treatment and de minimis physical

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health treatment.” The complaint, again, has no specific facts about how he was
restrained. His allegations of inadequate treatment are nothing like the actual
physical restraints this circuit has examined (and found reasonable). See, e.g.,
Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1031 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that “full
restraints,” including a black box, wrist chain, and leg irons, were “collectively
reasonable”); Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
that using a “blanket wrapping technique” on a disabled nine-year-old girl who
suffered from epilepsy did not violate her rights). His failure to “articulate a bodily
restraint” is fatal to a Youngberg-based claim. Montin v. Gibson, 718 F.3d 752, 755
(8th Cir. 2013) (“At some point along the spectrum of restrictions that might
potentially be characterized as bodily restraints, the asserted restraint becomes
merely an incident of the fact of commitment.”).
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The judgment is affirmed.
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