United States of America v. James E. Bowman, also known as Drake

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2156
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
James E. Bowman, also known as Drake
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
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Submitted: October 31, 2024
Filed: December 10, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
James Bowman appeals after the district court1 vacated a conviction and
sentence on one count and resentenced him on the remaining three counts to time
1The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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served plus supervised release. His counsel moved to withdraw and filed a brief
under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging his convictions and
sentence. Bowman filed a pro se brief challenging his convictions and sentence for
different reasons.
After careful review, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in
instructing the jury. See United States v. Patterson, 68 F.4th 402, 421 (8th Cir. 2023)
(standard of review); United States v. Weckman, 982 F.3d 1167, 1175 (8th Cir. 2020)
(under plain error review, considering whether jury instructions, taken as a whole,
adequately advised the jury of the essential elements of the offenses and the burden
of proof required of the government). Next, we conclude the court committed no
plain error under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). See Greer
v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507–09 (2021) (standard of review; defendant faces
uphill climb in trying to satisfy substantial-rights prong of plain-error test based on
argument that he did not know he was a felon; defendant has burden of showing
reasonable probability that outcome of trial proceeding would have been different
absent Rehaif error). Counsel’s double-jeopardy claim is unreviewable, see United
States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 1998) (double jeopardy claims may not
be raised for the first time on appeal), and in any event, the claim lacks merit, see
United States v. Thomas, 971 F.2d 147, 149 (8th Cir. 1992) (no double jeopardy
violation occurs when a person is convicted of conspiracy to commit substantive
crime and aiding and abetting the same substantive crime). To the extent counsel
argues that Bowman was sentenced to multiple punishments for the same offense, the
assertion is unsupported by the record.
We reject counsel’s argument that the district court was bound by this court’s
Guidelines calculation in United States v. Bowman, 722 Fed. Appx. 599 (8th Cir.
2018) (unpublished per curiam), after vacating one of the counts of conviction and
resentencing Bowman. See United States v. Dennis, 81 F.4th 764, 769 (8th Cir. 2023)
(under sentencing package doctrine, court may vacate entire sentence and reconfigure
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sentencing plan after vacating one of several convictions). There is no support for
counsel’s argument that Bowman was not permitted to challenge the fifth addendum
to the presentence report; moreover, to the extent counsel intended to challenge the
time-served sentence, that challenge is likely moot. See United States v. Jidoefor, 97
F.4th 1144, 1155 (8th Cir. 2024).
We reject Bowman’s pro se arguments that this court lacks jurisdiction over
this appeal, and decline to consider whether the district court should have resolved
an earlier 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion instead of ordering a resentencing, as the district
court’s January 2023 judgment and conviction is the only order properly before us.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Even assuming Bowman’s challenge to the validity of the
special housing supervised-release condition has not been waived, because his
counsel explicitly requested the condition at the resentencing hearing, see United
States v. Corn, 47 F.4th 892, 895 (8th Cir. 2022) (under invited error doctrine,
defendant who invites district court to make particular ruling waives right to claim
ruling was erroneous on appeal), the record demonstrates the court did not plainly err
in imposing the condition, see United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 694 (8th Cir.
2003) (standard of review); see also United States v. Melton, 666 F.3d 513, 518 (8th
Cir. 2012) (noting 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(11) and U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(e)(1) expressly
authorize a special supervised release condition requiring temporary residence at a
residential reentry center, and this court has “regularly upheld” such a condition as
reasonable). Finally, we conclude there is no support for Bowman’s contention that
counsel was “forced” upon him at resentencing, and to the extent Bowman intended
to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, we decline to consider it on direct
appeal. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir.
2006) (ineffective-assistance claims are usually best raised in collateral proceedings
where the record can be properly developed).
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We have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant
counsel leave to withdraw, and affirm.
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