23-3483 International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail v. The Kansas City Southern Railway Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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Nos. 23-3332/23-3483
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International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers,
Transportation Division
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
The Kansas City Southern Railway Company
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri
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Submitted: September 26, 2024
Filed: January 14, 2025
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
This case arose after an arbitration board issued an award in favor of an
employee in his dispute with Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR). The
employee’s union — International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and
Transportation Workers, Transportation Division (SMART-TD) — sought to
enforce the award in federal court. KCSR moved to dismiss, arguing the court

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lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the arbitration board needed to clarify its
award regarding back pay and vacation. The district court rejected KCSR’s
argument, determined the award was unambiguous, and enforced it under the terms
suggested by SMART-TD. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
In 2018, KCSR fired one of its conductors, Brandon Smith, after a disciplinary
investigation. On Smith’s behalf, SMART-TD challenged his discharge by
progressing a grievance pursuant to the applicable collective-bargaining agreement
(CBA) and the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188. In accordance
with the RLA, the claim was submitted to arbitration before The First Division of
the National Railroad Adjustment Board (Board). See 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i). In
2022, the Board overturned Smith’s discharge and explained its decision in Award
No. 31034 (Award). The Award detailed the “Statement of Claim” by quoting
SMART-TD’s grievance:
[T]hat Claimant be reinstated to service with seniority unimpaired and
with pay for all time lost, including time spent at the investigation,
without any deduction for outside earnings, if any, other than those
received from the Carrier and with full benefits restored and
reimbursement for any expenditures for health and welfare incurred, as
well as any COBRA payments made by the Claimant, and with all
notations removed from his personal record as a result of being
dismissed from the service of [KCSR], effective November 2, 2018.
The Award then described the circumstances surrounding Smith’s discharge
and overturned his discipline. For the “Award” section, the decision simply stated,
“Claim sustained.”
After KCSR reinstated Smith, a disagreement arose about whether KCSR
could offset Smith’s back pay by any outside earnings Smith earned during his
unemployment. SMART-TD then filed a petition to enforce the Award in federal
court.

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In January 2023, KCSR emailed the neutral arbitrator assigned to the original
arbitration before the Board, seeking clarification of the Award on the issue of back
pay. KCSR and SMART-TD exchanged emails with the neutral arbitrator about the
issue. The neutral arbitrator explained SMART-TD “expressly stated it was seeking
back pay without any deduction for outside earnings” and that he “fully sustained
the claim.” He stated it was not “permissible” to now change the Award.
In March 2023, while SMART-TD’s petition was pending, KCSR asked for
the Board to interpret the Award as it pertains to the back pay issue and whether
Smith was entitled to paid vacation for 2023. To earn paid vacation, Rule 45(e) of
the CBA required an employee to perform 140 days of compensated service in the
preceding year unless certain exceptions applied. Smith did not work the requisite
140 days, and KCSR believed he was not entitled to paid vacation in 2023.
The day after KCSR’s request to the Board for interpretation, KCSR filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the district court, arguing
the Award was incomplete and ambiguous. The district court denied KCSR’s
motion to dismiss. It ordered KCSR to provide Smith back pay with no deduction
for outside earnings and all vacation benefits to which he was entitled. The district
court also ordered KCSR to pay SMART-TD’s attorney fees in accordance with 45
U.S.C. § 153 First (p). KCSR appealed.
While KCSR’s appeals were pending, the Board issued an interpretation on
the back pay issue. The Board characterized KCSR’s request as whether the back
pay awarded could be offset by Smith’s interim earnings. It answered that question
in the negative, sustaining the Award in full without any exceptions. The
interpretation, however, did not mention the vacation issue. At oral argument before
us, KCSR conceded that the Board’s interpretation mooted the issue of back pay.
KCSR asks us to reverse the district court’s decision enforcing the Award and its
decision awarding attorney fees to SMART-TD.

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II. Analysis
KCSR argues the district court erred by enforcing the Award because it lacked
jurisdiction and was thus required to remand to the Board for interpretation of an
ambiguity. We agree.
The RLA governs labor relations in the railway industry by establishing a
mandatory arbitral mechanism for “the prompt and orderly settlement” of certain
disputes between carriers and their employees. 45 U.S.C. § 151a; see also Schiltz v.
Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1413–14 (8th Cir. 1997). Under the RLA,
disputes “are classified as either major or minor.” Schiltz, 115 F.3d at 1413. Major
disputes involve “the formation of collective[-]bargaining agreements or efforts to
secure them.” Avina v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 72 F.4th 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2023)
(alteration in original) (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252
(1994)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 555 (2024). Minor disputes “relate[] either to the
meaning or proper application of a particular provision” in a collective-bargaining
agreement. Schiltz, 115 F.3d at 1413 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’
Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 303 (1989)). The classification of a dispute “is important when
establishing jurisdiction because minor disputes must be submitted to binding
arbitration.” Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 270 F.3d
637, 639 (8th Cir. 2001).
In determining whether a dispute falls within the exclusive arbitral jurisdiction
of the RLA, we have explained that “it is not our function to interpret or construe
the language of the collectively bargained-for agreements between the parties . . . ;
rather, our function is to determine whether [the] case implicates a question of
contract interpretation.” Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,
893 F.2d 199, 203 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, Dist. Lodge No. 19 v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 850 F.2d 368, 376 (8th Cir.
1988)). In fact, “if there is any doubt about whether the dispute ‘require[s] . . .
interpret[ing] any term of a collective-bargaining agreement,’ dismissal is the only
option.” Avina, 72 F.4th at 843 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting

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Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 261). Furthermore, when federal courts are asked to
set aside an RLA arbitration award, their power to review the award is “among the
narrowest known to the law.” Schiltz, 115 F.3d at 1414 (quoting Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 858 F.2d 427, 429
(8th Cir. 1988)).
Here, the parties followed a typical procedure for resolving the dispute over
Smith’s wrongful termination, eventually placing the dispute before the Board,
which issued the Award.
RLA section 153 First (m) specifies that awards issued by the Board are “final
and binding.” 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m). Nonetheless, “[i]n case a dispute arises
involving an interpretation of the award, the [Board] upon request of either party
shall interpret the award in the light of the dispute.” Id. Section 153 First (o) states
that “[i]n case of an award by” the Board, it “shall make an order, directed to the
carrier, to make the award effective and, if the award includes a requirement for the
payment of money, to pay to the employee the sum to which he is entitled under the
award on or before a day named.” Id. § 153 First (o). The RLA also permits parties
to file a petition in federal court “[i]f a carrier does not comply with an order of [the
Board] within the time limit in such order . . . .” Id. § 153 First (p).
Keeping in mind the RLA strips federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
to interpret a collective-bargaining agreement, see Avina, 72 F.4th at 843, our limited
jurisdiction similarly applies to the district court’s role in enforcing RLA awards:
“the judicial duty to enforce an arbitration award . . . is neither a duty nor a license
to interpret it.” Bhd. Ry. Carmen Div., Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 956 F.2d 156, 160 (7th Cir. 1992). When
enforcing an award, the district court may not “implicitly interpret[]” a collective-
bargaining agreement. Id. Instead, a district court should remand to the original
arbitration panel “[i]f an arbitration award is too ambiguous to be enforced, as ‘when
the award fails to address a contingency that later arises or when the award is
susceptible to more than one interpretation.’” Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs &

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Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 500 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Green
v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 977 (6th Cir. 2000)). SMART-TD recognizes
this rule, acknowledging in its brief that “an arbitration award may be ambiguous
such that it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. The RLA addresses this
issue, allowing either party to request an interpretation of an ambiguous award.”
Balancing the tension of the district court’s power to enforce RLA awards and the
Board’s power to interpret those awards, federal courts should generally remand an
ambiguous award for clarification — a principle we have acknowledged in other
arbitration contexts. See J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 9 F.4th 663, 670
(8th Cir. 2021) (“Generally, ‘[a]n ambiguous award should be remanded to the
arbitrators.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Domino Grp., Inc. v. Charlie Parker
Mem’l Found., 985 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1993))); Harvill v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 640 F.2d 167, 170 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Ordinarily a suit to enforce an unclear
award should be remanded to the grievance tribunal for clarification.”).
We now turn to the parties’ dispute over the Award’s interpretation and the
impact on the district court’s jurisdiction to enforce the Award. We review de novo
the district court’s interpretation of an arbitration award, J.B. Hunt, 9 F.4th at 670,
and the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Avina, 72 F.4th at 842. When the district
court’s jurisdictional decision “is based on the complaint alone, or on the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record,” our “review is limited
to determining whether the district court’s application of the law is correct and, if
the decision is based on undisputed facts, whether those facts are indeed
undisputed.” ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 958
(8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990)).
“If the district court resolves disputed factual issues, its findings are reviewed for
clear error.” Id.
We begin with the issue of Smith’s paid vacation benefits. KCSR asserts the
parties did not discuss the impact of reinstatement on vacation benefits during
arbitration, and the parties have not cited evidence showing otherwise.
Consequently, the Award did not mention the issue. The closest the Board came

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was to sustain SMART-TD’s claim, which requested KCSR reinstate Smith “with
full benefits restored.” Further, unlike the issue of back pay, the Board has not since
interpreted the Award’s impact on Smith’s right to paid vacation for 2023.
KCSR argues the Award required restoration of Smith’s benefits as provided
by the CBA. Rule 45(e) of the CBA requires employees to have worked 140 days
in the preceding year to earn paid vacation for the current year unless an exception
applies. KCSR interprets the provision as applying to wrongfully terminated
employees upon their reinstatement. The district court noted KCSR’s interpretation
was consistent with KCSR’s past practice when reinstating terminated employees
represented by SMART-TD, a practice to which SMART-TD did not object.
Nonetheless, the district court determined “[t]he claim sought restoration of full
benefits, and vacation time is necessarily included in any fair understanding of
benefits.” We conclude the district court erred by going outside its jurisdiction to
interpret a term of the CBA when it enforced the Award.
The district court may be correct that “benefits” includes vacation. Yet it is
not so clear that restored “benefits” includes paid vacation when the employee did
not meet an explicit condition for earning vacation outlined in the CBA. Smith was
capable of specifically identifying the relief he sought. His claim requested
reinstatement with “seniority unimpaired,” “pay for all time lost, including time
spent at the investigation,” “reimbursement for any expenditures for health and
welfare incurred,” “COBRA payments made,” and “all notations removed from his
personal record as a result of” his dismissal. Although Smith’s claim detailed several
specific requests in the event his claim was sustained, it never mentioned paid
vacation. The mere fact that Smith also requested “full benefits restored” does not
necessarily mean the Board intended to automatically award him paid vacation after
he was reinstated in light of the requirements of Rule 45(e) of the CBA. The
ambiguity is amplified by the fact the issue was never brought before the Board, and
SMART-TD’s position conflicts with the parties’ past practice. We therefore
conclude the Award is ambiguous because each party offers a reasonable

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interpretation of the Award. See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen, 500 F.3d
at 592.
Although SMART-TD claims KCSR waived the vacation issue by not raising
it to the Board, the record does not show that the parties knew there was a dispute at
that time. In fact, as the district court noted, withholding paid vacation was
“consistent with [KCSR]’s past practice when reinstating terminated . . .
employees,” which in the past had “occurred without objection from
SMART[-TD].” We also note that KCSR complied with the Award to the extent the
parties did not challenge its interpretation, and our review of the record before us
does not give us reason to suspect KCSR manufactured the ambiguity it raised. See
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen, 500 F.3d at 593 (explaining trivial
ambiguities in awards that are manufactured by a party are not a ground to refuse to
enforce an award).
Ultimately, resolving the ambiguity of the Award requires interpreting a
particular provision of the CBA addressing the subject of paid vacation. As a result,
the court lacks jurisdiction to interpret the CBA because the controversy arises in
the context of the RLA. See Avina, 72 F.4th at 842 (“When a dispute over the
meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement crops up in a case involving a railroad
. . . , federal courts cannot hear it.”). Accordingly, the district court erred by failing
to remand to the Board for interpretation of the Award. See United Transp. Union
v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 529 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding if “the award is
too indefinite to be enforced, and cannot be made definite by considering
nonspecialized extrinsic evidence, then the court should remand to the board for
clarification of the award”). Although the parties also originally disputed the
interpretation of the Award over Smith’s entitlement to back pay without deductions
based on interim earnings, the parties have received the Board’s interpretation on
that question, which moots that specific issue.
That leaves the issue of attorney fees, which the district court awarded to
SMART-TD because it prevailed in its effort to enforce the Award. See 45 U.S.C.

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§ 153 First (p) (“If the petitioner shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney’s fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit.”). Because
the district court erred in enforcing the ambiguous Award without the Board’s
interpretation, we vacate the award of attorney fees.1
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and vacate the judgments of the district
court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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1 In light of this opinion, the district court may reconsider on remand whether
SMART-TD is entitled to any attorney fees and, if so, in what amount.

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