United States of America v. Archester Rodgers

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2193
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Archester Rodgers
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: January 24, 2025
Filed: January 29, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Archester Rodgers appeals the sentence imposed by the district court1 after he
pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, to being a
1The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Iowa.

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felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. His counsel has moved for leave
to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
challenging his sentence as substantively unreasonable. Rodgers has filed a pro se
brief asserting he was not competent to plead guilty due to psychiatric issues and
arguing that his due process rights were violated at sentencing.
Upon careful review, we conclude that, to the extent Rodgers intended to
challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea based on his assertion that he was not
competent to plead guilty, the claim is not cognizable in this appeal. See United
States v. Foy, 617 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (8th Cir. 2010) (claim that plea was
unknowing or involuntary is not cognizable on direct appeal where defendant failed
to move in district court to withdraw guilty plea). Regardless, the record
demonstrates that Rodgers entered into the plea agreement and appeal waiver
knowingly and voluntarily. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-91 (8th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (one important way district court can ensure plea agreement and
appeal waiver are knowing and voluntary is to question defendant about decision to
enter into agreement and to waive right to appeal); Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d
699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements made during plea hearing carry
strong presumption of verity). As to the remaining issues raised in this appeal, we
conclude that the appeal waiver is valid, enforceable, and applicable. See United
States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (validity and applicability of an
appeal waiver are reviewed de novo); Andis, 333 F.3d at 889-92 (appeal waiver will
be enforced if the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and the waiver, and
enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice).
We have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the
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appeal waiver. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal, and grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
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