Danny Lee Hooper v. Roosevelt Barden, Captain Shift Supervisor, EARU

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1783
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Danny Lee Hooper
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v.
Roosevelt Barden, Captain Shift Supervisor, EARU
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Delta
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Submitted: January 23, 2025
Filed: February 25, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Arkansas inmate Danny Lee Hooper appeals following the district court’s1
adverse judgment based on the partial grant of summary judgment and an adverse jury
1The Honorable D.P. Marshall Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Edie
R. Ervin, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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verdict in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Upon de novo review, we affirm the grant of
summary judgment on Hooper’s excessive-force claims regarding the use of pepper
spray and a Taser during the extraction from his cell, and the takedown during
Hooper’s escort to an isolation cell. See Peterson v. Heinen, 89 F.4th 628, 636 (8th
Cir. 2023) (officer did not use excessive force by pepper-spraying handcuffed but
recalcitrant inmate who cursed at, threatened, and spit at officers); Burns v. Eaton,
752 F.3d 1136, 1138, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard of review; affirming summary
judgment for officer who pepper-sprayed inmate, as inmate was refusing to leave cell,
officer warned inmate that he would be sprayed if he did not submit to handcuffs, and
officer sprayed inmate after each act of defiance); Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 759
(8th Cir. 1993) (use of stun gun is constitutionally permissible when prison security
and order, or safety of other inmates or officers, has been jeopardized).
To the extent Hooper challenges the sufficiency of the jury’s adverse finding
on the excessive-force claim regarding Barden’s alleged assault in the isolation cell,
we conclude that Hooper failed to preserve this issue for appeal, as he did not file
timely motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(a) or 50(b). See Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2012) (to
preserve insufficiency argument, party must move for judgment as a matter of law
before submission to jury, or after verdict and entry of judgment, in accordance with
rule). Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Hooper’s motion for
leave to amend his complaint. See Friedman v. Farmer, 788 F.3d 862, 869 (8th Cir.
2015) (standard of review).
The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We deny Hooper’s pending
appellate motion for judgment as a matter of law.
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