James Saylor v. Rob Jeffreys, Director of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-3414
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James Saylor
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Rob Jeffreys, Director of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, in his
official capacity
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
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Submitted: November 20, 2024
Filed: March 19, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, BENTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
James M. Saylor sued the Director of Nebraska’s Department of Correctional
Services, alleging deprivation of accommodations, unlawful placement in solitary
confinement, and discrimination based on disability. The district court1 dismissed
1 The Honorable John M. Gerrard, United States District Judge for the District
of Nebraska.

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the complaint. He appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court
affirms.
In 1985, Saylor, convicted of second-degree murder, was sentenced to life in
prison. Assaulted by other inmates in 2002, he was later diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder due to the attack. In 2010, he won a $250,000 judgment
against the Department for its failure to stop the attack and provide adequate care
afterward.
In 2012, Saylor sued in federal court attacking the conditions of his
confinement (Saylor I). Saylor v. Kohl, 2016 WL 8201925 (D. Neb. Nov. 28, 2016).
In 2017, he brought two suits in state court, also attacking the conditions of his
confinement (Saylor II and Saylor III). See Saylor v. State, 995 N.W.2d 192, 196
(Neb. 2023). All cases were dismissed.2
Saylor brought this fourth case under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district
court dismissed, concluding his claims were barred by res judicata.
Saylor first argues that the district court erred in concluding the claims in this
case are based on the same nucleus of operative facts as those alleged in Saylor 1.
He asserts that in January 2018, the Director “took away accommodations he had
previously provided to Saylor, placed [him] in solitary confinement, excluded [him]
from programs, activities, aids, and services, and did so discriminatorily based upon
[his] disability, PTSD.” These facts, his argument goes, “were sufficient to comprise
a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the
first.”
This court reviews de novo the dismissal of a case on res judicata grounds.
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 533 F.3d 634, 639
(8th Cir. 2008). Res judicata is when “a final judgment on the merits of an action
2 This court takes judicial notice of the records in these cases.

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precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have
been raised in that action.” Id. The doctrine applies when: “(1) the first suit resulted
in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was based on proper jurisdiction;
(3) both suits involve the same parties (or those in privity with them); and (4) both
suits are based upon the same claims or causes of action.” Elbert v. Carter, 903 F.3d
779, 782 (8th Cir. 2018). “Whether two claims are the same for res judicata purposes
depends on whether the claims arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact or are
based upon the same factual predicate.” Id.
On November 28, 2016, the district court dismissed Saylor’s § 1983 claims in
Saylor I, 2016 WL 8201925. One month later, he moved to: (1) vacate the dismissal
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and (2) file a third amended complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The district court denied his motions. Saylor v. Kohl, 2017
WL 486921, at *1 (D. Neb. Feb. 6, 2017).
Saylor argues that in Saylor I, the district court “did not dismiss with prejudice
or rule on the merits . . . but simply found that [he] had not met the standard for a
Rule 59(e) motion . . .” and also refused to allow an amended complaint. He
concludes that there was no “judgment on the merits” in Saylor I, and thus res
judicata does not bar his claim in this case.
To the contrary, it is “well settled that denial of leave to amend constitutes res
judicata on the merits of the claims which were the subject of the proposed amended
pleading.” King v. Hoover Grp., Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 222–23 (8th Cir. 1992). Saylor
tries to counter with Lundquist v. Rice Memorial Hospital, 238 F.3d 975 (8th Cir.
2001). While employed, Lundquist sued alleging discrimination under the ADA.
238 F.3d at 976. Later, she was fired. Id. The court denied her motion to add later
“specific discriminatory events” resulting in alleged wrongful termination. Id. at
976–77. She then filed a second suit. This court held that her wrongful termination
claims were not barred by res judicata because she “did not have a claim for wrongful
termination at the time she filed her first Complaint,” so “the merits of Lundquist’s
wrongful termination claim were never addressed by the district court.” Id. at 978.

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Unlike Lundquist, Saylor had an ADA claim when he filed his Saylor I
complaint. Saylor believes that his claims here arise from new facts that occurred
years after Saylor I. He says that the new facts are the “Director’s rescission of
accommodations, which had been provided to him after the facts in, and the filing
of, Saylor I.” See id. at 977 (“it is well settled that claim preclusion does not apply
to claims that did not arise until after the first suit was filed.”) (cleaned up).
In fact, Saylor’s proposed amended complaint in Saylor I would have added
an ADA claim arising out of “the same nucleus of operative fact” as his original
complaint there—so he could have brought the ADA claim then. See Elbert, 903
F.3d at 782. In this case, Saylor again complains of ADA discrimination by the
Director but alleges no new specific discriminatory events. In Saylor I, Saylor
alleged that he was “discriminated against” because “of his disease or disability,
specifically PTSD.” Here, Saylor asserts he “has been, and continues to be,
discriminated against because he has PTSD.” Although both complaints reference
his time in prison from 2002 to 2013, the complaint here adds that he “continued to
be housed in solitary confinement” from 2013 to 2016, and 2018 to 2021. Saylor’s
complaint repeats facts from Saylor I, adding how they continued and reoccurred.
Any “new facts” may be additional evidence, but are not specific discriminatory
events. The nucleus of operative facts remains the same. See Banks v. Int’l Union
Elec., Elec., Tech., Salaried & Mach. Workers, 390 F.3d 1049, 1052–53 (8th Cir.
2004) (“Where a plaintiff fashions a new theory of recovery or cites a new body of
law that was arguably violated by a defendant’s conduct, res judicata will still bar
the second claim if it is based on the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior
claim.”). “The pertinent question is whether the second claim is based on subsequent
legal or factual events that produce a different nucleus of operative facts, not whether
those events inspire new legal theories of recovery or provide additional evidence
supporting the previously rejected claim.” United States v. Bala, 948 F.3d 948, 951
(8th Cir. 2020). When the Saylor I court denied the motion to amend, it addressed
the merits of his ADA claim and issued a final judgment.

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Saylor emphasizes Whole Woman’s Health to assert that claim preclusion
does not apply to claims based on new facts. See Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582, 599–600 (2016) (“Material operative facts occurring after
the decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in themselves,
or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may
be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first.”).
Saylor’s “new facts” refer to the Director's “rescission of accommodations
which the Director had provided to Saylor from late 2017 until early 2018.” His
complaint outlines the following facts:
• In 2016, Saylor experienced a mental breakdown.
• After a hospital stay, he was transferred to the Mental Health Unit,
given a single cell, and provided other accommodations.
• He remained in the Mental Health Unit from July 25, 2016, to
January 24, 2018.
• He was later ordered out of the Mental Health Unit but refused to
comply, leading officials to place him in the LCC C Unit—solitary
confinement.
The movement into and out of the Mental Health Unit does not give rise to a
new claim. Saylor acknowledges that he was placed “back into solitary
confinement”—the same conditions this Court found lawful in Saylor I. See Saylor
I, 2016 WL 8201925 at *1. While Saylor’s transfer to the Mental Health Unit was
a subsequent event, it did not produce a different nucleus of operative facts. The
essence of his complaint is unchanged: he seeks a cell of his own. The movement is
only one “transaction” in a “series of connected transactions” alleging discrimination
against Saylor. See Lane v. Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 742 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1980)). Saylor’s reliance on the prisoners-
drinking-contaminated-water analogy in Whole Woman’s Health is inapplicable.
579 U.S. at 600 (“If at first their suit is dismissed because a court does not believe
that the harm would be severe enough to be unconstitutional, it would make no sense

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to prevent the same prisoners from bringing a later suit if time and experience
eventually showed that prisoners were dying from contaminated water.”). Here,
there is no time and experience effect.3 Saylor’s ADA claim was neither “remote”
nor “speculative” when it was rejected in Saylor I. See id. at 601. An eighteen-
month stay in the Mental Health Unit, and subsequent return to conditions this court
held constitutional, is not the kind of “concrete factual development” contemplated
by the Supreme Court. See id. at 602.
The district court properly applied res judicata in this case.
Second, Saylor argues the district court should have granted his motion for
“consideration of issue and directions.” Construing this as a motion for extension
of time to amend the complaint, the court denied the motion. This court reviews the
denial of an extension for abuse of discretion. Soliman v. Johanns, 412 F.3d 920,
921 (8th Cir. 2005). Saylor’s motion does not explicitly request leave to amend.
Nor does the motion explain the substance of the proposed amendment. “A district
court does not abuse its discretion in failing to invite an amended complaint when
plaintiff has not moved to amend and submitted a proposed amended pleading.”
Drobnak v. Andersen Corp., 561 F.3d 778, 787 (8th Cir. 2009). The district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.
Third, Saylor challenges the district court’s rejection of his Rule 59(e) motion
to alter or amend the judgment. This, too, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP v. Lewis, 40 F.4th 830, 842 (8th Cir. 2022). “A district
court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
motion to alter or amend judgment, and this court will not reverse absent a clear
abuse of discretion.” Innovative Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assocs. of
3 This does not suggest that an extended period in solitary confinement can
never produce a new claim. This case does not provide the opportunity to address
whether indefinite solitary confinement might give rise to a new conditions-of-
confinement claim if, for example, the conditions caused significant deterioration of
mental or physical health over time. See Whole Women’s Health, 579 U.S. at 600.

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the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). Saylor’s rule
59(e) motion repeated arguments that the district court rejected in dismissing his
complaint. There is no ground for reversal. See Voss v. Hous. Auth. of the City of
Magnolia, 917 F.3d 618, 626 n.6 (8th Cir. 2019) (concluding “the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying [appellant’s] Rule 59(e) motion, which largely
repeated the same arguments advanced at the summary judgment stage.”).
Fourth, Saylor argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
leave to file his third amended complaint. As discussed, Saylor’s claims—which
repeated in the third amended complaint—are barred. The third amended complaint
is thus futile. See Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir.
2008) (motion to amend complaint properly denied if amendment would be futile).
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The judgment is affirmed.
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