United States of America v. Julian Bear Runner

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2395
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Julian Bear Runner
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Western
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Submitted: February 13, 2025
Filed: April 24, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, BENTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Julian R. Bear Runner was convicted of wire fraud, larceny, and
embezzlement and theft from an Indian Tribal Organization in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1343, 661, 1153, 1163. The district court1 sentenced him to 22 months in prison
1The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

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and ordered $82,484 in restitution. Bear Runner appeals. Having jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
The Oglala Sioux Tribe (“OST”) is a federally recognized Indian Tribal
Organization headquartered in Pine Ridge, South Dakota. Bear Runner, an enrolled
member of OST, served as President from December 2018 through December 2020.
Before taking office, Bear Runner learned about the Tribe’s travel policies
during orientation. Travelers were required to complete a travel authorization form
specifying the dates, destination, and purpose of their trip. Once the details were
verified, a travel specialist advanced the full amount of the estimated expenses to the
traveler. If a traveler did not make the trip, they were responsible to return the
unused funds to the Tribe. Those who travelled were required to submit a travel
report upon their return.
While President, Bear Runner pressured travel specialists to approve forms,
submitted fraudulent travel requests, and ultimately embezzled travel funds. With
advance payments of over $80,000, he traveled to and gambled at the Prairie Wind
Casino in Pine Ridge, South Dakota.
The jury found Bear Runner guilty on all counts. He argues that the
government failed to prove the requisite criminal intents for his offenses, and that
the district court committed procedural and substantive errors in sentencing.
II.
This court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and
will affirm the jury’s verdict “if, taking all facts in the light most favorable to the
verdict, a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty of the charged
conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Clark, 668 F.3d 568, 572 (8th

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Cir. 2012). This court’s task is not to weigh the evidence or assess witness credibility
because the jury has “the sole responsibility to resolve conflicts or contradictions in
testimony.” United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2010).
The wire fraud, larceny, and embezzlement charges required the government
to prove intent. See 18 USC §§ 1343, 661, 1153, 1163. “Fraudulent intent need not
be proved directly and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding
a defendant’s actions.” United States v. Flynn, 196 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 1999).
Bear Runner argues that his intent to defraud the Tribe is negated because “per
[tribal] policy,” he “would have expected any overpayments to be withheld from his
pay.” He expected that his failure to file travel reports would result in a payroll
deduction, the argument goes, disproving any intent to defraud, steal, or embezzle
funds.
But according to the travel specialist, it was Bear Runner—not the Tribe—
who was responsible for ensuring funds not used for official travel were returned to
the Tribe. Bear Runner never repaid any of the advance payments. The jury also
received sufficient evidence to reasonably infer his intent to defraud. Bear Runner
often submitted requests for travel to two different destinations at the same time,
receiving funds for both. Despite requesting and receiving funds to travel to
Nebraska, New Mexico, Montana, Ohio, South Carolina, Arizona, New York, and
California, he exclusively visited the Prairie Wind Casino in South Dakota. Twice,
he presented at tribal meetings on the reservation when he was claimed to be
traveling. “When the ‘necessary result’ of the actor’s scheme is to injure others,
fraudulent intent may be inferred from the scheme itself.” United States v. Brown,
627 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 2010).
Bear Runner’s treatment of the travel specialist and his administrative
assistant further defeats his argument. Evidence suggested he used his position as
Tribe president to manipulate the approval process in his favor—pressuring staff to
fast-track approvals and to ignore red flags. He visited the travel office after hours,

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and “hover[ed] over” specialists, rushing them to approve his requests. The Tribe’s
accounts-payable supervisor, for example, testified that Bear Runner arrived after
hours “wanting to push [travel authorizations] through” in a way that made her feel
“not too well.” Multiple employees testified they felt pressured to sign his forms, or
risk losing their jobs. Bear Runner’s administrative assistant further testified that
she was asked to close out travel reports without the required receipts and that Bear
Runner directed her to draft memos justifying his travel. “A scheme to defraud is
generally one which is reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary
prudence and comprehension.” United States v. Behr, 33 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir.
1994).
Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Bear Runner intended to
defraud, steal, and embezzle.
III.
Bear Runner argues that the district court committed procedural and
substantive error in sentencing. Because he failed to object at the time of sentencing,
review is for plain error. United States v. Lovelace, 565 F.3d 1080, 1087 (8th Cir.
2009). Bear Runner must show “there was an error, the error is clear or obvious
under current law, the error affected the party’s substantial rights, and the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Delgrosso, 852 F.3d 821, 828 (8th Cir. 2017); Fed.
R. Crim. P. 52.
Bear Runner argues that the district court erred by “misconstru[ing] his
statement to the court as indicative of a lack of acceptance of responsibility.” But
his own brief acknowledges a “refusal to accept responsibility” for “political reasons
. . . .” Bear Runner pled not guilty, explicitly told the court he did not accept
responsibility, and shifted blame to employees in the accounting department for his
actions. At no point did he accept responsibility for embezzling over $80,000 from
the Tribe. See United States v. McQuay, 7 F.3d 800, 802–03 (8th Cir. 1991)

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(acceptance of responsibility requires defendants to express genuine remorse and
accept responsibility for their wrongs). The district court committed no procedural
error.
Bear Runner also argues that the district court committed substantive error in
failing to consider a relevant factor in sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (a
sentencing court “shall consider” sentencing disparities among similarly situated
defendants). “A sentence within the Guidelines range is accorded a presumption of
substantive reasonableness on appeal.” United States v. St. Claire, 831 F.3d 1039,
1043 (8th Cir. 2016).
This argument fails. The district court acted within its discretion in
considering similarly situated defendants and determining that Bear Runner’s
individual circumstances warranted a different outcome. The court considered Bear
Runner’s extensive criminal history, the impact of his crimes, his failure to accept
responsibility, and the need to protect the public from future crimes. A sentencing
court has “wide latitude to weigh the 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some
factors greater weight than others.” See United States v. Hubbs, 18 F.4th 570, 572
(8th Cir. 2021).
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The judgment is affirmed.
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