United States of America v. Freeman Whitfield, IV, also known as Mr. Furley, also known as Furl, also known as…

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1368
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Freeman Whitfield, IV, also known as Mr. Furley, also known as Furl, also known
as Farley, also known as Mr. Farley, also known as Furley Beam, also known as
Furley
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: February 10, 2025
Filed: June 18, 2025
[Published]
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Before SMITH, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Freeman Whitfield IV appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motion to
suppress evidence and his motion to sever his charged counts. We affirm.
1 The Honorable Matthew T. Schelp, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri.

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I. Background
In 2018, Detective James Gaddy of the St. Charles County, Missouri Police
Department was investigating a large-scale drug distributor in the St. Louis area
named Guy Goolsby. Detective Gaddy applied for and received wiretap
authorization for Goolsby’s cell phone. The wiretap information allowed
investigators to intercept Goolsby’s calls and those of two other individuals who
sold fentanyl pills. Whitfield was one of those individuals. In 2019, investigators
applied for wiretap authorization of Goolsby’s other cell phones. Soon after,
Goolsby was intercepted directing Whitfield and another individual to retrieve
drugs. In May 2019, the government indicted Goolsby, Antonio Boyd, and 13 others
for their involvement in a drug distribution conspiracy. Boyd cooperated with
investigators and identified Whitfield as a “lower-level distributor and ‘shooter’[2]
for Goolsby’s operation.” R. Doc. 2, at 6. In December 2019, investigators learned
that a drive-by shooter had shot Boyd and his friend while they were standing in
Boyd’s front yard. The shots killed Boyd and injured his friend. The friend identified
the shooter as driving a silver sedan. In addition, several witnesses reported a silver
sedan speeding away from the house. Boyd’s brother, as he headed to Boyd’s house
shortly after the shooting, saw a silver sedan. He identified the driver as Whitfield.
Investigators collected ammunition from the shooting scene that matched the
ammunition found in Boyd’s body.
Three days later, investigators intercepted a call between a suspected drug
distribution conspirator and Whitfield. Although the conversation was intentionally
coded, the other suspect asked Whitfield if he knew Boyd’s brother. The caller told
Whitfield that Boyd’s brother said he saw Whitfield at the shooting scene. Whitfield
responded that Boyd’s brother was not even at the house. Whitfield’s response
implied that he may have been present at the scene. Based on this conversation,
investigators believed that they were referencing the Boyd murder. Whitfield’s
2 A “shooter” is a term used to describe “an armed enforcer” for a drug
distribution organization. Appellee’s Br. at 4.

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asserted knowledge and his conspiracy role as a shooter implicated Whitfield as the
possible assailant. Once investigators obtained Whitfield’s phone number, they
applied for and received a warrant to obtain cell tower data to determine the
historical locations of the phone on the days surrounding the murder. According to
the historical data, Whitfield was moving between cell towers on a direct route to
Boyd’s house on the day of the murder and quickly departed the area immediately
after.
Investigators continued to document Whitfield’s involvement in the drug
conspiracy from January to July 2020. A law enforcement informant identified
Whitfield selling fentanyl on several occasions during that period. However,
Whitfield suspected the informant’s cooperation and subsequently cut off
communication and changed his phone number. In March 2021, investigators
obtained Whitfield’s new phone number and obtained digital geolocation
information. The phone was located in an apartment complex on Tributary Drive.
From March to April 2021, investigators conducted physical surveillance of
Whitfield that revealed his regular departure early each morning from the Tributary
Drive apartment to the Union Boulevard apartment. He would carry the same bag
with him each time. He would then depart the Union Boulevard apartment, enter his
rental vehicle, briefly meet with other vehicles at a different location, and then return
directly to the Union Boulevard apartment. The investigators believed that this
activity was consistent with drug sales and that the apartments were likely used for
stashing drugs and drug proceeds. Investigators installed a closed-circuit video
recording system in the public area of the Tributary Drive apartment and recorded
Whitfield entering apartment 517.
On April 28, 2021, Detective Gaddy applied for search warrants for both the
Union Boulevard apartment and the Tributary Drive apartment. The warrants were
accompanied by identical affidavits detailing the information outlined above. The
warrants stated that the purpose of the search was to find “[a]rticles of personal
property tending to establish and document” Whitfield’s “use of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime . . . resulting in death,” as well as evidence

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of “possession with intent to distribute narcotics.” R. Doc. 68, at 12. The affidavits
also contained the following statement:
Furthermore, although a subject may discard a particular weapon used
in a crime especially if the shooting resulted in death, based on prior
experiences, I am aware subjects often fail to discard the left over
ammunition they used in a crime. Based on my training and experience,
I believe that WHITFIELD may still be in physical possession of
predecessor telephone #1 (telephone WHITFIELD was in possession
of at time of homicide), ammunition, and/or other evidence which was
used during the homicide and shooting on December 9, 2019.
Id. at 24 (bold omitted).
The magistrate judge approved and signed the search warrants. Investigators
executed both warrants simultaneously on May 4, 2021. Investigators encountered
Whitfield at the Tributary Drive apartment and detained him. During the search of
the Tributary Drive apartment, investigators found and seized firearms, ammunition,
drug proceeds, and cell phones. The concurrent search of the Union Boulevard
apartment produced drugs, firearms, a ballistic vest, and suspected drug proceeds. In
Whitfield’s stash of ammunition was a partially filled box of the exact ammunition
that officers found at the scene of Boyd’s murder.
A grand jury indicted Whitfield with seven counts related to the events in
December 2019 and summer 2020. Count I alleged that Whitfield conspired to
possess and distribute controlled substances between March 8, 2018, through May
4, 2021, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). Count II alleged
that Whitfield, on or about December 9, 2019, discharged a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime and that the violation resulted in a death, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (j)(1). Count III alleged that Whitfield, on or about
December 9, 2019, knowingly possessed one or more firearms in furtherance of drug
trafficking crimes, in violation of § 924(c)(1)(A). Count IV alleged that on or about
May 4, 2021, Whitfield possessed with intent to distribute more than 400 grams of
fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). Count V alleged

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that on or about May 4, 2021, Whitfield knowingly possessed one or more firearms
in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
Count VI and VII alleged that Whitfield knowingly possessed firearms and
ammunition knowing he had previous felony convictions, in violation of
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1).
Prior to trial, Whitfield filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to
sever Counts II and III from the remaining counts, a motion to suppress physical
evidence from the search of the residences, and a motion to suppress electronic
surveillance evidence. Following a hearing on the motions, the magistrate judge
issued an order and recommendation advising that all of Whitfield’s motions be
denied. Whitfield objected, but the district court overruled the objection and denied
his pretrial motions. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the evidence that
Whitfield sought to suppress was admitted at trial and presented to the jury.
Whitfield was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life. Whitfield timely filed
this appeal.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Whitfield contends that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress and his motion to sever Counts II and III from the remaining
counts.
A. Motions to Suppress
Whitfield appeals the denial of his motions to suppress the physical evidence
seized upon the search of his two apartments and the electronic surveillance evidence
obtained by investigators after receiving a warrant to wiretap various devices. We
review the denial of a motion to suppress under a “mixed standard of review.” United
States v. Charles, 125 F.4th 904, 909 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 777 F.3d 1013, 1015 (8th Cir. 2015)). “[W]e review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Juneau, 73 F.4th 607, 613 (8th Cir. 2023)).

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1. Physical Evidence
Whitfield argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the physical evidence collected at his apartments because the affidavits supporting
the warrant application lacked probable cause. More specifically, Whitfield argues
that the investigators’ suspicion of drug activity was linked to documented drug
transactions occurring too remotely in time. Thus, the affidavit’s assertion that
Whitfield used the apartments in relation to drug trafficking lacked sufficient
evidence. Additionally, he argues that the affidavits failed to show why evidence
related to the 2019 murder would be found in either residence.
When evaluating whether a warrant affidavit is sufficient to establish probable
cause, “our role is to ensure that the issuing [court] had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed.” United States v. Mayo, 97 F.4th 552, 555
(8th Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Juneau, 73 F.4th at 614). “Probable
cause exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Probable
cause is ‘not a high bar.’” Charles, 125 F.4th at 910 (quoting Kaley v. United States,
571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)).
We hold that the affidavit supporting the warrant application was sufficient to
establish probable cause to search the two residences. The affidavit set forth concrete
evidence and observations regarding Whitfield’s involvement in the drug
conspiracy. Investigators had intercepted confirmed drug transactions by Whitfield
back in 2020. Later, when the officers no longer had an informant working with
Whitfield, they relied on physical surveillance. There was no evidence that Whitfield
conducted his drug transactions inside either residence. But the affidavits included
evidence showing Whitfield repeatedly leaving one residence to travel to the other
with the same bag. He would engage in short-term suspected drug transactions with
other vehicles and then return to the Union Boulevard apartment before heading back
to the Tributary Drive apartment. Whitfield’s habits were consistent with using the
residences as stash houses for drugs and drug proceeds. These facts established a
reasonable probability that evidence of drug possession and distribution would be

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found at the residences. The transactions’ occurrences outside the home did not
prevent the house from being connected to the drug transactions. The residences
stored the drugs, drug proceeds, possible weapons, and other drug paraphernalia.
Similarly, the affidavit contained evidence concerning Whitfield’s suspected
involvement in Boyd’s murder. Whitfield had been identified as the “shooter” for
the conspiracy, see R. Doc. 2, at 6, and investigators had reason to suspect that he
committed the murder based on geolocation data and intercepted conversations. The
lapse of time between the murder and the warrant to search the apartments did not
invalidate the affidavit. The investigator’s affidavit included a statement that
suspects “often fail to discard the left-over ammunition they used in a crime.” R.
Doc. 76, at 7. Thus, investigators believed that Whitfield might still be in possession
of an old phone from the time of the murder, as well as the ammunition that was
used during the murder. Viewed in totality, the affidavits were supported by a
reasonable probability of discovering evidence of the Boyd murder. Therefore, the
magistrate judge had a sound basis for concluding that probable cause existed to
search the Union Boulevard apartment and the Tributary Drive apartment.
Additionally, the district court overruled Whitfield’s objection to the
magistrate judge’s “finding that it was objectively reasonable for law enforcement
officers executing the search warrants to rely in good faith on the issuing judge’s
findings of probable cause.” R. Doc. 76, at 9–10 (citing United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 905 (1968)). On appeal, Whitfield did not contest this finding in his
opening brief. He also does not allege that the affidavit contained any facial
deficiencies, that the issuing judge abandoned its judicial role, or that the affidavit
was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotations marks
omitted). Whitfield, thus, does not argue, and the record does not show, that it was
“entirely unreasonable” for the officers to believe that the warrant application
established probable cause. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 553 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress the physical evidence found at the two residences.

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2. Wiretap Evidence
The affidavits supporting the search warrant for Whitfield’s residences
highlighted intercepted conversations connecting him to the drug conspiracy and the
Boyd murder. Whitfield argues that this wiretap evidence should have been
suppressed. He contends that the affidavits supporting the multiple wiretap warrants
failed to assert that “other investigative procedures ha[d] been tried and failed” or
“reasonably appear[ed] to be unlikely to succeed if tried or [would] be too
dangerous” as required under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). Whitfield argues that the
warrant affidavits illustrate the investigator’s prior success using other investigative
techniques rather than failure. He contends that the warrants should not have been
granted because they were unneeded.
Section 2518 sets forth the procedure for authorizing the interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications. Each application must include “a full and
complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been
tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or
to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). This “is known as the ‘necessity’
requirement.” United States v. Armstrong, 60 F.4th 1151, 1161 (8th Cir. 2023)
(quoting United States v. Merrett, 8 F.4th 743, 749 (8th Cir. 2021)). “To satisfy this
requirement, the government need not ‘exhaust every available investigative
technique.’” Id. (quoting Merrett, 8 F.4th at 749). Rather, the government must
establish “that conventional investigatory techniques have not been successful in
exposing the full extent of the conspiracy and the identity of each coconspirator.”
Id. (quoting Merrett, 8 F.4th at 749). “We will affirm a district court’s finding of
necessity unless substantial evidence does not support the determination, the
determination ‘evolve[d] from an erroneous view of the applicable law,’ or ‘we, after
reviewing the whole record, have a definite and firm conviction that the district court
made a mistake.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Merrett, 8 F.4th at 749).
Here, the affidavits provided a detailed list of numerous investigative
techniques and explained why they were not fully successful, would not be

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successful if tried, or were too dangerous to try. The investigators’ partial success
with some investigatory methods does not win the day for Whitfield. The limitations
of those methods were thoroughly explained in the affidavit. See id. On this record,
the district court did not clearly err when it denied the motion to suppress upon a
finding that the government had satisfied the necessity requirement.
B. Motion to Sever Counts II and III
Lastly, Whitfield argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
sever Counts II and III from the remaining counts because the conduct charged in
Counts II and III was a separate event that occurred over a year prior to the remaining
conduct charged. Accordingly, Whitfield argues that unfair prejudice resulted from
this joinder because it permitted admission of evidence of unrelated wrongdoing that
improperly influenced the jury.
“We review a district court’s denial of a motion to sever for an abuse of
discretion.” United States v. May, 70 F.4th 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The district court may sever joined charges if the
defendant demonstrates that joinder prejudices the defendant. See United States v.
Goodhouse, 81 F.4th 786, 791 (8th Cir. 2023). “A defendant is prejudiced when
deprived of an appreciable chance for an acquittal, a chance that the defendant would
have had in a severed trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “a
defendant does not suffer any undue prejudice by a joint trial if the evidence is such
that one crime would be probative and admissible at the defendant’s separate trial of
the other crime.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the “real”
prejudice standard, a defendant must show “that the jury will be unable to
compartmentalize the evidence,” and “[t]he defendant carries a heavy burden in
making this showing.” United States v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634, 644 (8th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “the risk of prejudice posed by joint
trials is best cured by careful and thorough jury instructions.” United States v. Delpit,
94 F.3d 1134, 1144 (8th Cir. 1996).

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Here, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge that Counts II and III
were sufficiently related to the other offenses because they were “specifications of
the multi-drug trafficking conspiracy.” R. Doc. 68, at 20; see also R. Doc. 76, at 4.
In other words, the evidence presented demonstrated that Boyd was cooperating with
investigators to give information about the Goolsby drug conspiracy. Shortly after
Boyd began cooperating, Whitfield, a “shooter” for the conspiracy, see R. Doc. 2, at
6, likely shot and killed him. As the magistrate judge pointed out, “[w]hen violence
is part of the conspiracy’s modus operandi, charges stemming from that violence are
properly joined with conspiracy charges.” R. Doc. 68, at 21 (quoting Delpit, 94 F.3d
at 1143). Therefore, the discharge of the weapon to kill Boyd and injure his friend
was sufficiently connected to the purposes of the conspiracy.
Moreover, the 18-month gap between the murder and the drug charges did not
vitiate the connection between the drug conspiracy and the shooting given the drug
conspiracy’s timespan and the likelihood of overlapping evidence. See United States
v. Rodgers, 732 F.2d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding joinder of charges despite
a 20-month time lapse between charges); see also United States v. Hastings, 577
F.2d 38, 40 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding joinder of counterfeiting offenses covering a
two-year period).
Finally, Whitfield has failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice. Here,
Whitfield cannot show that evidence of his involvement in the drug conspiracy and
possession of drugs, weapons, and ammunition would have been inadmissible in a
severed trial for Counts II and III. The evidence likely would have been admissible
to prove motive, identity, and absence of mistake under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). His involvement in the drug conspiracy is intertwined with the motive for
the shooting. Moreover, the district court’s jury instructions contained separate
independent verdict directors for each count and instructed the jury to “[k]eep in
mind that each count charges a separate crime” and that they “must consider each
count separately and return a separate verdict for each count.” R. Doc. 125, at 15.
Whitfield is unable to show that the evidence would have otherwise been excluded,
that the jury instructions were insufficient, or that exclusion of that evidence

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deprived him of an appreciable chance for an acquittal on Counts II and III.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
sever Counts II and III from the remaining counts.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
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