24-1903•United States of America v. Hombra Lavail Williams
24-1903Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit30 de jun. de 2025
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-1770
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Hombra Lavail Williams
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern
____________
Submitted: March 17, 2025
Filed: June 26, 2025
[Unpublished]
____________
Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Hombra Lavail Williams appeals from a revocation sentence imposed by the
district court1 after he admitted to a number of violations of his supervised release
conditions, including conduct related to a pending state charge for operating a motor
1 The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Iowa.
-- 1 of 5 --
-2-
vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) (third offense). Williams contends the district
court abused its discretion when it ordered the revocation sentence to run
consecutively to the state OWI cases and when it imposed an additional term of
supervised release. We affirm.
On Apri1 1, 2022, Williams was released to supervision after serving a 72-
month sentence for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. When Williams
failed to comply with drug and alcohol testing requirements, admitted to using
alcohol, and was arrested for OWI (second offense), the district court modified
Williams’ release conditions to require him to reside at a residential reentry center
for a period of up to 120 days and participate in remote alcohol testing. After the
modification, Williams failed to report for testing as instructed on three occasions,
and less than a month after being released from the Waterloo Residential
Correctional Facility, Williams was arrested for OWI (third offense).
At the revocation hearing, Williams admitted to all eight categories of
violations listed in the petition for revocation. The parties agreed that Williams’
criminal history category was VI and the most serious violation was grade B, which
yielded an advisory revocation Sentencing Guidelines range of 21 to 24 months. The
district court rejected Williams’ recommendation for a 19-month sentence to run
concurrent with any state sentence imposed for OWI. The court highlighted
Williams’ “terrible” and lengthy criminal history, his multiple convictions for OWI,
and his inability to follow release conditions. The court expressed concern that
Williams, now age 47, had made a career of “committing new crimes and putting
the public at danger.” Concluding the time for leniency had passed, the district court
imposed a 23-month sentence to be served consecutively to any state sentence
imposed in the OWI cases, noting it would have sentenced Williams to a longer
term—in the range of 36 to 48 months but for the 24-month statutory maximum.
The district court’s one month reduction from the maximum sentence
accounted for Williams’ acceptance of responsibility. Following release from
custody, the district court ordered Williams to serve one year on supervised release.
-- 2 of 5 --
-3-
On appeal, Williams contends the district court committed procedural error
when it seemed to imply “extraordinary circumstances” must be present before it
could order concurrent sentences. The record does not support Williams’ claim. The
record shows that when determining Williams’ sentence, the district court
considered permissible sentencing factors along with the Sentencing Guidelines
provision, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), that provides for the imposition of a consecutive
sentence. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (requiring sentencing courts to consider the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when determining whether to
impose consecutive or concurrent terms).
This Court reviews the district court’s decision to impose a consecutive
sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Roe, 9 F.4th 754, 755 (8th Cir. 2021).
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 2009). We apply a
presumption of reasonableness when the sentence is within the Guidelines range.
United States v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2018).
Williams has not offered any basis to show the district court abused its
sentencing discretion. The court relied on permissible sentencing factors, including
Williams’ repeated violations of supervised release conditions and the need to
protect the public, and it adequately explained the reasons for its sentence.
Furthermore, after expressing skepticism as to Williams’ request for a concurrent
sentence, the district court gave counsel an opportunity to identify “a good reason”
for doing so. Counsel responded by asking the court to use its discretion and impose
a sentence that is “just” under the circumstances. Given the nature of his criminal
history and his inability to comply with the law or release terms, Williams has not
offered any convincing argument as to why the district court’s decision to order a
consecutive sentence was unreasonable or an abuse of discretion. See United States
v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2016) (determining the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it ordered a 24-month revocation sentence to run
consecutive to any yet-to-be-imposed state sentence for domestic violence, resisting
arrest, and misdemeanor assault).
-- 3 of 5 --
-4-
Upon careful review of the record and Williams’ arguments, we conclude the
district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion when it imposed a 23-month
sentence, nor did it act unreasonably when it declined Williams’ request for the
sentence to run concurrent with any sentence imposed in the state OWI cases.
Williams also challenges the additional term of supervised release that the
district court imposed following his release from custody. He acknowledges that the
district court considered valid factors when deciding to impose an additional
supervision term, but argues the court erred since nothing more can reasonably be
gained from placing him back on supervision. Nor does Williams contest the district
court’s authority to impose an additional term of supervised release or its length.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (authorizing both an imprisonment term and additional
supervised release term). Instead, he claims additional supervision is unwarranted.
This Court construes a defendant’s argument that a new term of supervised release
is unwarranted as a challenge to the reasonableness of the sentence. United States
v. Defoor, 535 F.3d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 2008). Permissible considerations for
imposing an additional term of supervision include: the timing of the violations, the
nature of the violations, the need for services such as medical help and counseling,
a defendant’s criminal history, and the need to protect society. Id. at 765.
The district court was faced with a defendant who had demonstrated an
inability to meet the goals of supervision and posed a risk to the public. He had been
on supervision for less than a year when he began to violate release conditions. After
the court decided to modify Williams’ conditions rather than revoke his release,
Williams continued to violate the terms of his release by failing to report for testing
as directed. Less than three weeks after completing his stay at a residential reentry
center, Williams was arrested for OWI (third offense). Williams’ failure to
participate in substance abuse testing, his continued use of alcohol, and his two
arrests for OWI while on supervised release are permissible factors the court may
consider when deciding the appropriate sentence. Williams has not shown that the
district court’s decision to impose an additional year of supervised release was
unreasonable.
-- 4 of 5 --
-5-
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
______________________________
-- 5 of 5 --
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.