United States of America v. Jonathan Rashad Hope

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3304
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jonathan Rashad Hope
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Delta
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Submitted: May 12, 2025
Filed: June 13, 2025
[Published]
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Before BENTON, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
The district court1 revoked Jonathan Rashad Hope’s second term of
supervised release and sentenced him to 18 months in custody, with no supervision
to follow. Hope appeals.
1 The Honorable Lee P. Rudofsky, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

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I.
After Hope pleaded guilty to a firearm offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), the district court imposed a 24-month sentence, followed by 3 years of
supervised release. Hope’s first term of supervised release was revoked after he
violated several conditions, including committing another criminal offense, failing
to report to and follow instructions from the probation office, and failing to remain
in the district or receive permission to leave. The district court sentenced him to 9
months in custody, followed by 1 year of supervised release.
Hope’s second term of supervised release began in February 2024, and within
days, he failed to report to the probation office. Hope also left the judicial district
without permission, and his whereabouts were unknown until he was arrested in
Wisconsin in September 2024. Hope admitted both violations. The district court
revoked Hope’s term of supervised release and calculated an advisory Guidelines
range of 6–12 months of imprisonment. See USSG § 7B1.4(a).
The government moved for an upward variance to 24 months, the maximum
sentence permitted by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). After considering various
sentencing factors, the district court sentenced Hope to 18 months in custody with
no term of supervised release to follow.
II.
On appeal, Hope argues his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We
review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jackson, 83 F.4th 1090, 1091
(8th Cir. 2023). “A district court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable
sentence when it fails to consider a relevant and significant [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]
factor, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers the
appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”

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United States v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Kreitinger, 576 F.3d 500, 503 (8th Cir. 2009)).
In explaining its sentencing decision, the district court began with the nature
of the violations. The district court expressed concern that, since his release from
prison, “[Hope] didn’t do anything [he] w[as] supposed to” and “decided to ignore
all of [the help offered to him].” The district court acknowledged that the violations
were technical, not criminal, in nature. But it viewed them as “one of, if not the
worst, ways” to commit technical violations of supervision, because Hope “basically
just didn’t comply at all.”
Also “highly motivating” the district court’s decision to vary upward was the
fact that this was Hope’s second revocation hearing. The district court noted that
Hope’s original 24-month sentence and subsequent 9-month revocation sentence
were “not . . . enough to deter [him] from not following the rules.” In the district
court’s view, Hope’s repeated violations led it to believe that “additional deterrence
[wa]s necessary to make sure [Hope] [did]n’t commit further criminal acts and [to]
protect the public.”
We discern no abuse of discretion. The district court considered appropriate
factors, including the nature of the violations, the need for deterrence, and the need
to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3553(a)(2)(B), 3553(a)(2)(C),
3583(e) (referencing § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(C) as appropriate factors). Hope
argues the district court placed too much weight on these factors. He highlights the
fact that he committed no new law violations while on his most recent term of
supervision. But the district court considered this fact at the hearing and simply
disagreed with Hope about how it impacted the sentencing decision. See United
States v. Starr, 111 F.4th 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2024) (holding no reversible error where
district court considered mitigating factors but “afforded them less weight than [the
defendant] would have preferred”). Hope also contends the district court failed to
consider his homelessness and lack of reliable transportation—life circumstances
that made compliance with the conditions of supervision more difficult. Hope’s

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counsel made this argument at the hearing, but it did not sufficiently mitigate the
district court’s concerns about Hope’s conduct here: travelling from Arkansas to
Wisconsin without permission and remaining out of contact with the probation office
until his arrest.
The district court was also entitled to consider repeated supervised release
violations as a factor in varying upward. See United States v. Clark, 998 F.3d 363,
370 (8th Cir. 2021) (affirming above-Guidelines sentence based on defendant’s
“repeated violations of supervised release, his history and characteristics, and the
need to protect the public”). And here, Hope’s violations were similar in kind to
violations from his first term of supervision.
We affirm.
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