Katrina Beran v. VSL North Platte Court LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-3527
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Katrina Beran,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VSL North Platte Court LLC,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - North Platte
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Submitted: November 19, 2024
Filed: July 17, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, BENTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Chief Judge.
This appeal follows a jury verdict in favor of Katrina Beran in her action
alleging sex discrimination by a former employer. A jury found the employer liable
for subjecting Beran to a hostile work environment based on her sex. The jury

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awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The district court1 denied the
employer’s post-trial motions and granted Beran’s motion for attorney’s fees. The
employer appeals, and we affirm.
I.
We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. In March
2019, Beran was hired to work as a certified nursing assistant at Linden Court, a
skilled nursing facility. Linden Court is owned by the defendant, VSL North Platte
Court, LLC, and we will refer to the appellant as Linden Court.
In December 2019, Linden Court hired Christopher Eugene as another certified
nursing assistant. Early in his tenure, Eugene walked by the nurses’ station while
Beran was speaking with a nurse, remarked that “all women are crybabies.” He also
made repeated comments about wanting to touch one “good-looking” female nursing
assistant “any chance he would get.” Another female nursing assistant reported that
Eugene groped her crotch and buttocks and made derogatory remarks about women.
On January 20, 2020, supervisors reprimanded Eugene for poor performance.
The reprimand letter referred to requests from female residents that Eugene not assist
with their personal care, and admonished him for “complaining” and “being negative
towards other staff members.”
Supervisors moved Eugene within the facility from Dogwood Hall to Ash Hall
around January 18 due to complaints from female residents at Dogwood Hall. In Ash
Hall, Eugene worked alongside Beran.
1The Honorable Brian C. Buescher, United States District Judge for the District
of Nebraska.
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Soon thereafter, Eugene began a pattern of verbal and physical misconduct
targeted at Beran. On Saturday, January 25, Eugene groped Beran’s buttocks while
she was bent over preparing food for residents. On January 26, Eugene assailed
Beran again while she was transferring a resident from a bed to a wheelchair. As
Beran positioned the resident on a lift, Eugene told her to stop because she was not
capable of performing the task as a woman. When Beran declined to discontinue the
assistance, Eugene pushed her against a wall, grabbed her breasts with both hands,
and held her in that position while he told her that she was incapable of doing her job.
Because administrators were not present on the weekend, Beran was unable to
report Eugene’s misconduct immediately. Beran believed that she had no choice but
to remain in the room and care for the resident. While she made the resident’s bed,
Eugene grabbed her hand and ignored Beran’s repeated requests that he let it go.
Beran eventually freed her hand by jerking it away. Beran felt degraded and belittled
by the incident.
Beran reported for work the next day, Monday, January 27, and was again
scheduled to work with Eugene in Ash Hall. That morning, Eugene refused to help
Beran and a co-worker deliver breakfast trays to residents. In response to Beran’s
request for assistance, Eugene responded that she “needed to cool [her] hormones and
pull the rag out.” Beran interpreted the statement as a reference to a tampon.
Beran approached the facility’s assistant director of nursing, Marianne Harless,
in tears and feeling hurt, scared, anxious, and depressed about the situation. She
reported Eugene’s misconduct over the weekend and that morning. Harless did not
address Beran’s allegations of misconduct and instead suggested that Beran was “just
stressed out from . . . the hardship of being short staffed.” Beran responded that she
was upset by Eugene’s harassment, not by the workload. She asked to be transferred
to Dogwood Hall to avoid working with Eugene. Harless reiterated her view that
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Beran was stressed by the workload at Ash Hall but allowed Beran to transfer to
Dogwood Hall.
Eugene’s harassment of Beran continued after her transfer to Dogwood Hall.
On the afternoon of January 27, Beran went to the cafeteria to retrieve lunch trays,
and Eugene blocked her access to the galley. Eugene moved only slightly after Beran
made five requests. As Beran squeezed past him, Eugene elbowed her hard in the
chest.
Beran then approached the facility’s director of nursing, Jasmine Moore. Beran
cried, reported the elbowing incident, and recounted Eugene’s harassment and assault
over the weekend. Moore responded that she had already discussed the situation with
Harless and suggested that Beran was “making a bigger deal out of it than it was.”
Moore told Beran that she would talk to Harless and start an investigation. But Beran
described Moore as “very nonchalant” and believed that Moore did not consider the
issue a priority. Beran testified that Moore and Harless gave her “the cold shoulder”
after she complained.
No supervisor conducted a thorough investigation into whether Eugene
sexually assaulted and harassed Beran. After Beran made her reports, Moore thought
Eugene had no “physical intent to harm at all,” and that Beran was just “upset
[Eugene] didn’t acknowledge her and they weren’t getting along.” Moore conducted
a brief investigation. She spoke with Harless, Eugene, and two other employees
about Eugene’s work performance. She inquired generally whether he had
disagreements with co-workers or made inappropriate physical contacts.
On January 28, 2020, supervisors drafted a “crucial conversation” document
addressed to Eugene. The document reprimanded Eugene for making co-workers
“feel uncomfortable” by asking questions “about marital status” and admonished him
to “avoid conversations of a personal or gender specific nature.” Supervisors issued
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the crucial conversation document on January 30, after Eugene returned from a day
off work. Although supervisors required Eugene to sign a previous reprimand letter,
he did not review or sign the “crucial conversation” document on January 30.
On Wednesday, January 29, Beran saw Eugene at the facility, staring at her
while she worked at Dogwood Hall. Beran turned and walked away to avoid
confrontation. Eugene was not supposed to be at work that day and had been
reassigned away from Dogwood Hall due to resident complaints. Later that day,
Moore overheard Beran telling another female co-worker what had happened. Moore
interrupted the conversation and warned Beran against discussing Eugene’s conduct
“because they had other females coming forward to report him with similar findings.”
Beran heard from other nursing assistants that they reported Eugene’s misconduct,
but neither Beran nor the other complainants received a response from the
administration regarding their complaints.
Beran did not work on January 30, February 1, or February 2. On February 6,
a resident complained to Beran that Eugene had entered her room and forced her to
go into the bathroom. As the resident shared this information, Eugene walked by and
exclaimed that the resident had directed a racial epithet at him, and Eugene shouted
the epithet down the hall. Beran reported this incident to the facility administrator.
The next day, Harless terminated Beran for allegedly “targeting” Eugene by making
a “false” report about Eugene’s use of profanity.
After Beran’s termination, in April 2020, Eugene was reprimanded for
inappropriately touching other co-workers by brushing up against them and groping
them. In June 2020, Linden Court terminated Eugene for using “disrespectful and
inappropriate profanity towards a resident” and moving a resident against his wishes.
As a result of Eugene’s harassment, Beran experienced a resurgence of severe
post-traumatic stress disorder, including anxiety attacks. Beran had suffered from
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this condition several years earlier after she was raped at age 16. In the aftermath of
Eugene’s harassment, she had difficulty leaving her bed, getting dressed, or
socializing. When Beran eventually found a new job, she developed irrational fears
about communicating with male co-workers and avoided conversing with them or
asking for their help when needed.
Beran brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the
Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, alleging a sexually hostile work
environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1004. The district court
denied Linden Court’s motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, Linden Court moved for judgment as a
matter of law; the district court reserved ruling. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). The jury
found in Beran’s favor and awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages for
emotional distress and $2,500,000 in punitive damages. The district court then
denied Linden Court’s motion, reduced Beran’s punitive damage award to $200,000
based on the applicable statutory cap, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), and allocated the
compensatory damage award to Beran’s claim under Nebraska law. The district court
awarded Beran $95,665.80 in attorney fees and $904 in costs. Linden Court renewed
its motion for judgment as a matter of law and moved for a new trial. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 50, 59. The court denied both motions, and Linden Court appeals.
II.
Linden Court maintains that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
company asserts that there is insufficient evidence of a sexually hostile work
environment, and that even if there were such an environment, the employer took
prompt remedial action in response to Beran’s complaints. Linden Court also asserts
that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the company acted with
malice or reckless indifference as required to justify an award of punitive damages.
We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion de novo, viewing the evidence in the light
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most favorable to Beran, and drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving
conflicts in her favor. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scott, 486 F.3d 418, 422 (8th Cir.
2007).
In assessing whether the harassment experienced by Beran created a hostile
work environment, we assess “the totality of the circumstances, including the
frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, whether such conduct was
physically threatening or humiliating, as opposed to a mere offensive utterance, and
whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with [Beran’s] work performance.”
Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt Supply, Inc., 626 F.3d 410, 420 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation omitted). The harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive working environment.”
Hairston v. Wormuth, 6 F.4th 834, 841 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation omitted).
A jury reasonably could have found that Beran was subjected to sexual
harassment, consisting of both offensive utterances and physical misconduct, over
three full-time shifts. Eugene groped her buttocks, pushed her up against a wall while
grabbing her breasts with both hands, grasped her hand and refused to let go despite
repeated requests, and elbowed her chest. We cannot disagree with the district court
that “the evidence that Eugene shoved Beran against a wall and groped her breasts
was a single incident of sufficient seriousness to submit the case to a jury.” See
Hairston, 6 F.4th at 841. The additional conduct fortified the jury’s finding.
The harassment in this case is more severe than conduct in prior cases on which
Linden Court relies. In Watson v. Heartland Health Laboratories, Inc., 790 F.3d 856
(8th Cir. 2015), the alleged harassment included “a sexual touching, a single racial
slur, four sexually degrading slurs, and a threat” over ten working days. Id. at 862.
In affirming a grant of summary judgment for the employer, this court noted the
“brief” duration of the harassment. Id. Because the employee worked only “for a
couple of hours a day” and “her interactions with [the harasser] lasted mere seconds,”
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she was “not subject to [the alleged harasser’s] conduct throughout her workday.”
Id. In LeGrand v. Area Resources for Community and Human Services, 394 F.3d
1098 (8th Cir. 2005), the plaintiff alleged unwelcome sexual advances (with no
physical violence or threat) on three isolated occasions over a nine-month period. Id.
at 1100, 1102. This court ruled that these sporadic incidents “were not so severe or
pervasive as to poison [the plaintiff’s] work environment.” Id. at 1103. By contrast,
Beran experienced multiple, physically violent incidents and verbal harassment,
which “poisoned” and “permeated” her working environment over a concentrated
period. See Hairston, 6 F.4th at 841 (citations omitted).
A reasonable jury also could have found that Linden Court’s response did not
constitute a “prompt remedial action” that was “reasonably calculated” to stop
Eugene’s offending conduct. See Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc., 13 F.4th 681, 699
(8th Cir. 2021). Four considerations support the conclusion that Linden Court did not
take effective remedial action.
First, Beran’s supervisors, Harless and Moore, denied that Beran reported
Eugene’s sexual harassment. These denials conflict with Beran’s testimony and could
have been deemed false by a jury. False denials are consistent with Beran’s account
that supervisors “undermined” her complaints about sexual harassment and suggested
that she was merely “stressed out” from the demands of her job.
Second, the “crucial conversation” that Linden Court conducted with Eugene
on January 30, 2020, did not address his sexual harassment of Beran. The company
reprimanded Eugene only for demonstrating “negativity” toward colleagues, asking
inappropriate personal questions of a gender-specific nature, and failing to perform
job duties. The letter did not address Eugene’s assault of Beran or his demeaning
comments about women.
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Third, Linden Court previously had made two disciplinary communications to
Eugene with no apparent effect. After Beran’s complaint, the administration simply
repeated the approach that had proven ineffective and produced similar results.
Eugene continued to grope female co-workers through April 2020 and was terminated
shortly thereafter.
Fourth, Linden Court failed to notify Beran of the “crucial conversation” with
Eugene or update her regarding the resolution of complaints. See Sheriff v. Midwest
Health Partners, P.C., 619 F.3d 923, 931 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The jury could reasonably
find that [defendant] did not take [plaintiff]’s complaints seriously, given its repeated
failure to keep her apprised of its response or to follow through on its stated
intentions.”). Instead, there was evidence to support a finding that supervisors gave
her the “cold shoulder” and closed their office doors as she walked past them.
Linden Court contends that it took effective remedial action because Eugene’s
harassing behavior stopped after Beran moved to work in Dogwood Hall and Moore
had a “crucial conversation” with Eugene. But Eugene harassed and intimidated
Beran twice after her transfer to Dogwood Hall. And Linden Court’s “crucial
conversation” with Eugene did not even address the sexual misconduct at issue.
Linden Court terminated Beran on February 7, and Eugene continued to harass other
female employees. Therefore, the evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s finding
that Linden Court did not take prompt and appropriate remedial action that was
reasonably calculated to end the harassment.
There was also sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of punitive
damages. “Title VII allows punitive awards in the narrow class of cases where the
employer acts with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of
the employee.” Rowe v. Hussmann Corp., 381 F.3d 775, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation omitted). “The terms ‘malice’ or ‘reckless indifference’ pertain to the
employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law.” Kolstad v.
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Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999). “This standard does not require
egregious misconduct.” Rowe, 381 F.3d at 783. We have ruled that an employer
acted with reckless indifference where it responded to serious employee allegations
“in a half-heartened manner,” conducted an inadequate investigation, and threatened
an employee with possible termination. Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 217 F.3d
612, 616, 619 (8th Cir. 2000).
The evidence described above could have led a reasonable juror to conclude
that Linden Court made so little effort to respond to Beran’s complaints as to
establish reckless disregard of her right to be free of harassment. A jury could have
found that Beran’s “repeated complaints to supervisors” fell “on deaf ears,” see Rowe,
381 F.3d at 783, that supervisors “downplayed” Eugene’s sexual harassment by
attributing Beran’s complaints to her workload, see Henderson, 217 F.3d at 619, and
that supervisors made a “half-hearted” response and took no “meaningful action” to
discipline Eugene. See id.; Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 796 (8th
Cir. 2004).
II.
Linden Court next argues that the award of compensatory damages for Beran’s
emotional distress is excessive and should be remitted or the subject of a new trial.
We review the denial of a remittitur for abuse of discretion, recognizing that the
district court “has heard the evidence and knows the community’s standards.”
Mathieu v. Gopher News Co., 273 F.3d 769, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation omitted). We afford latitude to juries and tolerate “disparities among juries
as to what constitutes adequate compensation for certain types of pain and suffering.”
Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 725 F.2d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984) (internal
quotation omitted).
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The district court allocated the compensatory damage award to Beran’s claim
under the Nebraska statute, so state law guides our inquiry into whether the award is
excessive. See Sanford v. Crittenden Mem’l Hosp., 141 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir.
1998); Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2008). The district
court reviewed this question under federal law, but Linden Court does not claim
prejudice and acknowledges that the standard is “substantially similar” under both
federal and Nebraska law. Linden Court relies on both state and federal decisions to
support its argument.
Nebraska law deems an award excessive where it is “so clearly against the
weight and reasonableness of the evidence and so disproportionate as to indicate that
it was the result of passion, prejudice, mistake, or some means not apparent in the
record, or that the jury disregarded the evidence or rules of law.” Shipler v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 710 N.W.2d 807, 840 (Neb. 2006). An award will be sustained if it is
supported by the evidence and “bears a reasonable relationship to the elements of the
damages proved.” Funk v. Lincoln-Lancaster Cnty. Crime Stoppers, Inc., 885
N.W.2d 1, 13 (Neb. 2016). Given that an amount of “damages for pain, suffering,
and emotional distress inherently eludes exact valuation,” the plaintiff is “simply
required to offer sufficient proof of damages so that the jury could reach its award
without awarding an uncertain, speculative recovery.” Roth v. Wiese, 716 N.W.2d
419, 436 (Neb. 2006).
On compensatory damages, the jury was instructed to determine an amount for
“emotional pain, suffering, mental anguish, stress, worry, humiliation, fear,
apprehension, anxiety, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of life” that was “a
direct result of sexual harassment.” The jury’s award was supported by evidence of
Beran’s emotional distress. Eugene’s sexual harassment caused Beran to experience
“severe PTSD,” which required treatment by psychiatric medication and led Beran
to have difficulty getting out of bed, seeing friends, and leaving her house. She
experienced flashbacks, and suffered from anxiety, depression, and paranoia that
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interfered with her ability to interact with male co-workers in future employment.
The evidence regarding Beran’s mental health disorder is sufficient proof to support
the jury’s award.
The jury’s award of $500,000 also falls within a reasonable range compared to
other jury awards. In 2006, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld an award of
$150,000 after a plaintiff received a letter and three voice messages that caused her
to relive the emotional trauma of multiple sexual assaults during her childhood. Id.
Although Beran’s damages are greater, the award came almost twenty years after
Roth. The award also could reasonably reflect the jury’s estimation of additional
emotional trauma that Beran experienced when required to work with Eugene in an
environment of ongoing harassment. This court has upheld an emotional distress
award of $500,000 for a plaintiff who suffered from an anxiety disorder after being
sexually harassed by a coworker. Rowe, 381 F.3d at 783-84. While another jury
might reasonably have assessed damages differently, the award chosen was not so
disproportionate as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, mistake, or
some means not apparent in the record.
* * *
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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