United States of America v. Franklin Bell

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1703
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Franklin Bell
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: April 15, 2025
Filed: July 17, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Franklin Bell was arrested following his involvement in narcotics trafficking,
firearms trafficking, and a shooting that targeted rival traffickers during which an
innocent bystander was killed. This court has described the underlying facts in more
detail in United States v. Reeves, No. 24-1548, ___ F.4th ___, slip op. at 2-5 (8th
Cir. July 17, 2025). As relevant here, Bell pleaded guilty to five counts of possession

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with intent to distribute fentanyl, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) and (b)(1)(C); two counts
of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(A)(i); and one count of conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(B)(vi), and 846. As part of the plea agreement, the Government agreed to
dismiss one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime resulting in death, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (j)(1). The parties agreed
to jointly recommend an aggregate sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. The plea
agreement also contained an appeal waiver in which Bell waived, inter alia, his right
to appeal all non-jurisdictional and non-sentencing issues. He also waived his right
to appeal sentencing issues if the district court sentenced him to a prison term at or
below the joint recommendation of 240 months. The district court1 sentenced him
to 240 months’ imprisonment, followed by 60 months’ supervised release, and
monetary penalties totaling $9,890.16.
Bell appeals the district court’s acceptance of his guilty pleas. As a threshold
matter, he argues that the appeal waiver should not bar his appeal because he did not
enter into the plea agreement voluntarily in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Assuming that the appeal waiver is not valid and
applicable, Bell contends that his guilty pleas lacked adequate factual bases and that
the district court impermissibly engaged in plea negotiations.
We must first determine the validity and applicability of the appeal waiver,
which we review de novo. See United States v. Williams, 81 F.4th 835, 839 (8th Cir.
2023) (citing United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
We enforce an appeal waiver when the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered
into both the plea agreement and the appeal waiver, the attempted appeal falls within
the scope of the appeal waiver, and enforcing the waiver would not result in a
1 The Honorable Matthew T. Schelp, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri.

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miscarriage of justice. Id. If each of these conditions are met, we must dismiss the
appeal. Id.
Each condition for enforcing the appeal waiver is met here. Although Bell
contends that Rule 11 violations on the part of the district court impacted the
voluntariness of his plea agreement, the record indicates that he entered into it
knowingly and voluntarily. At his change of plea hearing, Bell stated multiple times
that he understood the ramifications of his guilty pleas and confirmed his desire to
enter into the plea agreement. Bell also affirmed that he had reviewed the plea
agreement—including his waiver of appeal rights—with his attorney, and that he
understood the terms. The agreement, and the appeal waiver, were thus entered into
knowingly and voluntarily. See United States v. Henry, 106 F.4th 763, 771 (8th Cir.
2024) (per curiam), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1102 (2025). Bell’s challenges on appeal
to non-jurisdictional and non-sentencing issues fall within the scope of the waiver.
And Bell’s challenges do not fall within any of the “limited contexts” in which we
have found that a miscarriage of justice warrants overriding a waiver. See Williams,
81 F.4th at 840 (recognizing a “narrow” “miscarriage-of-justice exception” for
“challenges to an illegal sentence, to a sentence that violates the terms of an
agreement, and where ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the appeal waiver
itself unknowing and involuntary”). Taken together, Bell’s appeal waiver is valid
and applicable to the instant appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
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