United States of America v. Adan Shamburger

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1897
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United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
v.
Adan Shamburger,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville
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Submitted: May 12, 2025
Filed: July 22, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Chief Judge.
Adan Shamburger was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment. The district
court* later reduced Shamburger’s sentence to 46 months based on a retroactive
amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2);
*The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Arkansas.

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USSG § 4A1.1. Shamburger challenges the reasonableness of the reduction and
argues that the court was required to shorten the sentence further. We conclude that
there was no abuse of discretion, and affirm the order.
In April 2023, Shamburger pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the possession
with intent to distribute fentanyl. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 2.
At sentencing, the district court determined an advisory guideline range of 30 to 37
months’ imprisonment. The court then varied upward from the advisory range and
imposed a sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment.
The court explained the variance by reference to the sentencing factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court adverted to the potential lethality of fentanyl, and
observed that the attribution of 15.7 grams of fentanyl to Shamburger under the
guidelines “significantly understates [his] actual culpability.” The court found that
Shamburger admitted that he distributed fentanyl for a few months and acknowledged
that he would typically buy 100 fentanyl pills at a time. The court also cited
Shamburger’s violent tendencies, high risk of recidivism, and criminal history.
The Sentencing Commission subsequently approved Amendment 821, effective
November 1, 2023, which changed the calculation of criminal history scores under
the guidelines. The amendment removed a two-point increase under USSG
§ 4A1.1(d) for committing an instant offense while under a criminal justice sentence.
The amendment also added a new subsection (e), which assesses one point if a
defendant has seven or more criminal history points and “committed the instant
offense while under any criminal justice sentence.” USSG § 4A1.1(e). The
amendment was made retroactive. See id. § 1B1.10(d).
The amendment reduced Shamburger’s criminal history score and changed his
advisory guideline range from 30-37 months to 24-30 months. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), the district court reduced Shamburger’s sentence from 48 months to 46
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months’ imprisonment. To explain the decision, the court cited its explanation for
imposing an upward variance at the original sentencing, and concluded that “the new
advisory range yields a result that is even more disproportionate to the relative
seriousness of the offense conduct.”
Shamburger argues that the degree of the sentence reduction was unreasonable
because the reduced sentence is harsher than the original sentence as compared to the
advisory guideline range. He asserts that the original sentence was only 30 percent
above the top of the guideline range, while the reduced sentence is 53 percent above
the top of the new range.
The district court, however, did not abuse its discretion by declining to make
what Shamburger describes as a “proportionate” sentence reduction. The Supreme
Court has addressed the matter of “proportional” sentence reductions. Where a
sentence within the original advisory range is reduced to a sentence within a new
advisory range, there is no presumption that the district court will choose a point
within the new lower range that is “proportional” to the point previously chosen
within the original range. Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 116 (2018).
The original sentence “will often simply reflect the judge’s belief that the chosen
sentence is the ‘right’ sentence . . . based on various factors, including those found
in § 3553(a).” Id. at 117. In that situation, it is “unsurprising,” and not
impermissible, for the judge to select a “nonproportional point on the new range.”
Id.
That analysis holds true when, as here, the original sentence represents an
upward variance from the guideline range. Where the judge eschewed the original
advisory range to impose a sentence above the range based on the § 3553(a) factors,
it is not surprising that the judge would conclude that the same or similar sentence is
still the “right” sentence under § 3553(a) despite a lower amended guideline range.
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In this case, the judge considered and gave some weight to the amended range
by reducing Shamburger’s sentence by two months. But the court believed that
aggravating factors continued to warrant a sentence close to the original term
imposed, and thus permissibly declined to make a reduction that was “proportional”
with respect to the new guideline range. The sentencing court has wide latitude in
weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, and there was no abuse of discretion
in the court’s decision to limit the reduction granted.
Shamburger contends that the district court committed procedural error because
it failed to explain adequately why an upward variance greater than the variance in
the original sentence was justified. It is unsettled whether the sentencing court has
a duty to provide an on-the-record explanation of a sentence modification decision,
given that Congress did not intend to authorize “a plenary resentencing proceeding.”
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010).
As with Chavez-Meza, however, “even assuming (purely for argument’s sake)”
that a district court has a duty to explain a decision on modification of sentence, 585
U.S. at 115, the district court satisfied the obligation here. The court incorporated by
reference its previous discussion of the § 3553(a) factors and its explanation for an
upward variance. The court explained that the amended guidelines “produced an
advisory range that was not proportionate to the relatively serious nature of the
offense conduct,” and that a minimal reduction was warranted because “the new
advisory range yields a result that is even more disproportionate to the relative
seriousness of the offense conduct.” This explanation is sufficient to facilitate
meaningful appellate review, and there was no procedural error. See United States
v. Lewis, 827 F.3d 787, 790 (8th Cir. 2016).
The order of the district court is affirmed.
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