Melissa Wanna, on behalf of herself individually v. RELX Group, PLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1916
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Melissa Wanna, on behalf of herself individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
RELX Group, PLC; Reed Elsevier, Inc., doing business as LexisNexis; RELX,
Inc., doing business as LexisNexis; LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Inc.; LexisNexis
Risk Solutions FL, Inc.
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: March 18, 2025
Filed: July 10, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
Melissa Wanna sued RELX Group, PLC, Reed Elsevier, Inc., RELX, Inc.,
LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Inc., and LexisNexis Risk Solutions FL, Inc. (together,
“Lexis”), alleging Lexis violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

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Organizations Act (“RICO”). She also advanced several Minnesota state law claims.
Lexis moved to dismiss Wanna’s claims and argued Wanna could not recover
because her claims depended on a nonexistent agency relationship between itself and
MyLife.com Inc. (“MyLife”), a company that collected public information about
Wanna and offered it for sale. The district court1 concluded MyLife was not Lexis’s
agent and dismissed Wanna’s claims. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Melissa Wanna searched for her name online and discovered her profile on
MyLife, an information broker that creates “reputation scores” for individuals using
public records. MyLife sourced most of those records from Lexis. Wanna’s profile
contained a poor reputation score and ominous references to court records. MyLife
offered to provide details or remove the profile for a fee. Believing she lost
employment opportunities because of her MyLife profile, Wanna filed a putative
class action in federal court.
Because MyLife had filed for bankruptcy and was subject to a bankruptcy stay
before she commenced her suit, Wanna named five Lexis entities as defendants. She
alleged Lexis participated in an extortion scheme by sharing her information with
MyLife. She contends that when Lexis shared her information with MyLife it
violated the FCRA, DPPA, and federal RICO act. Wanna also asserted several
Minnesota consumer-protection claims, a common law defamation claim, and a civil
conspiracy claim.
Lexis moved to dismiss Wanna’s claims on the ground that it was not
responsible for MyLife’s conduct. Lexis managed its relationship with MyLife
using a series of data-licensing agreements. Only one of the named Lexis entities,
1 The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota.

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LexisNexis Risk Solutions FL, Inc., was a point of contact with MyLife and party to
the most recent data-licensing agreement. The agreement provided in relevant part:
The Parties will perform their obligations hereunder as independent
contractors. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be deemed to
create any association, partnership, joint venture, or relationship of
principal and agent or master and servant between the Parties.
Based on the disclaimer in the data-licensing agreement, the district court granted
Lexis’s motion to dismiss. Wanna’s federal claims can succeed only if Lexis is
liable for MyLife’s actions as MyLife’s principal in an agency relationship. Since
Wanna did not plead such a relationship, the district court concluded the federal
claims failed. While the district court could have exercised supplemental
jurisdiction over Wanna’s state law claims, it declined to do so and dismissed them
without prejudice.
Wanna appeals,2 contending Lexis was responsible for MyLife’s actions. She
seeks reversal of the district court’s order dismissing her claims.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Secura Ins.
Co. v. Deere & Co., 101 F.4th 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2024). When a district court could
have exercised supplemental jurisdiction but declined to do so, we review its
decision for abuse of discretion. Hunter v. Page Cnty., 102 F.4th 853, 869 (8th Cir.
2024).
Wanna’s four federal claims depend on an agency relationship between Lexis
and MyLife. Her two FCRA claims require her to identify a “consumer reporting
2 The Clerk is directed to unseal the briefs in this case, as the parties did not
register an objection to unsealing in response to the Court’s order to show cause
dated March 19, 2025.

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agency” (“CRA”) as a defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). While MyLife could be a
CRA, because it created consumer reports, Lexis does not qualify as a CRA because
it does not collect or evaluate “consumer credit information or other information on
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” Id.
Wanna’s DPPA and RICO claims have the same issue. Both claims require proof
of tortious conduct, and Wanna’s theory of tortious conduct turns on MyLife’s
actions rather than Lexis’s actions. Her DPPA claim requires evidence someone
“knowingly obtain[ed], disclose[d] or use[d] personal information, from a motor
vehicle record” for an impermissible purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). Likewise, a
cognizable claim under RICO requires a continuous pattern of racketeering activity,
which is one posing a threat of continued criminal activity. Crest Const. II, Inc. v.
Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 354–55 (8th Cir. 2011). Even if we assume Wanna could prove
an impermissible purpose and threat of continued criminal activity, the only
allegations she makes are that MyLife used its information to extort her and other
individuals. She makes no allegations of any such conduct against Lexis.
The district court dismissed Wanna’s federal claims with prejudice because
Wanna failed to plead facts demonstrating MyLife was Lexis’s agent.3 In the district
court, Wanna contended MyLife had actual authority to act on Lexis’s behalf. But
actual authority must be granted. New Millennium Consulting, Inc. v. United
HealthCare Servs., Inc., 695 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2012). An entity does so in one
of two ways: it may either grant actual authority expressly or it may impliedly grant
it as a power “incidental and necessary to carry out the express authority.” Radiance
Cap. Receivables Eighteen, LLC v. Concannon, 920 F.3d 552, 558 (8th Cir. 2019)
(citation omitted) (examining Missouri’s approach); see also McGowen, Hurst,
Clark & Smith, P.C. v. Com. Bank, 11 F.4th 702, 711 (8th Cir. 2021) (recounting
Iowa’s analogous approach).
3 For the first time on appeal, Wanna contends she has viable claims premised
upon a vicarious liability theory contained in Section 876 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. She forfeited this argument because she did not present it to the
district court. Dreith v. City of St. Louis, 55 F.4th 1145, 1149 (8th Cir. 2022).

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MyLife lacked actual authority to act on Lexis’s behalf under the express
terms of their data-licensing agreement. See New Millennium Consulting, Inc., 695
F.3d at 857. Although MyLife operated an independent business and relied on Lexis
to sell information used in its business, Lexis and MyLife had no relationship beyond
those arm’s length transactions. The evidence in the record shows that Lexis did not
grant MyLife actual authority to act as its agent, and Wanna has alleged no facts
implying actual authority where none was expressly granted.
Courts have recognized that disclaimers may occasionally fail to preclude an
agency relationship from arising by way of apparent authority. See, e.g., Bd. of
Trade of City of Chicago v. Hammond Elevator Co., 198 U.S. 424, 437 (1905)
(concluding that “correspondents” who relayed their customers’ stock orders were
their customers’ agents despite a contractual disclaimer). However, MyLife did not
have apparent authority to act on Lexis’s behalf. Apparent authority arises only if
“the alleged principal affirmatively, intentionally, or by lack of ordinary care caused
third persons to act upon the apparent agency.” Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867,
882 (8th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up) (generalizing based on three states’ approaches).
Wanna never pled Lexis held MyLife out as its agent, or she believed MyLife acted
in Lexis’s stead for other reasons. Instead, she hinges her apparent authority
argument on the functional ties between Lexis and MyLife: Lexis offered
information for sale, and it knew it was selling to MyLife. Those facts are
insufficient to show Wanna understood MyLife to be Lexis’s agent and acted on that
understanding.
Wanna also contends Lexis ratified MyLife’s actions. An agency relationship
may arise when one entity ratifies another’s unauthorized acts. Newman v. Schiff,
778 F.2d 460, 467 (8th Cir. 1985) (summarizing one state’s approach); see also
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01 (laying out a similar approach). A principal
need only agree “to be bound by the agent’s action” to ratify another entity’s actions.
Newman, 778 F.2d at 467. Wanna has not connected Lexis with the specific uses to
which MyLife put data purchased from Lexis, or any facts suggesting Lexis
approved of those uses. Given these deficiencies, Wanna cannot demonstrate

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MyLife was Lexis’s agent under any theory of agency. The district court did not err
when it dismissed her federal claims.
The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Wanna’s
state law claims after it dismissed her federal claims. When a district court dismisses
all the claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it is usually appropriate to
decline supplemental jurisdiction. Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
350 n.7 (1988). Wanna’s case is no exception. The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it dismissed her state law claims without prejudice after declining
to exercise jurisdiction over them.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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