Justin Johnson v. Jacob Schurman, in his individual capacity only

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2002
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Justin Johnson
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Jacob Schurman, in his individual capacity only; Christopher Taylor, in his
individual capacity only
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: April 14, 2025
Filed: July 29, 2025
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Before SMITH, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Justin Johnson, a pretrial detainee, was attacked by two other inmates while
in protective custody. Johnson sued correctional officers for failure to protect him

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for negligence under Missouri law. The district court1
granted the officers’ motion for summary judgment because it found that qualified
immunity barred Johnson’s § 1983 claims and that official immunity and the public
duty doctrine barred his negligence claims. We affirm.
I. Background
Johnson was a pretrial detainee at the Jefferson County Jail (JCJ). Just after
midnight on March 31, 2021, Zachary Haferkamp, another inmate, attacked Johnson
in general population. Johnson informed JCJ staff and requested that they move him
to protective custody. JCJ staff then identified Haferkamp as Johnson’s “enemy” in
Johnson’s Integrated Jail Management System (IJMS) profile. R. Doc. 131, at 2.
Based on that information, JCJ officers then moved Johnson to the “lockdown
pod[].” Id. The lockdown pod housed inmates in protective custody, inmates
punished for fighting, and minors.
Jacob Schurman and Christopher Taylor (collectively, “Officers”) were
correctional officers at JCJ when Johnson was attacked. On March 31, Taylor was
the control officer responsible for opening cell doors. Schurman was the escorting
officer responsible for moving inmates and notifying the control officer when doors
should be opened or closed. According to Taylor, there was a “[c]ommon practice”
at JCJ “that in the lockdown pod, only one cell door was permitted to be open at a
time.” R. Doc. 117-2, at 5. Schurman also acknowledged this “rule,” R. Doc. 117-3,
at 5, which was in place “for the safety of the inmates,” id. at 8.
Later that same day, while in the lockdown pod, Johnson asked Schurman for
permission to leave his cell for recreation time. At that time, two other inmates were
out of their cells—Theodore Mathias and Damien Hedrick. Mathias and Hedrick
were both in the lockdown pod because they were minors. Johnson did not know
Mathias or Hedrick. Johnson’s IJMS profile did not list either of them as his enemies.
1 The Honorable Joseph S. Dueker, United States Magistrate Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by
consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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Schurman instructed Mathias and Hedrick to return to their cells and instructed
Taylor to open Johnson’s cell door. Mathias and Hedrick did not comply and
remained outside their cells. When Taylor opened the door, Johnson exited, and
Mathias and Hedrick attacked Johnson, seriously injuring him. Johnson sustained a
fractured spine and a forehead laceration from the attack.
Johnson then sued the Officers2 in their individual capacities for (1) violations
of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights for failure to protect him under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) negligence under Missouri law. The Officers moved for
summary judgment. They argued that qualified immunity barred Johnson’s § 1983
claims and that state-law official immunity and the public duty doctrine barred his
negligence claims. The district court granted the motion and dismissed all of
Johnson’s claims.
First, in dismissing Johnson’s § 1983 claims, the district court determined that
he could not show a constitutional violation3 and that the Officers were thus entitled
to qualified immunity. Johnson’s claim required him to show that the Officers were
“deliberately indifferent to the need to protect an inmate from a substantial risk of
serious harm from other inmates.” R. Doc. 131, at 5 (quoting Vandevender v. Sass,
970 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2020)). The district court found that prior to the surprise
attack, there was no “substantial risk of harm to [Johnson] by Mathias and Hedrick.”
Id. at 7. “The attackers here were not known to be volatile, dangerous, violent, or in
protective custody for previous violent episodes.” Id. Johnson had no prior
relationship with either attacker. The district court also said that Johnson could not
show a general risk of harm because he had “no evidence showing that the assault
2 Johnson also sued other JCJ employees but eventually dismissed all other
defendants.
3 The district court noted that it analyzed Johnson’s claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, because he was a pretrial
detainee. But that “d[id] not affect” the analysis because pretrial detainees receive
the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as convicted inmates under
the Eighth Amendment. R. Doc. 131, at 2 n.2.

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here was in the context of a substantial risk of inmate attacks that were longstanding,
pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past.” Id.
The district court also held that Johnson failed to show that the Officers were
“deliberately indifferen[t] to his safety.” Id. at 8. This is a “subjective requirement”
that requires Johnson to show that the Officers knew of the substantial risk and
disregarded it. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). The district
court said that Johnson had “no evidence that [the Officers] had any knowledge that
Mathias and Hedrick were a threat or risk of harm to Johnson or any other inmates.”
Id. “At best, [the Officers] were aware that Johnson was in protective custody.
However, his protective custody related to safeguarding [him] from Haferkamp,
specifically, not Mathias or [Hedrick].” Id. at 9. Because Johnson could not show
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, the district court held
that Officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and his § 1983 claims failed as a
matter of law.
Second, the district court dismissed Johnson’s negligence claims because the
Officers were entitled to official immunity. “Official immunity protects public
officials sued in their individual capacities for alleged acts of negligence committed
during the course of their official duties for the performance of discretionary acts.”
Id. at 10 (alteration omitted) (quoting Davis v. Buchanan Cnty., 11 F.4th 604, 629
(8th Cir. 2021)). The district court noted that the “crux of Johnson’s claims” was
that the Officers “violated prison policy” by opening Johnson’s cell “while Mathias
and Hedrick were out of their cells.” Id. at 11. It held that Johnson did “not establish[]
that there was a prison policy requiring lockdown doors to be opened one at a time,”
id., because the “Officer’s testimony d[id] not reflect such a policy,” nor was it in
JCJ’s written “policy on prisoner movement,” id. at 9. The district court concluded
that even if Johnson did establish a policy, official immunity shielded the Officers
because their acts were discretionary. It noted that the Officers “retained authority
to decide when and how to allow Johnson to have recreation time” and that their
duties “were untimed and [had] variation in how they may be performed, thereby
requiring them to exercise their discretion.” Id. at 11–12.

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The district court also dismissed the negligence claims based on the public
duty doctrine. This doctrine says that “a public employee is not civilly liable for the
breach of a duty she or he owes to the general public rather than to a particular
individual.” Id. at 12 (alteration omitted) (quoting E.M. by & through McInnis v.
Gateway Region Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 613 S.W.3d 388, 396 (Mo. Ct. App.
2020)). But the doctrine does not apply “when injury to a particular, identifiable
individual is reasonably foreseeable as a result of the public employee’s breach of
duty.” Id. (quoting E.M., 613 S.W.3d at 396). The district court said that the Officers
“owed no particular duty to Johnson greater than that of the prison population at
large” because it was not foreseeable that their omission would result in an attack on
Johnson. Id. at 13. Because the negligence claims also failed as a matter of law, the
district court granted the Officers’ motion and entered final judgment against
Johnson. Johnson appeals that order.
II. Discussion
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the record in the light most favorable to Johnson, the nonmoving party. See Hodges
v. Dep’t of Corr., 61 F.4th 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2023). “Summary judgment is
appropriate when the record presents no genuine issue of material fact, and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).
Johnson argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were
disputed material facts and that the district court thus erred in dismissing his § 1983
and negligence claims.
A. Failure to Protect
The district court dismissed Johnson’s § 1983 claims based on qualified
immunity. Government officials “are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983
unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” Dist. of Columbia
v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree
that the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Johnson has not shown that the
Officers violated a constitutional right.

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“The Eighth Amendment requires officials to ‘provide humane conditions of
confinement’ by taking reasonable steps to protect inmates convicted of crimes from
assault by other inmates.” Hodges, 61 F.4th at 591–92 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
832). Johnson was a pretrial detainee, so his Ҥ 1983 claims are analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.” Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 341
(8th Cir. 2011). “This makes little difference as a practical matter, though: Pretrial
detainees are entitled to the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as
imprisoned convicts receive under the Eighth Amendment.” Kahle v. Leonard, 477
F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2007). “To prove an unconstitutional failure to protect from
harm, [Johnson] must show that (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) a defendant was deliberately indifferent to
the substantial risk of serious harm.” Hodges, 61 F.4th at 592.
“Even if we assume for summary judgment purposes [that Johnson] presented
sufficient evidence that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm, [he] fails to
establish [that the Officers] knew of and were deliberately indifferent to the danger.”
Holden, 663 F.3d at 341. To show an unconstitutional failure to prevent harm,
Johnson “must establish [that] the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to
inmate health or safety.” Id. “This is a subjective requirement, mandating the
prisoner prove the official both knew of and disregarded ‘an excessive risk to inmate
health and safety.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); see also Hodges, 61 F.4th
at 592 (“An official is deliberately indifferent only if he actually knows of the
substantial risk and fails to respond reasonably to it.”). Deliberate indifference is
“something more than negligence but less than actual intent to harm.” Jackson v.
Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). It
“is the equivalent of criminal recklessness: the defendant must be ‘aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Hodges, 61 F.4th at 592 (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

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The district court held that Johnson failed to show deliberate indifference
because there was “no evidence that [the Officers] had any knowledge that Mathias
and Hedrick were a threat or risk of harm to Johnson or any other inmates.” R. Doc.
131, at 8. We agree. “We have held in several cases that qualified immunity for
prison officials is appropriate when an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim
arises from inmate injuries resulting from a surprise attack by another inmate.”
Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding no deliberate
indifference because there was no evidence that the plaintiff “was the likely target
of an impending attack by [the attacker]” and there was no evidence that the officer
“had any actual knowledge” of altercations between the plaintiff and the attacker
“much less that he knew [the attacker] would attack [the plaintiff]”); see also
Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 851–52 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding no deliberate
indifference because the plaintiff was the victim of a “surprise attack” and there was
no evidence “that any of the defendants were subjectively aware of, or deliberately
indifferent to, a substantial risk of harm to inmate safety” (emphasis omitted)).
This case is similar to Holden, in which we held that a pretrial detainee who
was injured in an altercation with his cellmates could not establish that “the prison
officials knew of and were deliberately indifferent to the danger.” 663 F.3d at 341.
Holden was in protective custody, “which offered greater supervision and protection
for vulnerable detainees.” Id. But he “offered no evidence the prison officials had
any knowledge of any specific danger posed to Holden by [his attacker] in the
protective custody pod.” Id. at 342. His cellmates did not previously threaten him,
nor did Holden tell “any of the prison officials he felt threatened.” Id. at 341. The
officers were also not aware that his cellmates were violent. Id. at 342.
We conclude that Johnson cannot show deliberate indifference because he has
not shown that the Officers both “knew of and were deliberately indifferent” to the
“specific danger posed to [him] by [Mathias and Hedrick].” See id. at 341–42. As
the district court said, “At best, [the Officers] were aware that Johnson was in
protective custody.” R. Doc. 131, at 9. But protective custody status does not
automatically give rise to a failure-to-protect claim. See Holden, 663 F.3d at 341–

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42. Further, “[t]here [was] no evidence that [Johnson] was the likely target of an
impending attack by [Mathias and Hedrick].” Tucker, 276 F.3d at 1002. They had
no previous relationship. The attackers were not known to be violent to anyone in
the facility. The Officers may have known that Haferkamp attacked Johnson earlier
that same day, but Haferkamp was not in the protective custody pod. The Officers’
failure to secure Mathias and Hedrick before permitting Johnson to exit his cell, even
if negligent, “falls short of deliberate indifference.” Patterson, 902 F.3d at 852.
Johnson argues that the district court erred in finding no deliberate
indifference because an officer may not “escape liability . . . by showing that, while
he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that
the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who
eventually committed the assault.” Appellant’s Br. at 14 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 843). This standard does not apply because these Officers were not “aware of an
obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. In explaining
this standard, the Supreme Court pointed out that a prison official could not avoid
liability if they were aware that “rape was so common and uncontrolled that some
potential victims dared not sleep but instead would leave their beds and spend the
night clinging to the bars nearest the guards’ station” by arguing that “the officials
could not guess beforehand precisely who would attack whom.” Id. at 843–44
(cleaned up). Here, there was no obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety. Johnson
has no evidence of other attacks, nor does he argue that these attacks were “common
and uncontrolled” in the JCJ lockdown pod. Id. at 843 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Similarly, Johnson argues that he had evidence of deliberate indifference
because the Officers knew that they had to follow the one-door policy, knew that the
policy was for inmate safety, and even attempted to follow it by instructing Mathias
and Hedrick to return to their cells. Thus, he argues that the Officers knew that failing
to abide by the policy placed Johnson in danger. This argument boils down to the
proposition that the Officers were deliberately indifferent because they knowingly
violated the one-door policy. “We have repeatedly held that violations of prison

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policy or regulations alone are not enough to establish deliberate indifference under
the Eighth Amendment.” Vandevender, 970 F.3d at 978. In the absence of an
obvious risk, we have required that the inmate provide evidence that the prison
official knew of “a specific threat posed by [the attacker].” Patterson, 902 F.3d at
851; see also Holden, 663 F.3d at 342. Johnson has no evidence that the Officers
knew Mathias and Hedrick posed a specific threat to Johnson. The district court did
not err in dismissing Johnson’s § 1983 claims.
B. Negligence
The district court dismissed Johnson’s negligence claims based on (1) official
immunity and (2) the public duty doctrine. Because we agree that the first applies,
we need not address the second.
“Missouri applies the doctrine of official immunity to protect public
employees from liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during the course
of their official duties for the performance of discretionary acts.” Torres v. City of
St. Louis, 39 F.4th 494, 507 (8th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). “An act is discretionary
where there is any room whatsoever for variation in when and how a particular task
can be done.” Id. (cleaned up). Official immunity, however, does not protect “public
employees . . . [from] torts committed when acting in a ministerial capacity.”
Letterman v. Does, 859 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Southers v. City of
Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. 2008) (en banc)). A ministerial act is a
“clerical” act that “compels a task of such a routine and mundane nature that it is
likely to be delegated to subordinate officials.” State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, 588
S.W.3d 187, 191 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). It is a task that “is to be performed upon a
given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, and without regard to the public official’s judgment.” Id. (cleaned up).
“[W]hether [the Officers] are entitled to official immunity is a question of law we
review de novo.” Letterman, 859 F.3d at 1125 (emphasis omitted).
Johnson argues that the district court erred in applying official immunity
because the one-door policy is ministerial, not discretionary. He contends that “the

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Officers had no discretion in whether they had to put Johnson’s attackers away
before opening Johnson’s door,” Appellant’s Br. at 16, and that the district court
ignored that both Officers “testified [that] they did not have discretion in allowing
inmates to remain out of their cells before opening a second cell,” id. at 18. Johnson
acknowledges that officers retain discretion in when to allow recreation time, but
once they permit it, the officer “has a ministerial task: lock up all other inmates first,
then let the person out.” Id. The Officers argue to the contrary that their task was
discretionary because it was “undoubtedly inexplicably intertwined with the
movement of inmates throughout the jail facility.” Appellees’ Br. at 35. Because
moving inmates requires officers to consider several factors like the inmate’s history
and their relationship with other inmates, the Officers contend that Schurman had to
“use his own judgment to determine when to instruct the cell door to be opened” and
Taylor had to “use his own judgment to make the decision as to when to push the
control to open the door.” Id. at 36.
We conclude that the Officers are entitled to official immunity because
compliance with the one-door policy involves discretionary acts. “The central
inquiry is not whether the law confers a duty to act but, instead, whether the public
official retains any discretion in completing the act.” State ex rel. Love v.
Cunningham, 689 S.W.3d 489, 495–96 (Mo. 2024) (emphasis omitted) (cleaned up).
Thus, it is immaterial that the Officers said that they did not have discretion to
comply with the one-door policy. The question is not whether the Officers had a
choice to follow the rule but whether there was “any room whatsoever for variation
in when and how [this] particular task c[ould] be done.” Torres, 39 F.4th at 507
(internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that there is.
Johnson acknowledges that “the caselaw has shown that . . . inmate movement
is a discretionary function” but argues that “the specific sequence of opening
Johnson’s cell door . . . does not involve a discretionary act.” Reply Br. at 16. He
contends that the task is “simple—return other inmates, close their door, then open
the second.” Id. at 17. That sequence demonstrates when there is room for variation
in the task: The act of securing inmates involves professional decisions of inmate

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movement, and officers can do that in different ways. The task is not only pressing
buttons upon a given set of facts. Instead, it involves communication between two
officers and requires at least one officer to ensure that inmates are indeed secure
before opening another door. Cf. Love, 689 S.W.3d at 496 (finding that the “act[] of
ensuring placement of [a] protective vehicle” was not clerical or ministerial because
“[t]o ensure” is inherently discretionary).
Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Johnson and assuming
that he has shown the existence of a one-door policy, we hold that the Officers are
nonetheless entitled to official immunity because the task was discretionary. The
reasoning and variation that officers use when securing inmates to comply with a
one-door policy is discretionary. The district court did not err in dismissing
Johnson’s negligence claims.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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