United States of America v. William Loydellton Speed, Jr., also known as Mikey, also known as William…

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1778
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
William Loydellton Speed, Jr., also known as Mikey, also known as William
Lloydellton Speed, Jr., also known as William Loydellerton Speed
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa
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Submitted: March 21, 2025
Filed: August 18, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, the district court1 found William Speed, Jr., guilty of
conspiracy to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine and distribution of
1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Iowa.

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five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1), 846, and 851. On appeal, Speed challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
for his convictions and the application of the career offender enhancement. We
affirm.
I. Background
On March 4, 2022, a confidential informant (CI) met Leroy Williams at an
apartment for a pre-arranged controlled buy of methamphetamine. Speed and
Ashley Young were also present in the apartment. Eventually, the group left the
apartment and got in the CI’s vehicle, with the CI and Williams in the front seats
and Speed and Young in the back seats. While in the vehicle, Williams asked the
CI how much methamphetamine he wanted, and the CI stated he wanted a half
pound. Williams then asked Speed if he had two ounces of methamphetamine with
him and directed Speed to give the two ounces to the CI. Speed left the vehicle and
returned, carrying a duffel bag. According to the CI, Speed handed the
methamphetamine to Williams. Later on, Speed left the vehicle, and the CI and
Williams drove to a gas station, hoping to obtain a scale to weigh the
methamphetamine. Speed separately joined them at the gas station and received
$800 from the CI for the drugs. Subsequent laboratory testing revealed the substance
obtained by the CI contained approximately forty-four grams of methamphetamine.
A grand jury indicted Speed on two counts: conspiracy to distribute five or
more grams of methamphetamine and distribution of five grams or more of
methamphetamine. Speed waived his rights to counsel and to a jury trial. At the
bench trial, the district court heard testimony from various government agents, the
CI, and Young. While the CI stated that Speed gave the methamphetamine to
Williams, Young claimed she thought the video recording of the controlled buy
showed her handing something to Williams. Speed moved for a judgment of
acquittal, but the district court denied his motion and found him guilty on both
counts. At sentencing, the district court concluded Speed was subject to the career
offender enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual

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(Guidelines) because of his two prior felony drug crime convictions for violating
Iowa Code § 124.401. After calculating his advisory Guidelines range as 360
months to life, the district court imposed a downward variance sentence of 264
months of imprisonment on both counts, running concurrently. On appeal, Speed
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions and the application of
the career offender enhancement.
II. Analysis
Beginning with Speed’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
conclude a reasonable jury could find him guilty on both counts. “We review the
sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, resolving conflicts in the government’s favor, and accepting all
reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v. Golden, 44 F.4th
1129, 1132 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Acosta, 619 F.3d 956, 960 (8th
Cir. 2010)). “We apply the same standard after a bench trial as after a jury verdict
and reverse ‘only upon a demonstration that a rational jury would have had no choice
but reasonably to doubt the existence of an element of a charged crime.’” Id.
(quoting Acosta, 619 F.3d at 960).
For the distribution count, the government needed to prove Speed
“(1) knowingly and intentionally distributed [five grams or more of
methamphetamine], and (2) knew the item was a controlled substance at the time of
distribution.” United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 985, 990 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation
omitted). As for the conspiracy count, the government needed to prove: “(1) that
there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement to distribute the drugs; (2) that the
defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the
conspiracy.” United States v. Conway, 754 F.3d 580, 587 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Slagg, 651 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir. 2011)). The government
provided ample evidence to support both convictions. The CI went to Williams to
buy methamphetamine. Williams then asked Speed if he had two ounces of
methamphetamine and directed Speed to provide the CI with that amount. The CI

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testified that Speed subsequently gave the methamphetamine to Williams to give to
the CI, and the CI later paid Speed $800 for the methamphetamine. Laboratory
testing revealed the substance contained about forty-four grams of
methamphetamine. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could conclude Speed
knowingly distributed more than five grams of methamphetamine to the CI.
Likewise, a rational jury could conclude Speed knowingly and intentionally entered
into an agreement with Williams to distribute methamphetamine to the CI.
Speed’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Speed asserts he could not
be found guilty because Young claimed that she had provided the drugs to Williams.
However, the district court rejected Young’s testimony because she was “combative,
evasive, and lacking candor.” As we have repeatedly emphasized, “[a]ssessing
witness credibility is the job of the [factfinder] and absent extraordinary
circumstances, we will not review that assessment.” Jones, 600 F.3d at 900 (cleaned
up) (quoting United States v. Wesseh, 531 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2008)). We have
no basis to disturb the district court’s credibility determination here. As the district
court explained, Young’s testimony that she provided the methamphetamine was
inconsistent with other evidence, such as Speed leaving and returning to the vehicle
after Williams asked if he had two ounces of methamphetamine. Moreover, Speed
separately travelled to the gas station where he was paid for the drugs. Speed also
claims there could not be an indictable conspiracy between him and a government
informant. See United States v. Nelson, 165 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 1999) (“It is
well settled that there can be no indictable conspiracy involving only the defendant
and government agents and informers.”). But here, the government’s evidence
showed Speed agreed with Williams, who was not a government agent or informant,
to distribute methamphetamine to the CI. Speed provided Williams with the drugs
the CI sought to purchase and received payment for those drugs.
Finally, Speed challenges the application of the career offender enhancement,
arguing one of his prior Iowa convictions does not qualify as a controlled substance
offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) because Iowa Code § 124.401 includes acts
involving simulated controlled substances while the Guidelines’ definition does not.

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As Speed acknowledges, this argument is squarely foreclosed by binding precedent.
See United States v. Castellanos Muratella, 956 F.3d 541, 543–44 (8th Cir. 2020)
(concluding Iowa Code § 124.401 “is no broader than U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2”). Thus,
we conclude the district court did not err by applying the career offender
enhancement.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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