United States of America v. Jermey Jordan, also known as Jeremy Jordan

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-2009
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jermey Jordan, also known as Jeremy Jordan
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
____________
Submitted: June 9, 2025
Filed: August 18, 2025
[Unpublished]
____________
Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Jermey Jordan pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, see
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of a machinegun, see id. § 922(o). Jordan’s
total offense level of 19 and criminal history category of III resulted in an advisory
sentencing guidelines range of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment. After considering

-- 1 of 5 --

-2-
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court1 varied upwards and imposed a
sentence of sixty months on each count to run concurrently to each other and
consecutively to an anticipated state sentence as well as any anticipated state
revocations. Jordan appeals, arguing that the district court procedurally erred and
that it imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm.
We first address whether the district court procedurally erred. See United
States v. Black, 129 F.4th 508, 513 (8th Cir. 2025). “Procedural error includes
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation
modified). Jordan alleges two procedural errors: first, that the district court relied
on clearly erroneous facts by describing his prior convictions of third-degree
domestic battering as “violent”; and second, that the district court erroneously
ordered his sentence to run consecutively to his anticipated state sentences without
explanation and without considering U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. As Jordan did not object to
these alleged errors before the district court, we review for plain error. See United
States v. Thigpen, 848 F.3d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, to prevail, Jordan must
show a plain error that affects his substantial rights and “seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (citation modified).
Regarding Jordan’s first allegation, the district court did not rely on clearly
erroneous facts when it described Jordan’s prior third-degree domestic battering
convictions as “violent.” In Arkansas, a person may only be convicted of third-
degree domestic battering if, either purposely, recklessly, or negligently, he “causes
physical injury to a family or household member” or if he “purposely causes stupor,
1 The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.

-- 2 of 5 --

-3-
unconsciousness, or physical or mental impairment or injury to a family or
household member” through the nonconsensual administration of drugs or other
substances. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-305 (2025). Thus, third-degree domestic
battering necessarily involves non-accidentally injuring or purposely impairing
one’s family or household member. When imposing a sentence, district courts are
directed to consider, among other factors, “the history and characteristics of the
defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thus, the district court did not plainly err when it
found that Jordan’s two previous convictions for third-degree domestic battering
indicated he had a violent history.
Regarding Jordan’s second allegation, the district court was not required to
provide additional explanation regarding why it ordered the sentences to run
consecutively. Just as a district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors when it
imposes a sentence, id., it also must consider the § 3553(a) factors when it decides
whether to run sentences concurrently or consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). But
the “sentencing court need not provide a separate statement of reasons for imposing
consecutive sentences.” United States v. Williams, 934 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 2019)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court considered
the § 3553(a) factors as well as the comments of counsel, including the
Government’s observation that the conduct charged in the instant offense was
unrelated to the conduct charged in the anticipated state sentences. We detect no
error, much less plain error.
Further, Jordan’s assertion that the district court ought to have considered
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 is meritless. Section 5G1.3 applies in a few, limited
circumstances. Subsection 5G1.3(a) applies when the defendant committed the
instant offense either while he was serving a term of imprisonment or after he had
been sentenced for a term of imprisonment but before he had commenced serving it.
Subsection 5G1.3(b) applies if the defendant is subject to “a term of imprisonment
result[ing] from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense.”
Subsection 5G1.3(c) applies if a state term of imprisonment involving relevant
conduct is anticipated. None of these circumstances existed here. When he

-- 3 of 5 --

-4-
committed the instant offense, Jordan was neither serving a term of imprisonment
nor waiting to commence an already-sentenced term of imprisonment. Jordan was
not subject to a term of imprisonment resulting from related conduct. And, though
Jordan was anticipating a state sentence, that state sentence did not involve related
conduct. Therefore, the district court did not plainly err when it ordered this sentence
to run consecutively to Jordan’s anticipated, unrelated, state sentences.
We next address whether Jordan’s sentence was substantively unreasonable.
We review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the guidelines
range, for abuse of discretion. Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461. “A district court abuses
its discretion in sentencing if the district court fails to consider a relevant factor that
should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or
irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear error
of judgment in weighing those factors.” United States v. Petersen, 848 F.3d 1153,
1157 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Jordan argues his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district
court improperly disregarded his remorse and post-conviction conduct and gave
undue weight to his criminal history, which was already accounted for in the
guidelines range. District courts may vary from the guidelines “based on factors
already taken into account by the advisory guidelines, where the Guidelines do not
fully account for those factors, or when a district court applies broader § 3553(a)
considerations in granting the variance.” United States v. Grace, 893 F.3d 522, 524
(8th Cir. 2018). “The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors
in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an
appropriate sentence.” United States v. Boelter, 806 F.3d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir. 2015)
(per curiam). In other words, “[s]imply because the district court weighed the
relevant factors more heavily than [Jordan] would prefer does not mean the district
court abused its discretion.” See United States v. White, 863 F.3d 1016, 1021-22
(8th Cir. 2017).

-- 4 of 5 --

-5-
The district court explicitly stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors.
It explained that it had considered Jordan’s history of firearms and domestic
battering offenses. It also noted the circumstances of the instant offense—that
Jordan had possessed a machinegun and several high-capacity magazines. Further,
the district court noted that it had considered Jordan’s comments at the hearing,
through which Jordan had expressed his regret and accepted full responsibility for
his actions. It is an unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence as
substantively unreasonable. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 at 464. This is not one such
unusual case. We detect no abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm.
______________________________

-- 5 of 5 --