United States of America v. Kamron Leemonte Mathis

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2153
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Kamron Leemonte Mathis
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: April 14, 2025
Filed: August 15, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before ERICKSON, ARNOLD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Kamron Mathis pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (prohibiting possession by felons). As part of the plea agreement, he
waived his “right to appeal” nearly “all non-jurisdictional issues.” His only non-
waived argument is foreclosed by precedent, so we affirm in part but otherwise grant
the government’s motion to dismiss.

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The only question we can address on the merits is a facial Second Amendment
challenge to the felon-in-possession statute. See id. It is “jurisdictional” and
“survive[s] a guilty plea,” United States v. Nunez-Hernandez, 43 F.4th 857, 860 (8th
Cir. 2022), because the government could “not constitutionally prosecute” him if it
succeeded, Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam). The
problem for Mathis is that we have already upheld the statute. See United States v.
Cunningham, 114 F.4th 671, 675 (8th Cir. 2024) (upholding § 922(g)(1) against a
facial Second Amendment challenge); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Elgin Warehouse &
Equip., 4 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1993) (“In this circuit only an en banc court may
overrule a panel decision . . . .”).
Whether the district court1 should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty
plea, on the other hand, is a non-jurisdictional issue that he waived. See United
States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining that an
appeal waiver will be enforced if the issue falls within the scope of the waiver, the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and the waiver,
and enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice). By its terms,
the appeal waiver covers “any issues relating to the negotiation, taking[,] or
acceptance of the guilty plea.” (Emphasis added). Any attempt to withdraw the plea
for one of those reasons also falls within its scope. See United States v. Gray, 528
F.3d 1099, 1102 (8th Cir. 2008) (reaching the same conclusion based on similar
waiver language).
Finally, even if he had directly raised the Sixth Amendment jury-trial issue
that he claims requires plea withdrawal, see Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821,
834 (2024), it too would have been waived. See United States v. Adkins, 636 F.3d
432, 434 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a plea agreement can waive challenges to
the “applicability of sentencing enhancements . . . and predicate felonies under” the
1 The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.

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Armed Career Criminal Act). We accordingly affirm in part, dismiss in part, and
deny the government’s motion to strike portions of Mathis’s brief as moot.
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