United States of America v. Norman Thurber

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1221
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Norman Thurber
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: September 16, 2025
Filed: September 19, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Norman Thurber appeals after this court affirmed his convictions and remanded
to the district court1 solely for the consideration of his standard conditions of
1The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

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supervised release. See United States v. Thurber, 106 F.4th 814, 832-34 (8th Cir.
2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1071 (2025). His counsel has moved for leave to
withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
challenging one standard condition imposed by the district court and arguing Thurber
was denied his right to allocution on remand. Thurber has filed a pro se brief
additionally challenging the length of his supervised-release term and certain
mandatory and special conditions imposed by the court.
Upon careful review, we conclude the district court did not err in requiring that
Thurber live in a place approved by probation. See United States v. Sterling, 959
F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 2020) (reversal not required if basis for imposed condition can
be discerned from record). Further, even assuming that Thurber had a right to
allocution on remand, he has not presented information about what he would have
said that might have changed the outcome. See United States v. Thurmond, 914 F.3d
612, 614-15 (8th Cir. 2019) (plain-error standard of review). Additionally, any
challenges to the length of Thurber’s supervised-release term and certain mandatory
and special conditions are not properly before this court in this appeal after the
limited remand. See United States v. Walterman, 408 F.3d 1084, 1085-86 (8th Cir.
2005) (in appeal following limited remand, refusing to consider issues outside of
scope of remand).
Having independently reviewed the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. We note, however, that
the written amended judgment failed to indicate that the portion of a mandatory
condition requiring drug testing was suspended, in conflict with the district court’s
oral pronouncement that it would do so. We thus modify the written amended
judgment in part to reflect a suspension of the drug testing requirement. See 28
U.S.C. § 2106; United States v. Raftis, 427 F.2d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam) (oral pronouncement prevails over contrary judgment); United States v.
Corona-Moret, 256 Fed. Appx. 873, 873-74 (8th Cir. 2007) (unpublished per curiam)
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(modifying written judgment that conflicted with plain intent of sentencing
pronouncement).
Accordingly, we modify the judgment, affirm the amended judgment as
modified, and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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