Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3077
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Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc.
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, Local Union No. 688
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: September 18, 2024
Filed: November 7, 2025
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Arbitrator Mark W. Suardi ordered the reinstatement of Cherie A. Miller at
Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. Meridian seeks to vacate the award, arguing
the arbitrator exceeded his authority, and the award violates public policy. The

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district court1 disagreed, granting summary judgment to Miller’s Union, the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Local Union No. 688. Meridian appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
Meridian manufactures emergency use auto-injectors used in EpiPens and
similar devices. These products are both a drug and a medical device. 21 C.F.R.
§ 3.2(e). Their manufacture is regulated by the United States Food and Drug
Administration through the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The FDCA prohibits the
introduction of adulterated drugs or medical devices into interstate commerce. 21
U.S.C. § 331. A drug is adulterated if its manufacture does not conform with
“current good manufacturing practice.” 21 U.S.C. § 351(a). FDA regulations
require Meridian to maintain proper training procedures to ensure current good
manufacturing practice. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.25, 211.180.
Meridian’s policy for proper on-the-job training is:
• to assign trainers to probationary employees for OJT;
• to require the trainer and trainee to complete OJT forms;
• for the trainee to certify, on completion, her competence;
• for the trainer to certify observing the trainee’s completion, the
trainee’s understanding of the learning, and ability to complete the
task; and
• for a supervisor to review and approve the training, permitting the
trainee to undertake production tasks.
1 The Honorable John A. Ross, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri.

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Meridian employed Miller, a senior technician, as a qualified trainer at its
facility in St. Louis County, Missouri. She was assigned to train a probationary
employee. A Meridian supervisor noticed that Miller certified that the employee
completed five OJTs in one day. This spawned an investigation. In June 2020,
Meridian terminated Miller for this (alleged fraudulent) certification. Meridian
believes Miller did not comply with its policy because the OJT forms lacked
supporting documentation and the employee did not display proficiency in the OJT
tasks. Miller timely filed a grievance.
By the collective bargaining agreement between Meridian and the Union, all
probationary employees must complete training during the 90-day probationary
period. Meridian has the right to “maintain efficiency, assign work and duties in
accordance with the needs of the Employer” and “to impose discipline up to and
including the act of discharge.” Meridian must provide a comprehensive training
program and materials necessary for required tasks. Meridian may terminate a
Union employee if it shows “just cause”:
No prior disciplinary action need be issued to an employee before
they are suspended/discharged if the cause of such
suspension/discharge is dishonesty, drunkenness, observed sleeping on
the job while the employee is expected to be performing work, fighting
on the job or otherwise violating the Company’s Workplace Violence
policy, document alteration and/or falsification (including signing for
work that was not performed by/checked by the colleague(s) who signed
for the work), three consecutive days of unreported absence (unless
there are unusual/extenuating circumstances), possession and/or use of
illegal drugs, willful or gross negligence or willful or gross misconduct
that results in loss of Employer property or product, refusal to obey a
direct work order, and any other serious misconduct.
(emphasis added). The CBA’s grievance and arbitration procedure states, “The
arbitrator shall have no authority to add to, detract from or modify the provisions of
this Agreement.”

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Meridian contends it discharged Miller for “dishonesty” or “document
alteration and/or falsification.” The Union counters that like the common practice,
Miller could conduct and observe five OJTs in one day, and thus Meridian lacked
just cause to terminate her.
The arbitrator ordered Miller reinstated with full seniority, no loss of benefits,
and back pay (less any compensation received after termination). The arbitrator
found that Meridian failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Miller’s
certification of the OJTs was “intentionally fraudulent” or “falsified.”
The arbitrator found:
• Meridian had always been “short-handed” for Miller’s shift;
• this insufficient staffing “resulted in a rush to get people trained,
employees frequently working double shifts, grievances over the
forced movement of employees and some trainers receiving
overtime in order to train new employees”;
• Miller and others “received instructions to sign off on documents
and to train employees in a manner contrary to the actual process for
OTJ training”;
• it was acceptable on Miller’s shift for non-qualified trainers “to
confirm a trainee’s performance of particular OJT tasks”;
• it was common practice on Miller’s shift “for a qualified trainer to
observe a trainee performing a task with another qualified
employee”;
• “it was a common practice which was known to supervisors to train
or observe a trainee over a period of time before sign off”; and
• “it was an acceptable practice to sign off on OJTs once a trainee was
fully trained, not on each day throughout the training process.”

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The arbitrator also drew an adverse inference against Meridian for not calling either
of Miller’s two direct supervisors to testify—both still employed by Meridian and
with knowledge of the allegations, while it called other employees.
Meridian moved to vacate the award at the district court, arguing the arbitrator
exceeded his authority, and the award violates public policy. The district court
granted the Union summary judgment, affirming the arbitrator’s award. Meridian
appeals.
II.
Reviewing a district court’s order affirming an arbitration award, this court
reviews conclusions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Williams v.
NFL, 582 F.3d 863, 883 (8th Cir. 2009). Arbitration agreements are governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act. Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir.
2001), citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. The FAA’s purpose is to prevent judicial hostility
towards arbitration agreements. Id. The “scope of review of the arbitration award
itself is among the narrowest known to the law.” Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Emps. v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 307 F.3d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 2002).
Under the FAA, a court may vacate an arbitration award only where
corruption, fraud, undue means, evident partiality, misconduct, or ultra vires acts
existed in its procurement. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 883, summarizing 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a). This court recognizes two “extremely narrow” circumstances where it can
vacate an arbitration award: (1) where an award fails to draw its essence from the
agreement, and (2) where the arbitrator’s decision manifests disregard for the law.
Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 461–62.
“The jurisdiction of the arbitrator is determined by the arbitration agreement.”
Terminal, 307 F.3d at 739. Reviewing an award, this court’s “sole function is to
decide whether the arbitrators’ decision draws its essence from the contract.”
Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 461, quoting Executive Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander Ins. Ltd.,

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999 F.2d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). “An arbitrator’s award draws its
essence from the parties’ agreement as long as it is derived from the agreement,
viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’
intention.” Williams, 582 F.3d at 883 (cleaned up).
True, this court vacates an award that ignores the plain language of the
agreement. But, an arbitrator may interpret ambiguous language. Terminal 307
F.3d at 739–40. In interpreting silent or ambiguous language, the arbitrator must
consider the parties’ intent. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus., Chem.
& Energy Workers, 309 F.3d 1075, 1081 (8th Cir. 2002). This court cannot set aside
an award simply because it believes the arbitrator erred in interpreting the law or
determining facts. Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 462. “[A]s long as the arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority,” this court cannot set aside the award on interpretation grounds, not even
for a “serious error.” United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
38 (1987).
Meridian argues the award fails to draw its essence from the CBA in both its
interpretation and its inference-finding. It also argues that public policy counsels
against Miller’s reinstatement.
III.
Meridian argues that the award failed to draw its essence from the CBA in its
interpretation of “just cause.” Meridian emphasizes that the CBA requires only
“dishonesty” or “document alteration and/or falsification.” Meridian attacks the
arbitrator’s interpretation that “dishonesty” and “falsification” are synonymous with
“intentionally fraudulent.” Meridian believes it did not need to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that Miller acted with an intent to deceive. Meridian
contends that by adding an intent element, the arbitrator made an unauthorized
modification of the CBA.

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The arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA was within his authority. While the
CBA prohibits adding to or modifying its terms, the CBA does not define
“dishonesty.” The term thus is ambiguous, authorizing the arbitrator to interpret its
meaning. See Terminal, 307 F.3d at 740. Meridian stresses that the CBA defines
“document alteration and/or falsification” as including “signing for work that was
not performed by/checked by the colleague(s) who signed for the work.” This
definition includes dishonesty. The arbitrator reasonably decided that at the heart of
all dishonest, false, or fraudulent acts is the intent to deceive. See id. Cf. United
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Historic Pres. Tr., 265 F.3d 722, 731 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nder
Missouri law, misrepresentation requires an intent to deceive.”). See generally
Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Modern English Usage: The Authority on Grammar,
Usage, and Style 443 (5th ed. 2022) (“[F]alse, in a phrase such as false statement,
is potentially ambiguous where intent is concerned, since the word may mean either
‘erroneous, incorrect’ or ‘purposely deceptive.’”). The arbitrator acted within his
authority in his arguable interpretation of the CBA’s terms. See Misco, 484 U.S. at
38.
Meridian also argues that the award does not draw its essence from the CBA
because the arbitrator went beyond its four corners by examining the parties’ intent.
However, the silent or ambiguous language required the arbitrator to consider “other
relevant sources of the parties’ intent, such as their past practices.” Exide Techs. v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. No. 700, 964 F.3d 782, 787 (8th Cir.
2020) (cleaned up), quoting Boise Cascade, 309 F.3d at 1082.
The award drew its essence from the CBA. The arbitrator’s interpretation
does not fall under the first “extremely narrow” exception. See Hoffman, 236 F.3d
at 461–62.
IV.
Meridian argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by drawing an
adverse inference against it for failing to call Miller’s direct supervisors as witnesses.

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Meridian tries to meet the second “extremely narrow” exception to overturn the
award. This court does not examine whether the adverse inference was appropriate,
only whether it is a manifest disregard for the law. See id.
The key here is whether Meridian bears the burden of proof for the adverse
inference issue. See Boardman v. National Med. Enters., 106 F.3d 840, 844 (8th
Cir. 1997). “Drawing an adverse inference from the failure of a party to put on key
witnesses relevant to some issue is most reasonable when it is the party with the
burden of proof on that issue who fails to do so.” Id. The arbitrator had discretion
to allocate to Meridian the burden to prove just cause to terminate Miller. See Alvey,
Inc. v. Teamsters Loc. Union No. 688, 132 F.3d 1209, 1212 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that this court ordinarily cannot review “[a]n arbitrator’s decision allocating the
burden of proof among the parties” without “specific controlling language in the
collective bargaining agreement”), quoting Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, Inc. v. Local
559 Laborers’ Int’l Union, 980 F.2d 1424, 1429 (11th Cir.1993). Cf. Ross v.
Garner Printing Co., 285 F.3d 1106, 1113 (8th Cir. 2002) (in applying Iowa law,
holding that “in a case arising under a ‘for cause’ employment contract, it is
generally held that the employer has the burden of proving cause for termination”);
Hirsch v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 422 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Mo. App.
2014) (stating under Missouri law, “the burden shifts to the employer to prove
misconduct connected with work when the employer asserts the employee was
discharged for misconduct”). Meridian called witnesses who testified about Miller’s
execution of the five OJTs. Yet, the direct supervisors were never called to testify.
“[I]t has long been ‘settled that if a party fails to produce the testimony of an
available witness on a material issue in the case, it may be inferred that his testimony,
if presented, would be adverse to the party who fails to call the witness.’” Kostelec
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 64 F.3d 1220, 1229 (8th Cir. 1995), quoting Illinois
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Staples, 272 F.2d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 1959). Because Meridian had
the burden of proof and its supervisors were available and possessed pertinent
information, the arbitrator’s adverse inference was not a manifest disregard for the
law. The arbitrator acted within his authority.

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V.
Meridian argues that Miller’s reinstatement violates public policy. Even if
the arbitrator acts within his contractual authority, this court can still overturn an
award on public policy grounds. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union
204 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987). This
exception, however, is narrow. WM Crittenden Ops., LLC v. United Food & Com.
Workers, Loc. Union 1529, 9 F.4th 732, 736 (8th Cir. 2021). For this court to revoke
the arbitration award on public policy grounds, the public policy “must be well
defined and dominant.” W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
The public policy must also be established by existing law, “not from general
considerations of supposed public interests.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 44, quoting W.R.
Grace, 461 U.S. at 766. Even if a well-defined and dominant public policy exists,
this court still adopts the arbitrator’s view of the facts. See id. at 37–38, 44; WM
Crittenden, 9 F.4th at 736.
For arbitration awards of employment disputes, this court focuses on whether
the arbitrator’s reinstatement decision violates public policy, not whether the
employee’s behavior violates public policy. Entergy Ops., Inc. v. United Gov’t Sec.
Officers of Am. Int’l Union, 856 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 2017). WM Crittenden, 9
F.4th at 736. The clearest examples of well-defined and dominant public policies
against reinstatement awards are where the law, legal precedent, or regulations
contain “specific and exacting requirements” or explicitly forbid or restrict
reinstatement. See Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. United Food & Com.
Workers, 739 F.3d 1136, 1142 (8th Cir. 2014), discussing Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d
at 1427–29. See also MidAmerican Energy Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers Loc. 499, 345 F.3d 616, 621 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming an arbitration award
where the regulatory framework lacked “the specific and exacting requirements
found” in Iowa Electric); Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. UMW, Dist. 17, 531
U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (affirming an arbitration award where “[n]either the Act nor the

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regulations forbid an employer to reinstate in a safety-sensitive position an employee
who fails a random drug test once or twice”).
Meridian relies on cases where the law and regulations are specific and
exacting, or explicitly forbid or restrict a reinstatement. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 861 F.2d 665, 673–74 (11th Cir. 1988) (reinstatement
through arbitration is improper if regulations require airlines to prevent intoxicated
pilots, like the employee, and the arbitrator was unauthorized to consider the
employee’s rehabilitation); Union Pac. R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255,
261–62 (8th Cir. 1993) (reinstatement through arbitration is improper if the Federal
Railroad Administration’s regulations expressly forbid reinstating an employee who
abused drugs or alcohol while on duty before “the employee had completed certain
steps designed to prevent future incidents”); Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d at 1427–29
(reinstatement through arbitration is improper if the employee “broke a safety rule
that was put in place pursuant to a strict regulatory scheme devised by Congress,”
and where the regulatory agency had promulgated “volumes of safety rules that
govern all nuclear power plants”). The arbitrators in these cases all found the
employee violated the regulations. The arbitrator here, however, found Miller’s
preparation of the OJTs was not “intentionally fraudulent” or “falsified.” Also,
neither the FDCA nor FDA regulations governing auto-injector training forbid or
restrict reinstating an employee for a procedural training violation. Cf. 21 U.S.C.
§ 351(a); 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.25, 211.180. The regulations here do not “evidence a
well-defined and dominant public policy” that prohibits Miller’s reinstatement for
procedural training violations condoned by the employer. Boehringer, 739 F.3d at
1143. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 43–44.
Meridian asserts that the “well-defined and dominant” policy framework
allows for overturning an award if the policy implicates safety with the potential to
affect the public. Based on hypotheses of emergencies, Meridian claims that
manufacturing its medical devices “is firmly rooted in common sense.” Misco, 484
U.S. at 44.

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Based on the arbitrator’s finding of facts, it is Meridian that disregards
common sense in its training practices. Meridian asks this court to defy W.R. Grace
and Misco and formulate public policy from the “underlying conduct leading to the
arbitration.” PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 350 (8th Cir. 1995), citing
Misco, 484 U.S. at 44 and W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766. This court cannot ignore
the requirement for a well-defined and dominant policy. See id. (holding this court
cannot “set aside [an] award in the absence of a well-defined and dominant policy”);
Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d at 1429 (stating that not every employee who breaches a
public safety regulation should be discharged). “A refusal to enforce an award must
rest on more than speculation or assumption.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 44. Meridian’s
public policy argument is speculation that Miller might violate training procedures
that harm the public. The arbitrator’s award reinstating Miller does not violate a
well-defined and dominant public policy.
In this case, vacating the award would undermine the federal policy of settling
labor disputes by arbitration and burden the courts. See United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). The district court did
not err in affirming the arbitrator’s award.
* * * * * * *
The judgment is affirmed.
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