United States of America v. Yuri Chachanko

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2440
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Yuri Chachanko
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Western
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Submitted: May 16, 2025
Filed: December 17, 2025
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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STRAS, Circuit Judge.
Definite articles like “the” can make a difference. For Yuri Chachanko, it
means he is not yet eligible for a sentence reduction. The word “the” in the phrase
“the term of imprisonment” required him to serve at least 10 years of the sentence

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he wanted the district court1 to reduce. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6). Given that he has not done so, we affirm the judgment denying his
request.
I.
Twenty-one years ago, Chachanko and an accomplice went on a crime spree
across the Great Plains. It started with an armed robbery of a casino in Rapid City,
South Dakota, followed by four more in Sioux Falls and Watertown. Next came two
crimes in Montana, both stickups at bars. By then, officers were hot on their trail.
After a high-speed car chase and a brief foot pursuit, their crime spree came to an
end.
Chachanko faced federal charges in both states. In reverse order of the crimes
he committed, the Montana prosecution came first, which resulted in a 219-month
prison sentence for two Hobbs Act crimes, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951, and use of a
firearm during a crime of violence, see id. § 924(c)(1)(A).
More prison time, however, was on its way. Once the District of Montana
finished with him, he had to face prosecution in South Dakota. He pleaded guilty to
using a firearm during another crime of violence. See id. §§ 2, 924(c)(1). But this
time, he received an even longer sentence, 300 months, set to start after he finished
serving the Montana one. See id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2006) (imposing a 25-year
mandatory-minimum sentence for any “second or subsequent conviction” of the
crime); id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (requiring a consecutive sentence).
Fast forward to the present. Due to legislative changes in the First Step Act,
Chachanko requested a sentence reduction in the South Dakota case. See Pub. L.
No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3582);
1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.

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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. As relevant here, he thought he deserved one because his
300-month sentence was “unusually long,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), and he had a
head injury, depression, and bipolar disorder, see id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)–(C). Instead
of making an immediate decision, the district court ordered briefing on whether he
had served “at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6)
(requiring it for “unusually long sentence[s]”). When it concluded he had not and
that “routine . . . monitoring” would take care of his medical conditions, it denied
the motion.
II.
Before 2018, only the Bureau of Prisons could seek a sentence reduction on a
prisoner’s behalf in these circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2017)
(providing that it was by “motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons”); United
States v. Rodd, 966 F.3d 740, 746 n.6 (8th Cir. 2020). Now, thanks to the First Step
Act, prisoners can request them on their own, once they have “fully exhausted” their
administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018); see Rodd, 966 F.3d at
744–45 (describing how the First Step Act changed the procedures). Any relief,
however, is still at the discretion of the district court, which “may reduce the”
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see Rodd, 966 F.3d at
747–48.
A prisoner seeking a sentence reduction must get past the eligibility
requirements: “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ing]” a reduction and
“consisten[cy] with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). What qualifies as an “extraordinary and
compelling reason” is up to the Sentencing Commission, although its policy
statements must be “consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute.”
28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C), (t). For those who are eligible, a court may then exercise
its discretion by considering the “factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
that they are applicable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

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With this framework in mind, Chachanko argues that the district court made
three errors when it denied a sentence reduction. First, it did not add his Montana
and South Dakota sentences together in evaluating his eligibility for relief from an
“unusually long sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Second, it applied the
“[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons” requirement too strictly when it found that
his medical conditions were not serious enough to count. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1). And
finally, it never addressed whether they qualified under a catch-all provision. See
id. § 1B1.13(b)(5) (accepting “any . . . circumstance or combination of
circumstances . . . similar in gravity” to a listed reason, other than an “unusually long
sentence”).
A.
Chachanko’s months-long crime spree resulted in two federal sentences, one
in Montana and the other in South Dakota. Although he singles out the South Dakota
sentence as “unusually long,” he wants us to treat the two sentences as one in
calculating whether he has “served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment.”
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (emphasis added). Only then would he be eligible for a sentence
reduction. See id.; see also United States v. Gamble, 572 F.3d 472, 474–75 (8th Cir.
2009).
The district court explained why. Although Chachanko had served 17 years
in prison by the time he filed his motion, the sentences were consecutive and he had
only just started serving his South Dakota sentence, which is the one he wanted
reduced. If he were serving them in reverse order, South Dakota then Montana, the
court suggested it might have granted the motion. But with each term of
imprisonment treated separately, rather than in the “aggregate,” he had yet to become
eligible because he had not “served at least 10 years” of the South Dakota sentence.

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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). The question for us is whether those 17 years should have
counted.2
The answer comes down to what the phrase “the term of imprisonment”
means. One interpretation is that it refers to the total time Chachanko will spend in
prison. This reading bunches the sentences together, allowing service on one to
count toward the other. Another is the meaning the district court gave it, which treats
each sentence on its own. Under this interpretation, the time Chachanko spent
serving his Montana sentence would not count.
In the absence of a statutory definition, we use the “ordinary tools of statutory
interpretation” to understand the phrase’s “plain and ordinary meaning.” United
States v. Clayborn, 951 F.3d 937, 939 (8th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). The most
helpful clue is the word “the,” which appears in both the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a),
(c)(1)(A), and the relevant Sentencing Guidelines provision, U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6). The statute directs “[t]he court” to consider certain factors when
“determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment” on “the defendant,” as
well as “the length of the term.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (emphases added). It then
allows “the court,” in its discretion, to “reduce the term of imprisonment” if “the
defendant” meets other criteria. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphases added). As a word
of limitation, “the” refers to a specific object, see Luiken v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC,
2 The government argued before the district court that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)
was without legal effect because it conflicts with both the statute, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and our precedent, see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez,
65 F.4th 1000, 1001 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 586
(8th Cir. 2022) (holding that disparities with future sentences due to non-retroactive
changes in the law cannot be “extraordinary and compelling reasons”). See
Rutherford v. United States, No. 24-820, 2025 WL 1603603 (U.S. June 6, 2025)
(granting certiorari to resolve the question presented in Crandall). It has dropped
this argument on appeal, however, so we will not consider it. See United States v.
Greene, 513 F.3d 904, 906–07 (8th Cir. 2008) (treating the failure to brief an
argument as waiver).

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705 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2013), usually one the text has already introduced, see
3M Co. v. Comm’r, 154 F.4th 574, 580 (8th Cir. 2025).
Let’s walk through what the repeated use of the word “the” means for this
case. “The court” originally imposed “a term” of 25 years on Chachanko, who was
“the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). Upon the filing of a motion for a sentence
reduction, “the court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment,” a clear reference to
the same court and the initial 25-year term it imposed. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
(emphases added); see 3M, 154 F.4th at 580; cf. United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342,
348 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“A[] . . . motion for compassionate release is generally filed
with the judge that imposed the original sentence.”).
If the statute tells us that the South Dakota court can only reduce the South
Dakota sentence, then the reference to “the term of imprisonment” in the relevant
Sentencing Guidelines provision must be similarly limited. U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6); see id. § 1B1.13(a) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)); 3M,
154 F.4th at 580 (explaining that the consistent-usage canon “is particularly strong
when a word like ‘the’ precedes a previously used noun”). That is, “the term of
imprisonment” requiring service of “at least 10 years” is the South Dakota
sentence—the same one Chachanko seeks to have reduced—and that one only.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6); see NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 527 (2014)
(“[T]he word ‘the’ frequently . . . indicates ‘a particular thing.’” (citation omitted)).
Under that interpretation, Chachanko falls well short of 10 years.
Chachanko would rather have us adopt the bunching-the-sentences
interpretation. For support, he points to a nearby statute that treats “[m]ultiple terms
of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively . . . as a single, aggregate term of
imprisonment” for “administrative purposes.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c) (emphasis
added). Treating them as a single sentence would mean he has served 17 years
already, substantially more than the 10 years needed for eligibility. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6).

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Chachanko’s interpretation is both counter-textual and contrary to precedent.
In Gamble, we rejected the idea that a district court can “meld . . . two sentences into
a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.” 572 F.3d at 474–75. There, the
defendant had already fully served the crack-cocaine sentence he wanted reduced.
See id. at 473. He filed a motion anyway based on the theory that Chachanko now
urges us to adopt: his two sentences become “joined as one” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584(c), so he should be eligible for a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. Id. at
474. In coming out the other way, we explained that only the Bureau of Prisons had
to treat sentences “as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment” because it, not
courts, “administers” them. Id.; see Black’s Law Dictionary 42 (5th ed. 1979) (“In
this sense, administrative functions or acts are distinguished from such as are
judicial.”).
With the same underlying theory supporting Chachanko’s argument, it is no
surprise that his motion runs into the same problem, even if it presents a slightly
different scenario. Although Gamble was hoping to reduce a sentence he had already
served and Chachanko one he had just started, both defendants tried to rely on the
same administrative statute to have two sentences “joined as one.” Gamble, 572
F.3d at 474. Regardless of how the Bureau of Prisons might treat each of these
scenarios for administrative purposes, see 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), neither was eligible
for a reduction.
B.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying a reduction based
on Chachanko’s medical conditions. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1); Rodd, 966 F.3d
at 747–48. Although he continues to suffer ongoing complications from a head
injury, in addition to facing mental-health challenges, he voluntarily declined
treatments for both. And, according to the Bureau of Prisons, his condition is
“stable” and medical needs are “limited.” In short, nothing suggests his health
“substantially diminishes [his] ability . . . to provide self-care” or “is at risk of
serious deterioration.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)–(C).

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The same goes for the argument that his medical conditions made him eligible
for a reduction under the catch-all provision covering “any other circumstance or
combination of circumstances.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5). The district court considered
his arguments “holistically” and in “combination,” but nothing rose to the level of
justifying relief. Id. (requiring a “similar[ity] in gravity” to the other listed reasons).
It did not abuse its discretion in coming to that conclusion. See Rodd, 966 F.3d at
747–48.
III.
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
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