Breayonna Aaron, individually v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, doing business as Amtrak

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2654
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Breayonna Aaron, individually and on behalf of Richie Terrell Aaron, Jr., deceased
and on behalf of her minor children M.A., R.A. and L.A.; M.A., by and through
next friend, Breayonna Aaron; R.A., by and through next friend Breayonna Aaron;
L.A., by and through next friend Breayonna Aaron
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, doing business as Amtrak
Defendant - Appellant
Marquise L. Webb
Defendant
___________________________
No. 24-2693
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Breayonna Aaron, individually and on behalf of Richie Terrell Aaron, Jr., deceased
and on behalf of her minor children M.A., R.A. and L.A.; M.A., by and through
next friend, Breayonna Aaron; R.A., by and through next friend Breayonna Aaron;
L.A., by and through next friend Breayonna Aaron
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, doing business as Amtrak
Defendant - Appellee

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Marquise L. Webb
Defendant
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Appeals from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
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Submitted: September 17, 2025
Filed: December 31, 2025
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, doing business as Amtrak, appeals
the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the
alternative, a new trial or a reduction in punitive damages in this suit for negligence
and wrongful death. We reverse.
I. Background
On January 14, 2022, Marquise Webb and Richie Aaron, Jr. separately
boarded an Amtrak train in Normal, Illinois. The train was operating as part of
Amtrak’s Lincoln Service, which runs between Chicago, Illinois, and St. Louis,
Missouri. Webb and Aaron did not know each other and were not traveling together.
Amtrak does not routinely conduct passenger security screening for weapons
prior to boarding its trains, but it prohibits passengers from carrying firearms
onboard. Amtrak enforces its firearm prohibition through language on its tickets and
signage in its terminals. Notwithstanding the prohibition, and unbeknownst to
Amtrak personnel, Webb boarded the train with a concealed firearm.

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The Lincoln Service train arrived in St. Louis, and both Webb and Aaron
changed trains to Amtrak’s River Runner, which operates between St. Louis and
Kansas City, Missouri. At 9:02 p.m., the River Runner made a scheduled stop at
Lee’s Summit, Missouri. At approximately 9:03 p.m., Webb suddenly shot Aaron in
the back five times. There was no apparent motive for the random execution. After
shooting Aaron, Webb exited the train.1
Several passengers heard loud noise from the gunshots. Some thought the
noise was from fireworks, but others suspected it was gunfire. At least one passenger
informed a member of Amtrak’s crew about possible gun shots, but this crewmember
apparently dismissed the noise as fireworks. The train departed from Lee’s Summit
at 9:08 p.m.
At some point before 9:19 p.m., Amtrak personnel discovered Aaron had been
shot. A conductor performed CPR on Aaron until the train arrived at the next station,
Independence, at 9:23 p.m. Emergency medical services were present when the train
arrived, but Aaron did not display signs of life upon arrival and was pronounced
dead at 9:33 p.m.
In March 2022, Aaron’s widow, Breayonna Aaron, on behalf of herself, Aaron,
and their three minor children (collectively, the Aarons), sued Amtrak asserting three
causes of action under Missouri law: (1) negligence and vicarious liability; (2)
negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision; and (3) wrongful death.2 The Aarons
1 Webb was later apprehended by law enforcement. He pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter and other related charges and was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment.
2 The Aarons also asserted a claim for “negligence/assault and battery” against
Webb. The district court entered default judgment against Webb, who failed to
appear or otherwise defend himself in the case.

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sought damages “in excess of $100 million,” but did not explicitly request punitive
damages.
In January 2024, the district court conducted a jury trial. After the close of
the Aarons’ case, Amtrak moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court
did not rule on Amtrak’s motion and submitted the case to the jury. The district court
also instructed the jury on punitive damages over Amtrak’s objection and its motion
to strike the Aarons’ punitive damages claim due to their failure to plead punitive
damages. The jury found Amtrak liable by general verdict and awarded the Aarons
$8.8 million in compensatory damages and $150 million in punitive damages.
After the verdict, Amtrak renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law
and moved, in the alternative, for a new trial or a reduction in punitive damages. The
district court denied Amtrak’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and
its motion for a new trial. The district court, however, found the jury’s award of
punitive damages to be grossly excessive and, therefore, unconstitutional under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It reduced the punitive damages
award to $35.2 million. The district court then entered final judgment.
Amtrak timely appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as
a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial. Amtrak also appeals the amount
by which the district court reduced punitive damages. The Aarons cross-appeal the
district court’s decision to reduce the punitive damages award. The district court
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1349, and we have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. Analysis
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a
matter of law (JMOL). Milhauser v. Minco Prods., 701 F.3d 268, 272 (8th Cir.
2012). A district court may grant JMOL “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue
during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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50(a)(1). On a motion for JMOL, we view the evidence and draw every reasonable
inference therefrom in favor of the verdict. Soltesz v. Rushmore Plaza Civic Ctr.,
847 F.3d 941, 946 (8th Cir. 2017). We may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence. Id.
Further, we apply Missouri law to the Aarons’ claims, all of which are asserted
under state law. See Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 1203 (8th Cir. 2011). In doing
so, “we look to relevant state precedent, analogous decisions, considered dicta, and
any other reliable data to determine how the Supreme Court of [Missouri] would
construe [Missouri] law.” Salier v. Walmart, Inc., 76 F.4th 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Ashley Cnty. Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009)). “If the
Missouri Supreme Court has not spoken on an issue, we may consider opinions from
the Missouri Court of Appeals as ‘particularly relevant’ and must follow them when
those opinions provide ‘the best evidence of Missouri law.’” Walker, 650 F.3d at
1203 (quoting Bockelman v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 403 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 2005)).
To establish a negligence claim under Missouri law, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
the existence of a duty; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) injury.
Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, 758 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Mo. 1988). Failure to
prove any one element defeats a finding of negligence. See, e.g., Rhoden v. Mo.
Delta Med. Ctr., 621 S.W.3d 469, 482 (Mo. 2021).
Here, the district court instructed the jury to find Amtrak negligent if it found
Amtrak failed to do any of the following (1) “exercise ordinary care to protect
[Aaron] from the danger by failing to make the premises reasonably safe from
foreseeable criminal acts by third parties”; (2) “adequately warn [Aaron] of the
condition of the train or security on the train, or . . . warn [Aaron] of the absence of
adequate security measures”; (3) “promptly and adequately investigate the noises
that took place as [Aaron] was being shot”; (4) “seek medical assistance on the train
to render aid to [Aaron] following the shooting”; or (5) “timely discover the need
for medical attention and render aid to [Aaron] following the shooting.” For each of
these five “negligence theories,” the Aarons were also required to prove causation

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and injury. The jury found Amtrak liable in a general verdict; thus, it is unclear
which negligence theory the jury relied upon. Nevertheless, Amtrak is entitled to
JMOL because the Aarons failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy all the
requisite elements of a negligence claim for any presented theory. More specifically,
if the verdict was premised on the first or second theory, there was insufficient
evidence to conclude Amtrak had a legal duty. If the verdict was premised on the
third, fourth, or fifth theory, there was insufficient evidence to establish causation.
A. Absence of a Legal Duty
First, Amtrak argues the district court erred in denying it JMOL because the
evidence did not establish an unprovoked shooting was foreseeable and, thus, under
Missouri law, it did not have a duty to protect Aaron from the unforeseeable criminal
acts of unknown third parties. We agree with Amtrak. There is not legally sufficient
evidence to conclude Amtrak owed, or breached, a duty to protect Aaron from the
criminal acts of third parties. Similarly, because Amtrak does not owe a duty to
protect business invitees from the unforeseeable criminal acts of third parties, it does
not owe a duty to warn its business invitees of such danger.
“Whether a duty exists is purely a question of law.” Lopez v. Three Rivers
Elec. Coop., 26 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Mo. 2000). “The touchstone for the creation of a
duty is foreseeability.” Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62. Generally, there is no duty to
protect against the criminal acts of third parties “because such activities are rarely
foreseeable.” L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257
(Mo. 2002). However, the Missouri Supreme Court recognizes two exceptions to
this general rule: (1) “when the defendant knows, or has reason to know, that a third
party is harming or is about to harm an entrant”; or (2) “when the nature of the
defendant’s business or past experience provides a basis for the reasonable
anticipation on defendant’s part that the criminal activity of third persons might put
entrants at risk.” Wieland v. Owner-Operator Servs., 540 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Mo.
2018) (quoting The Law of Premises Liability § 11.03[1], 11-6). In this case, only
the second exception is relevant. Under the second exception, to establish a duty,

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the “plaintiff must show evidence that would cause a reasonable person to anticipate
danger and take precautionary actions to protect its business invitees against the
criminal activities of unknown third parties.” L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 258. The
“plaintiff ‘need not show that the very injury resulting from defendant’s negligence
was foreseeable, but merely that a reasonable person could have foreseen that
injuries of the type suffered would be likely to occur under the circumstances.’” Id.
(quoting Smith v. Archbishop of St. Louis, 632 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
“Violent crimes are foreseeable if the premises have been the site of other prior
violent crimes, including robbery, assault, burglary, stealing, arson, abduction,
murder, sexual assault and rape.” Id. (citing to Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62 n.2).
There is insufficient evidence to reasonably conclude violent crime on the
River Runner was foreseeable. First, the Aarons do not present evidence that Amtrak
experienced prior violent crime on the relevant premises, which was the River
Runner. No shootings occurred on the River Runner or on Amtrak property in
Missouri. The jury was only presented evidence of one incident of prior violent
crime on the River Runner. That is, in 2021, a River Runner passenger brandished
a knife and threatened a conductor.3 Aside from this dissimilar incident, the Aarons
do not provide the court with any other evidence about violent crime occurring on
the River Runner. As a result, even when viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, there are not sufficiently “numerous, similar, and recent
[violent] crimes” to put Amtrak on reasonable notice of the danger of unprovoked
shootings on the River Runner. Wood v. Centermark Props., 984 S.W.2d 517, 524–
25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding there was no duty where plaintiffs alleged “20
incidents of allegedly violent crimes” occurring within the five-year period, none of
which were “sufficiently similar to the carjacking, abduction and murder of
decedent”); see also Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 274–75 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding there was no duty where prior instances of violent crime
3 The incident occurred during the COVID pandemic after the conductor
instructed the passenger he needed to wear a mask. The passenger did not physically
harm the conductor or any other passengers.

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were “significantly different” types of crime from the crime committed against the
decedent). This case is distinguishable from those in which the Missouri Supreme
Court has held such a duty existed because the violent crime is significantly less
frequent and is dissimilar to the random shooting that occurred here. See Madden,
758 S.W.2d at 62–63 (holding a duty existed where the premises had previously
experienced “six armed robberies, six strong arm robberies, one assault, and one
purse snatching” in the preceding three years); see also L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 258
(holding a duty existed where “seventy-five violent crimes” occurred on the
premises in the three years preceding the attack, “sixty-two percent” of which
involved female victims like the plaintiff).
To attempt to establish this crime was foreseeable, the Aarons seek to expand
the relevant premises too far. The Aarons argue prior instances of violent crime in
Amtrak’s entire Central Division, which consists of twenty-two states, are relevant
to whether crime on the River Runner was foreseeable. For example, the Aarons
point to evidence Amtrak recorded seventy-six violent crimes in Illinois and
Missouri from 2019 until 2021;4 and Amtrak had previously experienced two
shootings in Illinois. The Aarons’ view of “premises,” however, does not comport
with Missouri law. While trains may change location frequently, crime in one
location does not necessarily indicate crime in another. See Liszewski v. Target
Corp., 374 F.3d 597, 600 (8th Cir. 2004) (determining that when interpreting
Missouri law, we “give less weight to temporally remote crimes and crimes that
occurred off premises because common sense dictates that a reasonable person
would give less consideration to such events”). We cannot rely on crime statistics
in other locations simply because those locations are owned and operated by Amtrak.
In the same vein, we cannot look to crime statistics in cities the River Runner merely
passes through. See Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 273 (“The fact that crimes in general
have occurred in an area or that a business is located in a ‘high crime’ area is
4 An exhibit shows Amtrak recorded thirty-five violent crimes in 2019, twenty
violent crimes in 2020, and twenty-one violent crimes in 2021. These violent crimes
primarily occurred in Illinois; only five occurred in Missouri.

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insufficient to invoke the duty.”); see also Wood, 984 S.W.2d at 524–525 (“[U]nder
the violent crimes exception, the incident must occur on premises controlled by the
defendant.”). For off-premises crimes to be relevant, there must be a discernable
link to the premises. See, e.g., Virginia D. v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881,
888 (Mo. 1983) (finding incidents of crime in a hotel’s garage were not “insufficient
to provide warning” to the hotel because there was “ample evidence that persons on
the fringe of the law, and some quite over the border, could enter, remain, and
misbehave in the hotel without great difficulty”). The Aarons, however, fail to
connect prior violent crime in the Central Division to crime on the River Runner,
specifically.
Further, we reject the Aarons’ argument, and the district court’s conclusion,
that Amtrak’s existing security measures indicate violent crime on the River Runner
was foreseeable. As we have previously observed, “Missouri law makes clear that
the provision of a security program does not give rise to a general duty to protect
[business invitees].” Liszewski, 374 F.3d at 601. Missouri law also “makes clear
that it is improper to infer knowledge of risk, and therefore duty, based on the hiring
of security guards.” Id.; accord Miller v. S. Cnty. Ctr., Inc., 857 S.W.2d 507, 512
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“To infer a duty from the mere fact of hiring security guards is
no more legitimate than inferring a duty from the fact that a defendant purchases
insurance. Greater prudence than the law otherwise requires is not a proper basis for
the imposition of a duty; it is conduct society seeks to encourage.”). Phrased
differently, Amtrak’s acknowledgement that crime was possible does not prove that
this particular crime was sufficiently foreseeable to impose a legal duty. See Lopez,
26 S.W.3d at 156 (quoting Zuber v. Clarkson Const. Co., 251 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo.
1952) (defining foreseeability as “the presence of some probability or likelihood of
harm sufficiently serious that ordinary persons would take precautions to avoid it.
The existence of a mere probability is insufficient. . . [there must be] ‘some
probability of sufficient moment to induce the reasonable mind to take the
precautions which would avoid it’”).

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Therefore, we conclude there was legally insufficient evidence to confer a
duty on Amtrak to protect Aaron from the criminal acts of third parties. As a direct
result, Amtrak also did not have a duty to warn its business invitees of such
unforeseen danger. See Wofford v. Kennedy’s 2nd Street Co., 649 S.W.2d 912, 914
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that “because there was no duty to prevent injuries
[caused by third party criminal actors], there was no duty to warn [invitees] of
possible dangers”). If the jury’s verdict was premised on either theory of negligence,
Amtrak is entitled to JMOL.
B. Absence of Causation
With the first two theories of liability failing due to a lack of duty, we turn to
the remaining three theories, which relate to Amtrak’s purported negligence in
failing to discover the shooting and successfully render aid to Aaron. Amtrak argues
the district court erred in denying it JMOL because there was no evidence its alleged
failure to promptly discover Aaron and render medical care caused Aaron’s death.
In essence, Amtrak contends Aaron would have died from the gunshot wounds
regardless of its employees’ subsequent action and, thus, there is not but-for
causation. We agree. The jury did not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to
conclude Amtrak’s alleged negligence was the but-for cause of Aaron’s death.
In all negligence cases, Missouri courts require the plaintiff to prove
causation. Tharp v. St. Luke’s Surgicenter-Lee’s Summit, LLC, 587 S.W.3d 647, 657
(Mo. 2019). “Proof of causation entails proof of causation in fact, or ‘but-for’
causation, as well as proximate causation.” Nail v. Husch Blackwell Sanders, LLP,
436 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Mo. 2014). For present purposes, we are focused on but-for
causation. But-for causation is causation in fact; it requires the plaintiff to prove
their injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct. Callahan v.
Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 860–61 (Mo. 1993). Specifically, in a
wrongful death action, the plaintiff must prove the decedent would not have died but
for the defendant’s negligence. Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 209 (Mo. 2012).
In a wrongful death action, but-for causation is “established through expert

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testimony that there is a reasonable degree of medical or scientific certainty that but
for the tortfeasor’s conduct,” the decedent would not have died. Rhoden, 621 S.W.3d
at 482 (cleaned up) (quoting Lowe v. Mercy Clinic E. Cmtys., 592 S.W.3d 10, 18
(Mo. Ct. App. 2019)). But-for causation is not established, however, if an expert
testifies that a defendant’s negligence “‘might’” or “‘could have’” caused the
decedent’s death, “though other causes are possible[.]” Baker v. Guzon, 950 S.W.2d
635, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (stating “such testimony is devoid of evidentiary
value”).
Here, the Aarons did not present sufficient evidence to establish but-for
causation to support their theories of wrongful death premised on Amtrak’s inaction
after the shooting occurred. The jury heard expert testimony from Dr. Brokish, an
emergency room physician, about Aaron’s chance of survival. Dr. Brokish testified
if Amtrak took immediate action, by calling for emergency assistance at Lee’s
Summit or summoning onboard care, Aaron’s survival rate “would be anywhere
between 4 and 14 percent.” In other words, Dr. Brokish stated that if Amtrak had
acted promptly, Aaron’s survival was still statistically unlikely. This evidence,
without more, does not provide the jury with a sufficient basis to conclude Aaron
would not have died but for Amtrak’s negligence. Neither Dr. Brokish, nor any other
expert, testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Amtrak’s inaction
caused Aaron’s death.5 See Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 209–210 (holding there was
sufficient evidence to establish but-for causation where an expert “stated
unequivocally” that a physician’s substandard care “caused [the decedent] a very
profound brain injury” that “led to her death”); see also Baker, 950 S.W.2d at 646–
47 (finding but-for causation where an expert testified the defendant’s action or
inaction “more probably than not” and “did” directly contribute to the decedent’s
death). Instead, the evidence presented required the jury to make an impermissible
5 The Aarons claim Dr. Brokish testified that Aaron had an 80-90% survival
rate. But, this claim is unsupported by the record. Dr. Brokish stated if Aaron was
shot in his waiting room, Aaron’s survivability rate would have been 80-90%. Dr.
Brokish repeatedly testified Aaron’s chance of survival was only 4-14%.

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speculative inference that Aaron would have survived had Amtrak promptly
summoned care. See Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Mo. 1992)
(explaining that “there is a difference between logical inferences, and those
inferences that involve a leap of faith that makes such inferences mere speculation”).
The evidence does not support a reasonable inference that Amtrak’s
negligence “directly caused” or “directly contributed to cause” Aaron’s death. At
most, the evidence establishes Amtrak caused Aaron to lose a remote chance of
survival. However, the Aarons brought a claim for wrongful death, not for lost
chance of survival. See Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685 (“The language of the
survivorship statute and the wrongful death statute are mutually antagonistic. The
survivorship statute applies when the injury alleged did not cause death, and the
wrongful death statute applies when the injury did cause death.”). Therefore, under
the Aarons’ asserted cause of action, the jury did not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to reasonably conclude Amtrak’s negligence was the but-for cause
of Aaron’s death. As such, if the jury’s verdict was premised on Amtrak’s alleged
failure to promptly discover Aaron and render medical aid, Amtrak is entitled to
JMOL.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Aarons do not satisfy at least one
required element for each of their theories of negligence. Therefore, we hold the
jury did not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find Amtrak liable on any
presented theory of negligence.6 We reverse the district court’s denial of Amtrak’s
motion for JMOL and direct the district court to enter judgment for Amtrak.
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6 Because we find that Amtrak is not liable on any of the Aarons’ asserted
claims, we do not address the parties’ arguments about Amtrak’s motion for a new
trial or punitive damages.

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