Clara Cheeks, In Her Personal Capacity v. Jon Belmar, Individually

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2905
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Clara Cheeks, In Her Personal Capacity
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Jon Belmar, Individually and in his Official capacity as St. Louis County, Missouri
Chief of Police; St. Louis County, Missouri; M. Broniec, M.SGT, Trooper of
MSHP (Individually); Paul Kempke, SGT., Trooper for MSHP (Individually);
B.A. Teague, CPL., Trooper for MSHP; Individually; Mark Jakob, Individual
capacity; Frank L. Maloy, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Alex Maloy
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri
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Submitted: September 16, 2025
Filed: December 12, 2025
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
Mikel Neil initiated a high-speed chase by fleeing from St. Louis County
police officers Alex Maloy and Mark Jakob. During the chase, one of the officers
performed a PIT maneuver that caused Neil to fatally crash into a tree. Neil’s mother,

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Clara Cheeks, then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the officers used excessive
force on Neil. The district court1 dismissed Cheeks’s excessive force claim, and she
now appeals. We affirm.
I. Background
After allegedly seeing Neil run a red light in Berkeley, Missouri, Maloy and
Jakob turned on their emergency lights to pull him over.2 But Neil fled, prompting
Maloy and Jakob to give chase. The pursuit reached speeds greater than ninety miles
per hour on a primarily residential street with a thirty-five to forty mile-per-hour
speed limit. During the chase, Maloy and Jakob’s police car struck Neil’s vehicle
while executing a PIT maneuver, causing Neil to collide with a tree near the roadway.
St. Louis County Police Department’s pursuit policy prohibits chasing misdemeanor
suspects, and Maloy and Jakob left the scene of the crash without rendering aid or
calling for medical assistance, later falsely reporting the crash as a single-car
accident.
Following Neil’s death, Cheeks brought several § 1983 and state-law claims
against Maloy,3 Jakob, and others — most of which the district court dismissed.
Relevant here, the district court granted Maloy and Jakob qualified immunity against
Cheeks’s excessive force claim, holding she had failed to allege a constitutional
violation. Over thirteen months later — after the pleading-amendment deadline had
passed — Cheeks moved for leave to amend, hoping to revive her excessive force
claim. The district court denied that motion for futility under Federal Rule of Civil
1 The Honorable Sarah E. Pitlyk, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri.
2 Because we are reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, we recite the facts as alleged in the operative complaint. See Christiansen
v. Eral, 52 F.4th 377, 378 (8th Cir. 2022).
3 Maloy died during the pendency of this case. His father, Frank Maloy, was
substituted as the proper party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a).

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Procedure 15(a). This left Cheeks with one remaining active claim against Maloy
and Jakob for failure to provide medical aid to Neil. After that claim survived
summary judgment, Maloy and Jakob appealed, and we affirmed. Cheeks v. Belmar,
80 F.4th 872, 874 (8th Cir. 2023). But before trial, Cheeks voluntarily dismissed the
claim and took this appeal instead, challenging the dismissal of her excessive force
claim and the denial of her motion for leave to amend.
II. Analysis
Cheeks first argues the district court erred by dismissing her excessive force
claim based on qualified immunity. “We review de novo the grant of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the well-pled allegations of the
complaint as true and granting all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” Murphy v. Schmitt, 143 F.4th 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2025); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). The complaint must contain sufficient facts for a court to reasonably
infer the defendant’s liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A
government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the facts alleged by
the plaintiff establish the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the right was
clearly established at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct.” Murphy, 143
F.4th at 918. At the pleading stage, the official “must show that he is entitled to
qualified immunity on the face of the complaint.” Id. (alteration incorporated)
(quoting Carter v. Huterson, 831 F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 2016)).
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “using excessive force when conducting a
seizure.” Ching ex rel. Jordan v. City of Minneapolis, 73 F.4th 617, 620 (8th Cir.
2023); see also U.S. Const. amend. IV. A PIT maneuver performed with the intent
to restrain a fleeing suspect is a seizure. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381
(2007); Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 317–18 (2021); see also, e.g., Sabbe v. Wash.
Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 84 F.4th 807, 820 (9th Cir. 2023). “To establish a
constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from
excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was objectively
reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Davenport v. City of Little Rock,

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142 F.4th 1036, 1044 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Z.J. ex rel. Jones v. Kansas City Bd.
of Police Comm’rs, 931 F.3d 672, 681 (8th Cir. 2019)). The reasonableness of
deadly force turns on “the totality of the circumstances, including [1] the severity of
the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officer or others, and [3] whether the suspect is actively fleeing or resisting
arrest.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Wallace v. City of Alexander, 843 F.3d
763, 768 (8th Cir. 2016)); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
Weighing these factors, the Supreme Court has already held “[a] police
officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the
lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 386.
In Scott, a motorist initiated a police chase, “racing down narrow, two-lane roads in
the dead of night at speeds” exceeding eighty-five miles per hour. Id. at 375, 379.
After police failed to box in the motorist, an officer waited until the road was clear
and rammed the motorist’s vehicle from behind, causing him to crash and rendering
the motorist a quadriplegic. Id. at 375, 380 n.7. Even though ramming the motorist’s
car “posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to” him, the Supreme Court
held the officer acted reasonably given the public dangers posed by high-speed
chases. Id. at 384.
Making clear what Scott implied, we have stated a lack of immediate danger
to bystanders does not alone render a PIT maneuver unreasonable. See Christiansen
v. Eral, 52 F.4th 377, 380–81 (8th Cir. 2022). In Christiansen, a motorist fled the
police at night traveling eighty to ninety miles per hour. Id. at 378–79. After police
unsuccessfully tried to end the pursuit using stop sticks, an officer used a PIT
maneuver, causing the motorist to collide with a light pole. Id. While the motorist
argued he was not an immediate threat to other vehicles or pedestrians when the
officer used the PIT maneuver, we explained the motorist’s reckless driving “had
already threatened the safety of others during the chase.” Id. at 380. As a result, a
reasonable officer could have believed permitting the chase to continue would

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threaten the lives of potential bystanders. Id. (citing Pasco ex rel. Pasco v.
Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 580 (5th Cir. 2009)).
As Scott and Christiansen illustrate, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred
here. Neil led a pursuit through a residential area at speeds exceeding ninety miles
per hour — more than double the posted speed limit. Consequently, his reckless
flight created “an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who
might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in
the chase.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 384; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Though
Cheeks maintains Neil did not pose a “significant threat” to the officers or others
when the driving officer4 performed the PIT maneuver, we disagree. Suspects
fleeing from police in vehicles pose a generally inherent danger to the public, “even
when no bystanders or other motorists are immediately present.” Pasco, 566 F.3d at
580; accord Christiansen, 52 F.4th at 380. Under the circumstances here, the PIT
maneuver constituted a reasonable seizure.
Cheeks raises three arguments to the contrary, all of which lack merit. First,
she asserts the PIT maneuver was unreasonable because the driving officer did not
try other methods of ending the pursuit first. To be sure, the pursuits in Scott and
Christiansen involved initial attempts to trap the fleeing motorists. See Scott, 550
U.S. at 375; Christiansen, 52 F.4th at 378. But a reasonable officer in Maloy or
Jakob’s position could have believed “that, if the chase continued, [Neil] posed a
4 The complaint is unclear about which officer drove the police car and
executed the PIT maneuver. Even so, we must conduct “an individualized analysis
of each officer’s alleged conduct.” Bulfin v. Rainwater, 104 F.4th 1032, 1038 (8th
Cir. 2024) (quoting Bloodworth v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 89 F.4th 614,
624 (8th Cir. 2023)). Neil did not yield to the emergency lights, so only the officer
who performed the PIT maneuver could have seized him. See California v. Hodari
D., 499 U.S. 621, 628–29 (1991). Because no liability exists for the passenger
officer, we go on to analyze only the driving officer’s conduct. And since no
constitutional violation occurred, the driving officer’s identity does not affect our
conclusion.

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risk of serious harm or even death to others he encountered along the way.”
Christiansen, 52 F.4th at 380. So the driving officer was not required to wait on
other officers to set traps before using a PIT maneuver to end the pursuit promptly.
Second, Cheeks argues Maloy and Jakob’s violation of St. Louis County’s
pursuit policy demonstrates the driving officer acted unreasonably. We have
“repeatedly explained that police department guidelines and policies do not create
rights that give rise to a § 1983 action.” Id. at 379. “[T]he [C]onstitution doesn’t
rise and fall with the whims of each police department’s policies . . . .” Id. Thus,
“[j]ust because [the driving officer] chose to violate department policy doesn’t mean
that he acted unreasonably from a constitutional perspective . . . .” Id. at 380.
Third, Cheeks’s brief lists instances of Maloy and Jakob’s post-crash
conduct — such as leaving the scene without calling for aid — to show they knew
the PIT maneuver was unjustified. But these allegations relate to Maloy and Jakob’s
subjective beliefs. Since reasonableness “does not turn on the subjective intent of
the officer,” the driving officer’s subjective beliefs about his conduct have no bearing
on its constitutionality. LeMay v. Mays, 18 F.4th 283, 287 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Andrews v. City of West Branch, 454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2006)).
We now turn to the denial of Cheeks’s motion for leave to amend her
complaint. “Generally, we review the denial of leave to amend a complaint under
an abuse of discretion standard; however, when the district court bases its denial on
the futility of the proposed amendments, we review the underlying legal conclusions
de novo.” Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. City of Richmond Heights, 92 F.4th 763, 769 (8th
Cir. 2024) (quoting Jackson v. Riebold, 815 F.3d 1114, 1122 (8th Cir. 2016)). We
also review de novo whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in
exercising its discretion. Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 714 (8th
Cir. 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal
standard.” Petrone v. Werner Enters., Inc., 940 F.3d 425, 433–34 (8th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Union Elec. Co. v. Energy Ins. Mut. Ltd., 689 F.3d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 2012)).

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When a party seeks leave to amend, courts should “freely give leave when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In fact, “[a] court abuses its discretion
when it denies a motion to amend the pleadings unless there exists undue delay, bad
faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment.” Midwest Med.
Sols., LLC v. Exactech U.S., Inc., 95 F.4th 604, 606–07 (8th Cir. 2024) (alteration
incorporated) (quoting In re Target Corp. Secs. Litig., 955 F.3d 738, 744–45 (8th Cir.
2020)). But after the district court has set a pleading-amendment deadline in a
scheduling order, Rule 16(b) — rather than Rule 15(a) — governs the amendment
of pleadings after the deadline expires. Sherman, 532 F.3d at 716; see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Thus, a party seeking leave to amend after the deadline must first
show good cause for the untimely amendment under Rule 16(b). Sherman, 532 F.3d
at 716. Only after the movant shows good cause may the court consider whether
amendment is proper under Rule 15(a). Id.
The district court set a pleading-amendment deadline in its first case
management order. It later reset certain case management dates but declined to grant
additional time to amend the pleadings in its second case management order. When
Cheeks sought leave to amend, roughly twenty months had passed since the original
pleading-amendment deadline. The district court proceeded directly to evaluating
her motion under Rule 15(a) rather than requiring her to first show good cause for
the untimely amendment. While the parties have not disputed the standard applied
by the district court, we “retain[] the independent power to identify and apply the
proper construction of governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S.
90, 99 (1991). As we have noted before, “Rule 16(b)’s good-cause standard is not
optional.” Sherman, 532 F.3d at 716. Applying Rule 15(a) without first requiring
good cause under Rule 16(b) would effectively read the good-cause requirement out
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
Even so, any error was harmless here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. We agree with
the district court that Cheeks’s proposed amendments were futile. “An amendment
is futile if the amended claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule

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12(b)(6).” Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 92 F.4th at 769 (quoting Hillesheim v. Myron’s Cards
& Gifts, Inc., 897 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2018)). The proposed amendments include
several new, pertinent allegations: (1) the pursuit began at 9:30 p.m.; (2) the driving
officer may have used a ramming maneuver rather than a PIT maneuver; and (3) the
maneuver caused Neil’s car to swerve into oncoming traffic before spinning out of
control and into the tree. Despite marshaling these new facts, the proposed
complaint still fails to state an excessive force claim.
For one, the late hour and possible ramming maneuver increase the factual
similarities between this case and Scott, where an officer rammed a vehicle during a
high-speed chase late at night. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 375, 379. Further, ramming
maneuvers are “materially identical” to PIT maneuvers. Christiansen, 52 F.4th at
380. And finally, Neil’s turn into oncoming traffic implies the presence of other
vehicles nearby, which only increases the potential risk Neil posed to the public.
These new allegations do not make the driving officer’s actions less reasonable.
Since the proposed amendments do not establish a Fourth Amendment violation,
they are futile.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Cheeks’s excessive force claim and
its denial of leave to amend.
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