Lucas Alzu v. Amy Nichole Huff

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2517
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Lucas Alzu
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Amy Nichole Huff
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
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Submitted: November 20, 2025
Filed: January 23, 2026
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Lucas Alzu filed a Petition for Return of Child under the Hague Convention
and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. Alzu
alleged that Amy N. Huff, the child’s mother, wrongfully removed the child from

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his country of habitual residence. The district court1 denied the Petition. Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
Alzu, born in Argentina, has traveled extensively and has not lived there full-
time since 2007. Huff, born and raised in Missouri, began traveling internationally
after earning a master’s degree in 2017.
In December 2018, Huff and Alzu met at a Rainbow Gathering in Colombia
(described as a weeks-long congregation where people around the world gather to
live in peace while surrounded by nature). They began a romantic relationship. Huff
became pregnant months later.
In July 2019, they were living in Colombia on a coffee ranch. Their visas
expired and could not be renewed. They considered relocating to Mexico, Chile, or
the United States to have the child, but Alzu could not legally enter those countries.
They chose Argentina, where his family lived.
Before the child’s birth, Huff and Alzu planned to attend a Rainbow Gathering
in Chile and travel through South America with the child in a van. They were
interested in continuing their “nomadic lifestyle,” organizing and attending Rainbow
Gatherings.
Alzu asserts that their plan was to make Argentina their “home base,” where
their travels would begin and end. Huff testified that there was no discussion of
making Argentina their “home base.” The district court found no evidentiary
support for Alzu’s testimony.
1 The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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Leaving Colombia, Huff traveled to the United States to visit her family. Alzu
traveled to Argentina, began working, and prepared for Huff’s arrival. In December
2019, when Huff was six months pregnant, she moved in with Alzu at his mother’s
house.
In February 2020, Huff moved out because Alzu physically assaulted her, and
she no longer felt comfortable at his family’s home. Huff first moved into an
apartment, then signed a three-year lease for a house, where Alzu eventually joined
her.
The child was born on March 4, 2020. Huff planned to return to the United
States with him, but one week after his birth, COVID-19 restricted all travel. The
restrictions also prevented travel to Chile for the Rainbow Gathering.
The child spent time with Alzu’s family on various occasions, including a
Christmas gathering (which Alzu did not attend).
In February 2021, Huff and Alzu ended their relationship. They agreed to
share custody of the child, splitting their time 50/50. Huff moved out of the rental
home, terminated the lease, and was granted an order of protection against Alzu.
In November 2021, travel restrictions ended. Huff stayed in Argentina
because Alzu, fearing she would not return, refused to allow the child to leave the
country. The Argentinian family court granted Huff permission to travel
internationally with the 22-month-old child for 40 days over the Christmas holiday.
Huff assured Alzu and his family she would return to Argentina. But she
traveled to the United States, remained there, and began full-time employment. Alzu
maintained contact with the child but has had no in-person visits. He is unable to
legally enter the United States.

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Alzu filed a Petition for Return of Child. The district court bifurcated the
proceedings to determine the threshold issue of the child’s habitual residence,
deferring consideration of Huff’s affirmative defenses. Following a two-day
evidentiary hearing, the court dismissed the Petition—finding that Alzu had not
established that Argentina was the child’s habitual residence. Alzu appeals.
II.
“The Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted the Hague
Convention in 1980 ‘to address the problem of international child abductions during
domestic disputes.’” Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68, 71 (2020), quoting Lozano
v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 4 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Convention, implemented in the United States by the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq., addresses “whether a child has been
wrongfully removed from the country of its habitual residence or wrongfully
retained in a country other than that of its habitual residence.” Barzilay v. Barzilay,
600 F.3d 912, 916–17 (8th Cir. 2010). “The petitioner bears the burden of proving
‘that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the
Convention.’” Id. at 917, citing 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A).
The determination of a child’s habitual residence is a mixed question of law
and fact. Monasky, 589 U.S. at 84. “Once the trial court correctly identifies the
governing totality-of-the-circumstances standard, . . . [t]he habitual residence
determination . . . should be judged on appeal by a clear-error review standard
deferential to the factfinding court.” Id.; See also Tsuruta v. Tsuruta, 76 F.4th 1107,
1111 (8th Cir. 2023) (same).
The district court applied the correct standard. This court reviews its
determination for clear error.
“[L]ocating a child’s home is a fact-driven inquiry[.] [C]ourts must be
‘sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense.’”

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Monasky, 589 U.S. at 78, citing Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 744 (7th Cir.
2013). “For older children capable of acclimating to their surroundings, courts have
long recognized, facts indicating acclimatization will be highly relevant. Because
children, especially those too young or otherwise unable to acclimate, depend on
their parents as caregivers, the intentions and circumstances of caregiving parents
are relevant considerations. No single fact, however, is dispositive across all cases.”
Id.
Alzu argues that the district court misapplied the totality-of-the-circumstances
test by treating the parents’ travel intentions as determinative, rather than
considering the child’s acclimatization in Argentina. But just because the court did
not weigh the factors as Alzu prefers does not mean it failed to consider them.
The district court considered the totality-of-the-circumstances—weighing the
parents’ intentions and connection to Argentina; their immigration statuses; the
child’s age; residency; and family relationships; and the effects of COVID-19—
applying “maximum flexibility” to act based on the precise scenario before it,
informed by common sense. Id. at 79. The district court recognized that “no one
factor is determinative,” emphasizing the “unusual circumstances,” the “unique
scenario of the parties’ nomadic lifestyles,” and the “world-wide travel restrictions
imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.” Contrary to Alzu’s assertion, the court did
not treat the parents’ travel intentions as dispositive.
Invoking Sorenson v. Sorenson, 559 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2009), Alzu believes
that Argentina must be the child’s habitual residence because he lived there
exclusively for the first 22 months of his life. See Sorenson, 559 F.3d at 873 (“A
person may have only one habitual residence . . . .”), quoting Silverman v.
Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 898 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Exclusive residence in a single country, however, does not alone establish
habitual residence. See generally Monasky, 589 U.S. at 81 (“An infant’s ‘mere
physical presence,’ we agree, is not a dispositive indicator of an infant’s habitual

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residence. But a wide range of facts . . . including facts indicating that the parents
have made their home in a particular place, can enable a trier to determine whether
an infant’s residence in that place has the quality of being ‘habitual.’”). The relevant
inquiry is whether the petitioner has met his burden of establishing where the child
habitually resides, not whether the district court could identify an alternative
residence. See Pope v. Lunday, 835 F. Appx. 968, 971 (10th Cir. 2020) (“The
Convention does not require a district court to determine where a child habitually
resides . . . [but] whether the child habitually resides in the location that the petitioner
claims.”). Considering the totality-of-the-circumstances, the district court correctly
found that Alzu failed to establish Argentina as the child’s habitual residence.
The district court did not commit clear error.
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The judgment is affirmed.
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