United States of America v. Christopher L. Carroll, also known as Chris; Whiskey Dix Big Truck Repair, LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1396
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Christopher L. Carroll, also known as Chris; Whiskey Dix Big Truck Repair, LLC
Defendants - Appellants
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: November 20, 2025
Filed: February 11, 2026
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
After a jury trial, Christopher Carroll was convicted of six fraud counts
stemming from his application for and receipt of funds pursuant to the Paycheck
Protection Program (PPP) during the Covid-19 pandemic. Carroll was also
convicted of sixteen counts of tampering with a Clean Air Act (CAA) monitoring
device, one count of conspiracy to violate the CAA, and two counts of witness
tampering, while his co-defendant, Whiskey Dix Big Truck Repair, LLC, (WDBTR)

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was convicted of sixteen counts of tampering with a CAA monitoring device. The
district court1 sentenced Carroll to 108 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to
pay over $3 million in restitution and sentenced WDBTR to 3 years’ probation and
ordered it to pay an assessment of $6,400. On appeal, both Carroll and WDBTR
challenge the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that the grand jury was improperly instructed that the probable cause
standard governed its charging decision. Carroll also challenges the district court’s
decision at trial to allow the Government to introduce evidence that Carroll was on
parole for a previous criminal conviction at the time he committed the instant
offenses. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
In 2021, Carroll, along with a business associate, George Reed, were indicted
on bank fraud and money laundering charges stemming from their scheme to receive
PPP funds by making material misrepresentations that their business, Square One
Group (SOG), intended to use PPP funds to cover payroll and other business
expenses, when Carroll and Reed actually used the funds for personal use and to
acquire assets to start WDBTR. After Reed pled guilty to one count of bank fraud,
a grand jury returned a superseding indictment, which charged Carroll with three
counts of bank fraud, six counts of money laundering, three counts of making false
statements to a financial institution, one count of conspiracy to violate the CAA,
twenty-one counts of tampering with a CAA monitoring device, and two counts of
witness tampering. The financial crimes stemmed from the alleged
misrepresentations regarding the PPP fraud scheme, while the CAA charges arose
from Carroll’s involvement in disabling the emissions controls on WDBTR trucks
to enhance their performance and in concealing this tampering with the emissions
1 The Honorable Sarah E. Pitlyk, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable
Stephen R. Welby, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of
Missouri.

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control devices. Finally, the witness tampering charges arose from Carroll’s
attempts to influence two individuals to provide false information or otherwise
impede law enforcement in their investigation of the CAA offenses. The
superseding indictment also added WDBTR as a defendant, charging it, alongside
Carroll, with twenty-one counts of tampering with CAA monitoring devices.
Carroll and WDBTR then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, asserting
that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the grand jury misapplied the Fifth
Amendment burden of proof applicable to indictments. Carroll and WDBTR
asserted that historical evidence demonstrated that the probable cause standard was
not always the accepted standard and that the Founders envisioned a standard of
proof higher than probable cause. A magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation, recommending that the district court deny the motion. The
magistrate judge noted that the Supreme Court has long recognized the standard for
grand juries as probable cause and stated that Carroll and WDBTR “have failed to
convince the undersigned that the grand jury standard, long recognized by the
Supreme Court, is in conflict with the grand jury standard as they allege it existed in
1791.” Over Carroll and WDBTR’s objections, the district court adopted the report
and recommendation. In doing so, the district court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court
has acknowledged and applied the probable cause standard many times,” and stated
that it “decline[d] Defendants’ invitation to reject a standard that the United States
Supreme Court has accepted.” Carroll and WDBTR immediately appealed,
asserting that the district court’s order was appealable under the collateral order
doctrine, but this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as premature.
Before trial, Carroll filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence
related to his status as a parolee for a prior criminal conviction. As alleged in the
superseding indictment, the PPP loan application contained the answer “no” to the
question of whether any individual owning 20% or more of the company seeking a
PPP loan was currently on parole, when at the time of the application, Carroll was
an owner of SOG and was on parole following a term of imprisonment for a previous
felony conviction. The superseding indictment alleged that this was one of the

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material misrepresentations in the PPP application, and that in an effort to avoid
disclosing his parole status, Carroll omitted his name entirely from the PPP
application, instead submitting it in his wife’s name. In his motion in limine, Carroll
asserted that he did not qualify as an owner of SOG under the definition contained
in the PPP application and was therefore not required to include his name on the PPP
application, let alone disclose that he was currently on parole. According to Carroll,
because he did not make any misrepresentation about his parole status in the PPP
application, any reference to it was entirely irrelevant to the charges against him,
was highly prejudicial, and should be excluded from any evidence at trial. The
Government filed its own motion in limine, seeking admission of Carroll’s felony
conviction and parole status. The Government asserted that Carroll’s parole status
was integral to the scheme to defraud because the superseding indictment
specifically alleged that Carroll completed the PPP application in a manner to
conceal his parole status. The Government argued that, while Carroll disputed
whether he qualified as an owner of SOG as defined in the PPP application, Carroll’s
failure to disclose his parole status was relevant to his intent to defraud, regardless
of the factual accuracy of whether he was an owner of SOG.
The district court determined that evidence related to Carroll’s parole status
was admissible, concluding that whether Carroll intentionally left his name off the
PPP application to avoid disclosing his parole status or because he did not believe,
under the definition of owner in the application, that he qualified as an owner of
SOG was a question for the jury to resolve. The district court explained that both
parties would be permitted to introduce evidence about Carroll’s intent when filling
out the PPP application. Ultimately, because Carroll’s intent was at issue, the district
court concluded that Carroll’s parole status was highly probative of why he might
not have included his name on the PPP application and allowed the evidence to be
introduced at trial.
After a five-day trial, the jury found Carroll guilty of three counts of bank
fraud, three counts of making false statements to a financial institution, one count of
conspiracy to violate the CAA, sixteen counts of tampering with a CAA monitoring

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device, and two counts of witness tampering.2 Carroll then filed a motion for a
mistrial or a new trial, again challenging the district court’s decision to allow
evidence of his prior conviction and parole status to be introduced at trial. The
district court denied the motion for the same reasons as in its earlier ruling. The
district court also noted that, even if it had erred in admitting the evidence of
Carroll’s prior conviction, a new trial was warranted only where the evidence was
so prejudicial that a new trial would likely render a different result, and, given the
strength of the Government’s evidence, a new trial would not likely produce a
different result. The district court subsequently sentenced Carroll to 108 months’
imprisonment and ordered over $3 million in restitution and sentenced WDBTR to
3 years’ probation and ordered it to pay an assessment of $6,400. This appeal
follows, with Carroll and WDBTR challenging the denial of the motion to dismiss
the indictment and Carroll challenging the admission of evidence of his prior
conviction.
II.
First, Carroll and WDBTR assert that the district court erred in denying their
motion to dismiss the indictment because an indictment returned by the grand jury
under a probable cause standard of proof is invalid. According to Carroll and
WDBTR, under a founding-era analysis of the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury clause,
an indictment requires a standard of proof “more stringent” than probable cause.
Further, Carroll and WDBTR assert that “no Supreme Court decision has ever
actually addressed the issue and held that the standard for indictments should be
‘probable cause.’” “We review the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment de
novo.” United States v. Wilson, 939 F.3d 929, 931 (8th Cir. 2019).
We are unpersuaded by Carroll and WDBTR’s contentions. Under the Fifth
Amendment, “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
2 Prior to trial, on motion of the Government, the district court dismissed the
money laundering counts and five counts of tampering with a CAA device.

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infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury.” U.S. Const.
amend. V. While the Constitution mandates the initiation of federal prosecution
through a grand jury, it does not provide the standard under which a grand jury
should return an indictment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 282 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The specific provisions of the Bill of Rights [in the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments] neither impose a standard for the initiation of a prosecution,
nor require a pretrial hearing to weigh evidence according to a given standard.”).
However, for over 130 years, the Supreme Court has recognized that probable cause
is the standard governing grand jury proceedings. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12
(1887) (“[T]he grand jury is as valuable as ever in securing . . . ‘individual citizens
from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense, and
anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is established by the presentment
and indictment of such a jury; and in case of high offenses it is justly regarded as
one of the securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive public
prosecutions.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); see also Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S.
73, 84 (1904) (“The grand jury is a body known to the common law, to which is
committed the duty of inquiring whether there be probable cause to believe the
defendant guilty of the offense charged.”). And the Supreme Court has often
reiterated this standard. See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 328 (2014)
(“This Court has often recognized the grand jury’s singular role in finding the
probable cause necessary to initiate a prosecution for a serious crime.”); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (“The grand jury’s historic functions
survive to this day. Its responsibilities continue to include both the determination
whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the
protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.”); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972) (“[T]he ancient role of the grand jury . . . has
the dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal
prosecutions.”); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 352 (1972) (“Grand
juries daily determine probable cause prior to rendering indictments, and trial juries
assess whether guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). This authority

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convincingly demonstrates that the probable cause standard has long been accepted
by the Supreme Court as the proper standard for the grand jury.
Insofar as Carroll and WDBTR assert that the Supreme Court has never
addressed the question precisely as they raise it here, the claim does not change our
analysis. Even if the Supreme Court has not made an express holding about the
probable cause standard, “[a]ppellate courts should afford deference and respect to
Supreme Court dicta, particularly where . . . it is consistent with longstanding
Supreme Court precedent.” In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d
1059, 1064 (8th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court has time and again recited the
probable cause standard in its decisions discussing grand jury indictments, and “we
must respect the language used by the Supreme Court . . . regardless of whether it is
controlling.” United States v. Adams, 914 F.3d 602, 611 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kelly, J.,
concurring). And, indeed, following Supreme Court precedent, our Court has recited
the probable cause standard. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 644-45
(8th Cir. 2006) (“As a threshold matter, we note that the district court’s statements
regarding probable cause were correct statements of the law. The grand jury returns
an indictment only upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and criminal proceedings should be instituted against a
particular defendant.” (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-44)). We decline Carroll
and WDBTR’s invitation to reject the long-standing probable cause standard for
grand jury indictments. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Carroll
and WDBTR’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
III.
Next, Carroll asserts that the district court erred when it allowed the
Government to introduce evidence about Carroll’s parole status. Carroll asserts that,
because the PPP loan application required only owners of the company to disclose
their parole status, and under the application’s definition of owner he did not qualify,
his parole status was not required to be disclosed, was irrelevant to the charges, and
was highly prejudicial. “We review [the] district court’s . . . evidentiary rulings and

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denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Oliver,
987 F.3d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 2021) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
However, “we will not reverse a conviction if errors were harmless,” which occurs
“when, after reviewing the entire record, we determine that the substantial rights of
the defendant were unaffected, and that the error did not influence or had only a
slight influence on the verdict.” Id. (citation omitted).
First, Carroll appears to focus his argument largely on the question of whether
he, as matter of law, qualified as an owner of SOG under the definition used in the
PPP application, even suggesting that a de novo standard of review applies to this
question of law. However, the issue Carroll raises is one challenging an evidentiary
ruling regarding Carroll’s criminal history, which is separate and apart from the
question of legal ownership of SOG. Properly framed, the issue is whether the
district court erred in its determination that the evidence of Carroll’s parole status
was relevant and that the unfair prejudice of this evidence did not outweigh its
probative value.
Relevant evidence has any tendency to make a fact of consequence “more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401(a).
However, a court may exclude relevant evidence where “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
“‘Unfair prejudice “speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to
lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to
the offense charged.”’ Unfair prejudice does not occur, however, merely because a
piece of evidence damages a defendant’s case.” United States v. Nadeau, 598 F.3d
966, 969 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). As the district court found, evidence of
Carroll’s parole status was highly relevant to the question of his intent in filling out
the PPP application and thus his overall intent to defraud. And the danger of unfair
prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of this evidence,
especially where the district court instructed the jury that, if it believed Carroll acted
in good faith, he could not be guilty of the crimes of bank fraud and making false
statements to a financial institution. Further, the district court limited the evidence

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of Carroll’s prior conviction and parole status “to just the fact that Mr. Carroll
committed a felony and some of the details of his parole and no other details about
that conviction in [the] case–in–chief,” and allowed Carroll to present evidence to
support his claim that he believed he did not qualify as an owner of SOG under the
definition used in the PPP application. Given the foregoing, we find no error in the
district court’s balancing of the probative value of the prior conviction with the risk
of unfair prejudice. Cf. United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 2015)
(“In light of the district court’s careful analysis and appropriate limiting instruction,
we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of
[defendant]’s previous . . . convictions.”).
Further, even assuming the district court erred, we hold that any error would
be harmless. Over the five-day trial, the jury heard testimony from 18 witnesses and
viewed numerous exhibits that detailed Carroll’s actions and participation in the
overall scheme to defraud. This included evidence that Carroll and Reed used their
wives’ names in the PPP applications despite neither wife holding a management
position with SOG, that Carroll used PPP funds to purchase trucks to start up
WDBTR while furloughing SOG employees and cancelling their health insurance,
and that Carroll deposited PPP funds directly into his own personal account. Carroll
has provided nothing to suggest that the fact of his prior conviction and parole status
alone was so crucial to the jury’s deliberations that it had more than a slight influence
on the verdict. See United States v. Red Legs, 28 F.4th 931, 936 (8th Cir. 2022)
(holding that “because substantial evidence other than [the challenged] testimony
supported the jury’s verdict, any error in admitting [the] testimony was harmless and
does not warrant reversal”). Coupled with the district court’s efforts to ameliorate
the risk of unfair prejudice from the introduction of Carroll’s prior conviction by
allowing Carroll to offer his defense and instructing the jury on good faith, we are
convinced that, if any error occurred, it would have been harmless. See United States
v. Hawkins, 796 F.3d 843, 865 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that the erroneous admission
of an exhibit was harmless “in light of the strength of the government’s case against
[defendant] and the safeguards implemented to minimize the prejudicial effect of the
exhibit.”). The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Carroll’s

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motion for a new trial based upon the admission of evidence of his prior conviction
and parole status.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We
also deny Carroll and WDBTR’s motion to supplement the record.
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