Ce'drick Brown v. Freddie Otts

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1969
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Karla Yesenia Gomez-Orozco; E.F.G.-O.
lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioners
v.
Pamela Bondi
lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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Submitted: February 20, 2026
Filed: February 25, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Guatemalan natives and citizens Karla Yesenia Gomez-Orozco and E.F.G.-O.,
her minor child, petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). An immigration judge denied Gomez-Orozco’s applications for asylum,

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withholding of removal, and humanitarian asylum, and the BIA dismissed her appeal
from that decision.1
Substantial evidence supports the denial of asylum and withholding of removal.
We agree with the government that Gomez-Orozco failed to exhaust any claim based
on a pattern or practice against women generally in Guatemala, as she consistently
argued before the agency that her claims were based on her ex-partner’s actions. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring administrative exhaustion); Santos-Zacaria v.
Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 423 (2023) (discussing exhaustion requirement); Essel v.
Garland, 89 F.4th 686, 691 (8th Cir. 2023) (enforcing exhaustion requirement). The
agency found that Gomez-Orozco failed to establish the Guatemalan government was
or would be unwilling or unable to control her ex-partner, and we agree with the
government that she has waived review of this dispositive finding by failing to
meaningfully challenge the agency’s reasons for this ruling. See Coreas-Chavez v.
Garland, 52 F.4th 413, 416 (8th Cir. 2022). Even if she had not waived the issue, the
record does not compel a contrary conclusion. See Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189,
1192 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining the standard of review); see also Juarez-Coronado
v. Barr, 919 F.3d 1085, 1089 & n.2 (8th Cir. 2019).
Likewise, even assuming Gomez-Orozco meaningfully challenged the denial
of humanitarian asylum, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the claim
based on its finding that she had failed to show the Guatemalan government was or
would be unwilling or unable to control her ex-partner, which also disposed of this
claim. See Mejia-Lopez v. Barr, 944 F.3d 764, 769 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining the
1E.F.G.-O. was a derivative applicant on Gomez-Orozco’s asylum application.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A); Fuentes v. Barr, 969 F.3d 865, 868 n.1 (8th Cir. 2020)
(per curiam). The BIA also denied E.F.G.-O.’s motion for administrative closure, but
petitioners have waived review of that decision because they do not meaningfully
challenge it in this court. See Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th
Cir. 2004).
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applicable standards); see also, e.g., Kanagu v. Holder, 781 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir.
2015); Mateo-Mateo v. Garland, 124 F.4th 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2024).
Because these issues were dispositive of Gomez-Orozco’s claims, the agency
did not err by failing to address her arguments on the other elements of her claims.
See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule
courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which
is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
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