United States of America v. Cory Rusher

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2732
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Cory Rusher
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville
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Submitted: December 15, 2025
Filed: March 9, 2026
[Published]
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
The district court1 revoked Cory Rusher’s term of supervised release and
sentenced him to 24 months of imprisonment. Rusher appeals, asserting his sentence
is substantively unreasonable.
1 The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas.

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I.
In 2017, Rusher was sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment after pleading
guilty to a firearms offense. After his release from custody, his 3-year term of
supervised release commenced on April 14, 2023. On June 13, 2023, the United
States Probation Office filed a Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under
Supervision on the grounds that Rusher had violated several conditions of his
supervision. The district court issued a warrant that same day, but because Rusher’s
whereabouts were unknown, he was not arrested until October 6, 2023.
At a hearing on November 30, 2023, Rusher admitted that he had tested
positive for controlled substances, failed to report for drug testing and treatment,
changed his residence without notifying his probation officer, and failed to make a
fine payment. The district court expressed concern that Rusher had violated his
conditions so soon after his term of supervised release began and described the fact
of his absconding as “pretty aggravating.” The court also noted that Rusher’s “entire
adult life has been a revolving door of the criminal justice system,” and that at some
point, Rusher would have to “get this figured out” if he wanted to remain in the
community. The district court did not revoke Rusher’s supervised release but took
the admitted violations under advisement for a period of six months and explained
to Rusher that “this is likely [his] last chance.” Rusher was released.
On January 17, 2024, a Supplemental Petition for Warrant or Summons for
Offender Under Supervision was filed, alleging new violations and informing the
court that Rusher’s “current whereabouts are unknown.” The district court issued a
warrant. Rusher was not located and arrested until July 19, 2024.
A final revocation hearing was held on August 16, 2024. Rusher admitted the
additional violations, which included the use of controlled substances, failure to
report for substance abuse and mental health assessments, failure to notify the
probation office of a change in residence, and failure to make a fine payment. The
district court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 8–14 months. After hearing

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arguments from counsel and an allocution from Rusher, the court imposed a sentence
of 24 months’ imprisonment with no supervised release to follow.
II.
“We review the substantive reasonableness of a [revocation] sentence for
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Petersen, 848 F.3d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2017).
“A district court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it fails to consider a relevant
factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits
a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” Id. (citation modified).
Rusher argues that the district court failed to give sufficient weight to his
mitigating factors. He points out that he admitted all violations, and that his
substance abuse and mental health issues significantly contributed to the difficulty
he had complying with the terms and conditions of supervised release. And when he
absconded, he did so “by going to the woods to live by himself in a tent by a creek,”
where he did not “commit[] any new crimes[.]” He also asserts that the district court
overstated the need to protect the public, given the nonviolent nature of his
violations, and did not consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.
We discern no abuse of discretion in how the district court weighed the
relevant factors when determining an appropriate sentence. As to mitigation, the
record shows that the district court recognized Rusher’s substance abuse and mental
health struggles, calling them “co-occurring issues.” The court also acknowledged
the role these issues likely played in Rusher’s difficulties under supervision. But the
court was concerned about a “pattern” of conduct Rusher had established over the
course of his adult life. One variation was to get released from custody, violate the
conditions of release, make “[n]o genuine concerted effort to try to comply” with the
rules of supervision, and then, when given a second chance, start the pattern over
again. As to public safety, the district court explained that Rusher’s decision to “go
on the run” created public safety concerns, particularly where law enforcement had

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to go into the woods to “chase [him] down[.]” And the court considered cases that
presented similar circumstances to Rusher’s with the express goal of avoiding
unwarranted disparities.
III.
The judgment is affirmed.
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