United States of America v. Andrew Butler

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 25-1817
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Andrew Butler
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
____________
Submitted: January 16, 2026
Filed: March 6, 2026
____________
Before SMITH, BENTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
____________
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Andrew D. Butler pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). The district court1 sentenced him to 60 months
in prison. He appeals, alleging that the district court erred in denying his motion to
1 The Honorable Lee P. Rudofsky, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

-- 1 of 6 --

-2-
suppress and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Having jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
On March 21, 2022, Jasmine Spates called 911, reporting that Butler broke
into her apartment with a gun, then left in a gold Chevy Impala. Officer Gregory
Bowman and Sergeant Thomas Bracey responded. Bowman saw a splintered
doorframe and a bent lock, indicating forced entry. Spates told Bracey she believed
Butler had gone to Altium Packaging, where he worked.
Bracey knew Butler was a convicted felon with outstanding misdemeanor
arrest warrants. He also knew Butler was on probation, subject to a warrantless
search waiver requiring him “to submit . . . property under [his] control to search
and seizure at any time, day or night, with or without a search warrant by any
Arkansas Community Correction Officer or any other certified law enforcement
officer.”
Bracey and Detective Cecil Langston went to Altium Packaging. Langston
saw a Chevy Impala parked near the front entrance. The license plate was registered
to Butler. Langston also learned Butler was on probation with the warrantless search
waiver and the arrest warrants. Through the Impala’s windows, Langston did not
see a gun. Bracey placed a “stop stick” under a tire.
Entering the (unlocked) employee entrance, the officers walked toward the
(empty) Altium Packaging management offices. Returning to the entrance, they
opened a door to the manufacturing area. The officers saw Butler with two other
employees.
Langston told Butler to approach them. Butler backed away, reached into his
jacket pocket, and ran. Believing he was armed, Langston yelled “gun.” The
officers chased Butler. He ran around a corner, out of view. When the officers

-- 2 of 6 --

-3-
neared him, they saw him pick up a gun from the floor. Langston said “drop the
gun.” Butler refused. Langston fired four shots. None hit Butler. Butler dove into
an empty alcove of pallets.
The officers approached Butler, lying in the alcove, face down, hands at his
sides. Langston found the gun beneath a nearby pallet, several feet from Butler.
Butler was arrested and charged with aggravated residential burglary, felon in
possession of a firearm, and fleeing.
Butler moved to suppress the gun and the fingerprint evidence obtained from
it; the district court denied the motion. He pled guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm, reserving his right to appeal the denial. The district court sentenced
him to 60 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Butler
appeals.
II.
Butler argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. “In
considering the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district
court’s conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United
States v. Spratt, 141 F.4th 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2025).
“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted
vicariously.” United States v. Long, 797 F.3d 558, 568 (8th Cir. 2015). A defendant
must show “‘that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched,
and that his expectation is reasonable.’” United States v. Barragan, 379 F.3d 524,
529 (8th Cir. 2004), quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). “If a
defendant fails to prove a sufficiently close connection to the relevant places or
objects searched[,] he has no standing to claim that they were searched or seized
illegally.” United States v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254, 256 (8th Cir. 1994). To establish
a Fourth Amendment violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the search or

-- 3 of 6 --

-4-
seizure was unreasonable. See United States v. Green, 9 F.4th 682, 688 (8th Cir.
2021).
Relying on the Lewis and Long cases, Butler claims he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his workplace. See United States v. Lewis, 864 F.3d 937,
943 (8th Cir. 2017); Long 797 F.3d at 565. He believes the officers violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by entering Altium Packaging (despite their knowledge
of his presence there and the warrants). See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,
219–20 (1981) (holding that an arrest warrant for an non-resident does not authorize
a search of another person’s home without consent or exigent circumstances);
United States v. Glover, 746 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 2014), citing Steagald, 451 U.S.
at 215–16; United States v. Greer, 607 F.3d 559, 563 (8th Cir. 2010), citing
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220; Haley v. Armontrout, 924 F.2d 735, 737 (8th Cir. 1991),
citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220.
Butler’s argument fails. Even assuming he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, he cannot challenge the officers’ entry. Steagald “addressed only the right
of a third party not named in the arrest warrant to the privacy of his or her home”; it
did not decide that officers may not enter a third party’s property to arrest the subject
of a warrant they reasonably believe is present. United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d
658, 663 n.5 (8th Cir. 1989). See also Steagald, 451 U.S. at 219 (“The issue here,
however, is not whether the subject of an arrest warrant can object to the absence of
a search warrant when he is apprehended in another person’s home, but rather
whether the residents of that home can complain of the search.”). An individual
“cannot claim any greater Fourth Amendment protection in [a third party’s] home
than he possessed in his own home.” Kaylor, 877 F.2d at 663, citing United States
v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1093 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that a defendant cannot
challenge police entry into another person’s home when officers possess an arrest

-- 4 of 6 --

-5-
warrant and reasonably believe the warrant subject is present, because the defendant
cannot assert greater rights than the property owner). 2
The district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
III.
This court “review[s] the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse
of discretion.” United States v. Harlan, 815 F.3d 1100, 1107 (8th Cir. 2016). A
district court abuses its discretion when it: (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that
should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper
or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear
error of judgment in weighing those factors. See United States v. Wintermute, 443
F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2006).
Butler believes the district court placed too much weight on the seriousness
of the offense, the need for deterrence and respect for the law, and his history and
characteristics—factors already considered in the Guidelines. See, e.g., United
States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d 984, 989–90 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that an above-
Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable where the district court took a
“major departure” for a “minor” justification, increasing the advisory range from
121-151 months to 262-327 months); United States v. Wiley, 509 F.3d 474, 478–79
(8th Cir. 2007) (vacating above-Guidelines sentence where the district court based
its upward variance on factors already taken into account by the Guidelines),
questioned by United States v. Bacon, 848 F.3d 1150, 1152 (8th Cir. 2017) (“We
note Wiley was decided four days before Gall, and under Gall, ‘[w]e must give[ ]
due deference to the District Court’s reasoned and reasonable decision that
the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the sentence.’”), quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 59–60 (2007).
2 The district court alternatively ruled that Butler’s search waiver justified
entry. This court need not address that issue.

-- 5 of 6 --

-6-
The upward variance here was not an abuse of discretion. The district court’s
60-month sentence—exceeding the Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months—
reasonably accounted for the § 3553(a) factors and their application to Butler,
including his armed force entry into a woman’s home, possession of a gun at his
workplace, flight from officers, and retrieving the gun after dropping it. Although
some of these factors were considered in determining the Guidelines range, it is
“well-settled” that a district court may rely on them to justify an upward variance.
See United States v. Manuel, 73 F.4th 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2023). This court grants
district courts “wide latitude to weigh the section 3553(a) factors in each case and
assign some factors greater weight than others.” United States v. Hubbs, 18 F.4th
570, 572 (8th Cir. 2021). The district court did not abuse its discretion merely by
“weigh[ing] relevant factors . . . more heavily than [Butler] would prefer.” United
States v. Farmer, 647 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2011).
The district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.
* * * * * * *
The judgment is affirmed.
______________________________

-- 6 of 6 --