United States of America v. Edgar A. Mejia

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3380
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Edgar A. Mejia
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
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Submitted: November 20, 2025
Filed: April 7, 2026
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Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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STRAS, Circuit Judge.
Officers found heroin and guns in a secret compartment in Edgar Mejia’s
trailer. He claims the government did not prove he was part of a drug-dealing
conspiracy and that two errors call his sentence into question. We affirm the
conviction, reject one sentencing challenge, and dismiss the other.

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I.
Mejia’s legal troubles began when officers discovered six grams of heroin and
453 grams of methamphetamine in his car outside a casino. When he mentioned that
he also had a trailer, they decided to have it searched too. It had a hidden
compartment in the kitchen wall with two firearms and 541 grams of heroin.
Mejia tried to have his alleged co-conspirator, Gregory Johnson, remove the
drugs and guns, but he did not get there in time. Among the topics discussed during
a series of jailhouse calls were how to open the hidden compartment, the “dog food”
supposedly inside, and his desire for Johnson to remove it before “the roaches” and
“rodents” arrived. In another call, he said, “I got the toys in the wall, man. And . . .
the dog food I bought for Sprinkles is gonna go bad.” He emphasized that “there
[wa]s a lot of money right there.”
Johnson reported back to a disappointed Mejia in another call. He admitted
that, according to neighbors, the police had taken “the toys and shit” and that his
bond was “probably about to go up.” Unsatisfied, Mejia asked him to go back to the
trailer to see whether officers had actually opened the hidden compartment. Johnson
later confirmed they had, and it was empty.
Mejia faced four federal charges. He pleaded guilty to two of them. See 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (possession with intent to distribute heroin); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8) (illegal possession of a firearm as a felon). The jury found
him guilty of the other two, one for conspiring to distribute heroin, see 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846; and the other for possessing a firearm in furtherance of
drug trafficking, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
At sentencing, three of his 11 criminal-history points came from a marijuana
conviction that a state court had expunged under a Missouri constitutional
amendment. See Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 2.10(8)(a) (expunging “criminal[-]history
records” for some who have finished serving felony marijuana sentences). Based on

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several considerations, including his criminal history and the overwhelming
evidence of guilt, the district court1 gave him a sentence of 322 months in prison. It
also included 60 months of supervised release, during which he either had to “work
full time” or, in his probation officer’s discretion, “perform up to 20 hours of
community service per week.”
II.
Of his four convictions, Mejia challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on
just one: the conspiracy to distribute heroin. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
846. For that charge, the government had to prove Mejia and at least one other
person had “an agreement to distribute [heroin]” and that he knew about it and
“intentionally joined.” United States v. De La Cruz Nava, 80 F.4th 883, 888 (8th
Cir. 2023). The standard of review for a sufficiency challenge is de novo, viewing
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Streb, 36 F.4th 782,
790 (8th Cir. 2022).
The jailhouse calls between Mejia and Johnson established they were co-
conspirators. They formed the agreement, at the latest, when Johnson promised to
retrieve the “dog food” from the hidden compartment in the trailer. See United States
v. Escobar, 909 F.3d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 2018) (describing a conspiracy in which co-
conspirators would “pick up” drugs from each other). Mejia even told him the
reason: the heroin was worth “a lot of money.” From there, the jury could reasonably
infer that the plan was for Johnson to either sell the drugs himself or hold onto them
until Mejia could do so. See United States v. Bailey, 54 F.4th 1037, 1040 (8th Cir.
2022) (“The conspiracy may be proven through circumstantial evidence and by
inferences based on the actions of the parties.”). And the fact that Mejia appeared
to be in charge showed that he knew about the conspiracy and intentionally joined
1 The Honorable David Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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it. See United States v. Madrigal, 136 F.4th 766, 774 (8th Cir. 2025) (explaining
there was enough evidence of a conspiracy when the defendant “led it”).
It makes no difference that Johnson never recovered the heroin. He may not
have seen or touched it, but the crime was complete once he agreed to visit the trailer,
open the hidden compartment, and remove what was inside. See United States v.
Norton, 846 F.2d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that a defendant joined a
conspiracy even though his “involvement concerned only his efforts to . . . recover
the cocaine”); see also United States v. Gehl, 128 F.4th 1001, 1006 (8th Cir. 2025)
(explaining that it is unlikely that a drug dealer would provide “an innocent person
with the potential to furnish evidence against him” (quoting Maryland v. Pringle,
540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003))). A foiled conspiracy is still a conspiracy. See United
States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003) (explaining that the “agreement
is a distinct evil, which may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive
crime ensues” (citation omitted)).
Not to mention that the government presented evidence that Mejia conspired
with an unknown supplier too. See United States v. Pinto, 106 F.4th 750, 756 (8th
Cir. 2024) (explaining that “members of a conspiracy do not have to know one
another, nor do they need to be aware of all the activities of other participants in the
conspiracy”). He had more than a personal-use amount of heroin and limited
equipment for making it, which suggests that someone else must have provided it.
See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 363 F.3d 788, 796 (8th Cir. 2004)
(upholding a conspiracy conviction in part because it was implausible that the
defendant “grew, processed, packaged, and loaded such large amounts of marijuana
[himself] . . . without assistance from any other person”). On these facts, it would
have been reasonable for the jury to infer “that a conspiracy existed between [Mejia]
and at least one unidentified [supplier].” United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 461 F.3d
939, 946 (8th Cir. 2006); see Mendoza-Gonzalez, 363 F.3d at 796.

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III.
The remaining two challenges are to Mejia’s sentence. One focuses on the
criminal-history calculation and the other on a condition of supervised release that
will eventually require him get a job or perform community service. The former
changes nothing, and the latter is not yet ripe.
A.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the treatment of expunged convictions can
be complicated. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). When an expungement is the result of
“constitutional invalidity, innocence, or a mistake of law,” the conviction does not
count in a defendant’s criminal-history score. United States v. Lincoln, 408 F.3d
522, 525 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In other circumstances, it does. See id.
Mejia received three points for a marijuana conviction, even though it had
been expunged under a Missouri constitutional amendment. See Mo. Const. art.
XIV, § 2.10(8)(a). The decision to count it, however, ultimately did not matter
because the district court also justified the 322-month sentence under the statutory
sentencing factors. Any error became harmless the moment the district court made
clear that the sentence would be the same, with or without the expunged conviction.2
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not
affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”); see also United States v. Kemp, 908
F.3d 1138, 1140–41 (8th Cir. 2018) (upholding a sentence because “any error in
calculating the applicable Guidelines range was harmless”).
2 We recently held that a conviction expunged for the same reason counted
under a different Sentencing Guidelines provision. See United States v. Lozano, ___
F.4th ___, 2026 WL 850182, at *6 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 2026) (dealing with the career-
offender provision). Given that Mejia’s expunged conviction made no difference
either way, there is no reason to have the parties address Lozano.

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The first step was explaining why a longer sentence was “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary,” to serve “the purposes” of the federal sentencing statute. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Among the reasons were Mejia’s “history and characteristics,” id.
§ 3553(a)(1), consisting of “frequen[t]” crimes, including two federal cases ending
in the revocation of supervised release. The violations reflected an “inability to
demean [him]self to supervision.” The district court then turned its attention to “the
nature and circumstances of [his most recent] offense[s].” Id. They were, in the
court’s words, “serious” and “dangerous,” with little doubt that he had committed
them.
The next step was to explain why the statutory analysis mattered. If it was
wrong about the expunged conviction, it wanted to clarify that the “analysis under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)[] would” still lead to the same sentence. See, e.g., United States
v. Simms, 695 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding that any error in calculating
a defendant’s criminal-history score was harmless when the district court explained
the sentence would be the same either way); United States v. Sanchez-Martinez, 633
F.3d 658, 660–61 (8th Cir. 2011) (same). It then left no doubt by declaring that,
“[e]ven if [Mejia’s] attorney would have won all of her objections[,] . . . [it would]
still come out the same.” The point was to make clear that he would receive a 322-
month sentence no matter what.
Mejia claims that the district court forgot a step: calculating an alternative
range. It is true that, before Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), we stated that
the calculation of an error-free range was necessary for substantive-reasonableness
review. See United States v. Bah, 439 F.3d 423, 431 (8th Cir. 2006). And though
the addendum to the presentence investigation report included one, there is no
dispute that the court never mentioned it.
Gall changed the sentencing landscape. It rejected a strict “mathematical
approach” in favor of one requiring an “individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 47, 50. What matters, in other words, is whether the

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district court “adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Id. at 50.
It is no surprise that our approach to harmless-error review has changed too.
After Gall, we shifted from mechanically requiring alternative ranges for every
alleged error to evaluating whether the “reasoning” allowed for “meaningful
appellate review.” United States v. McGrew, 846 F.3d 277, 282 (8th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50); see United States v. Vickers, 528 F.3d 1116, 1121
(8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that post-Gall analysis is “fact-intensive” and depends
on whether the district court’s “resolution of the issue affected its ultimate
determination of a reasonable sentence”); see also United States v. Guzman-Rendon,
864 F.3d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 2017) (adopting a similar analysis based on Gall). None
of these cases, nor others like them, mentioned the need for an alternative range.3
See, e.g., Simms, 695 F.3d at 866; United States v. Holmes, 87 F.4th 910, 914 (8th
Cir. 2023); United States v. Neri, 73 F.4th 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2023). We decline to
turn back the clock.
B.
Less is known about why the district court decided that Mejia would need “to
perform up to 20 hours of community service per week until [he is] employed.” But
it may not matter, at least not yet. The condition, after all, only kicks in once he
starts supervised release, which will require him to serve more than 25 years in
prison first. Even if he has a point about whether the Sentencing Guidelines allow
an open-ended community-service condition like this one, see U.S.S.G. § 5F1.3,
3 Even our pre-Gall cases did not uniformly require one. In United States v.
Harris, we determined that, “[i]f the sentence imposed falls within the guideline
range urged by the appellant” and it is “clear that the sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence regardless . . . , there can be no reversible error.” 390
F.3d 572, 573 (8th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see United States v. Elk, 632 F.3d
455, 458 (8th Cir. 2011) (replicating Harris’s approach). The 322-month sentence
in this case checks the relevant boxes from Harris.

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cmt. n.1 (“Community service generally should not be imposed in excess of 400
hours.”), we cannot address its legality until it is “ripe for adjudication,” KCCP Tr.
v. City of North Kansas City, 432 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 2005).
Dealing with it any earlier deprives us of a “Case[] or Controvers[y],” U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, because the condition “may not occur as anticipated[] or . . .
[even] occur at all,” Parrish v. Dayton, 761 F.3d 873, 875–76 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). It rests upon “contingent
future events,” like whether his probation officer will decide that community service
makes sense for Mejia, given that he will be over 70 by the time he leaves prison.
Id. at 876 (quoting Texas, 523 U.S. at 300). Or perhaps he will find a job the moment
he gets out, which would leave the community-service contingency untriggered.
There are countless possibilities. But one thing is for sure: we cannot decide
questions that “may never arise.” Paschall v. Kan. City Star Co., 605 F.2d 403, 407
(8th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
The condition also does not threaten imminent harm like the one in United
States v. Hinkeldey, 124 F.4th 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2024) (per curiam). There, the
defendant was on supervised release, which meant that the potential harm from a
similar community-service condition was already hanging over his head. See id.;
see also United States v. Wroblewski, 816 F.3d 1021, 1023 (8th Cir. 2016)
(explaining that a probation officer can enforce the conditions of supervised release).
Here, by contrast, any injury is speculative and decades away.4 See United States v.
Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining that a challenge to a
condition prohibiting a defendant from associating with a gang was unripe because
4 On occasion, we have considered challenges to the conditions of supervised
release on direct appeal, even when defendants still have years left on their sentence.
See, e.g., United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 850 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Kerr, 472 F.3d 517, 520–24 (8th Cir. 2006). But in those cases, unlike this one, the
“potential jurisdictional defect [was] neither noted nor discussed, [so] the decision
does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed.” Ariz. Christian Sch.
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011).

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his release was a decade away); see also Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 10 v. City of
Peculiar, 345 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a “case is more likely
to be ripe if it poses a purely legal question and is not contingent on future
possibilities”).
The wait, however, may not last forever. Once the community-service
condition imposes some hardship on him, he is free to try again. See United States
v. Williams, 30 F.4th 796, 801–02 (8th Cir. 2022) (stating that “speculative harms
do not justify reversal of special conditions when the defendant can seek
modification of the condition” after release); see also Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v.
MidAmerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
hardship includes the “heightened uncertainty and resulting behavior modification
that may result from delayed resolution”). Until then, we dismiss without prejudice.
See Parrish, 761 F.3d at 875.
IV.
Except for dismissing the challenge to the community-service condition
without prejudice, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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