Lindell Briscoe, individually v. St. Louis County; Joseph Percich, in his individual capacity

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 25-1668
___________________________
Lindell Briscoe, individually; Brittany Arlesia Shamily, individually and as next
friend of her minor children; B.M.C.; B.A.S.; B.L.B.D.; B.R.C.B.; B.A.B.
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
St. Louis County; Joseph Percich, in his individual capacity
Defendants - Appellees
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
____________
Submitted: January 15, 2026
Filed: April 10, 2026
____________
Before SMITH, BENTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
____________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
The St. Louis County Police Department’s Tactical Operations Unit
(colloquially known as a SWAT team) executed a search warrant at a home in
connection with an armed carjacking. As it turns out, the family living at the home
had no connection to the carjacking. The family—Lindell Briscoe, Brittany Arlesia,
and their five minor children (collectively, Appellants)—sued St. Louis County and
Detective Joseph Percich, the author of the search warrant affidavit. The complaint

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alleged claims related to the search warrant affidavit, the execution of the search
warrant, and St. Louis County’s use of its SWAT team to execute search warrants.
They also alleged that St. Louis County violated Missouri’s Sunshine Law. The
district court1 granted St. Louis County and Detective Percich’s motion to dismiss
Appellants’ claims. Appellants appeal. We affirm.
I. Background
One morning, two teenagers leaving a Waffle House restaurant got into their
vehicle, a black Dodge Charger. Before they could drive away, two carjackers
ordered them out of the Charger at gunpoint. The teenagers complied, and the
carjackers drove away in the Charger. Four other individuals who arrived at Waffle
House with the carjackers also drove away in two separate vehicles.
St. Louis County police officers responded to the incident and began to
investigate. A friend of the victims informed the officers that his Apple AirPods
were in the back seat of the stolen vehicle. AirPods have a feature that enables them
to be located electronically through the Find My application. Using that feature, the
officers believed that the AirPods could be located at 1022 Wylin Court.
Accordingly, Detective Percich applied for a search warrant. He submitted the
following affidavit with the application:
1. This affiant, Detective Joseph Percich . . . has been a St. Louis County
Police Officer for over sixteen years, the last eleven assigned as a
detective to the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons. Your affiant also
serves as a credentialed Task Force Officer for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, serving on the Violent Crimes Safe Streets Task Force.
Your affiant has led numerous complex investigations into various
homicides, assaults, police officer-involved shootings and other violent
crimes. Your affiant has had vast specialized training regarding the
investigation of violent crime.
1 The Honorable Matthew T. Schelp, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri.

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2. On Friday, May 26, 2023, at approximately 6:26 AM, police
officers . . . responded to the Waffle House, located at 3154 Telegraph
Road in St. Louis County, for a report of a First Degree
Robbery/Vehicle Hijacking.
3. The victims . . . reported they were at the restaurant to eat
breakfast with friends prior to the last day of school at Oakville High
School. While the victims ate, a black male in a light blue hooded
sweatshirt entered the restaurant and sate [sic] at the counter. The
subject then returned to two vehicles in the parking lot. Those vehicles
were described as a white Kia passenger car and a silver Chevrolet
passenger car.
4. After breakfast, the victims exited the business and entered the
vehicle, described as a 2021 Dodge Charger, black in color. The victims
were approached by two masked black male suspects. It was reported
both suspects displayed firearms, with at least one equipped with a
drum magazine. Both suspects provided verbal directives to the victims
to exit the vehicle. The suspects entered the vehicle and departed the
scene.
5. Video surveillance footage revealed the suspects arrived in the
aforementioned silver and white passenger cars. One suspect was
dressed in a red hooded sweatshirt. The suspects take possession of the
vehicle and flee.
6. A witness and friend to the victims . . . reported his Apple AirPods
were inside the Dodge Charger at the time of the vehicle hijacking. [He]
assisted investigators by tracking the AirPods using Apple’s “Find My”
application. After a short time, the stolen AirPods were determined to
be at the residence of 1022 Wylin Court, St. Louis, Missouri 63135.
7. Surveillance was initiated at 1022 Wylin Court.
8. At 8:10 AM . . . patrol officers . . . located the stolen Dodge Charger.
The vehicle was occupied by a driver and four passengers. The patrol
officers attempted to initiate a felony stop . . . however, the driver fled
at a high speed. A vehicle pursuit was initiated.

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9. The pursuit ultimately culminated in the 1700 block of Foley Drive.
Two males abandoned the vehicle and fled on foot. Two females also
abandoned the vehicle but were immediately taken into custody. The
unoccupied stolen Dodge Charger then struck the front of a marked
police vehicle.
10. Police officers initiated a foot chase of the two male suspects. Both
were taken into custody . . . . In the area along the path of the foot chase,
police officers located two pistols with drum magazines and a satchel
containing the victim’s property.
11. The driver [and passenger] of the Dodge Charger w[ere] positively
identified . . . . [The passenger] was dressed in a red sweatsuit. It
appeared as if [the driver] disrobed himself of a gray hooded sweatshirt
at the time of the foot chase. The article of clothing was seized as
evidence. The female passengers were [also] identified . . . .
12. Detectives conducted a[n] . . . interview of [one of the females]. She
reported being presented [sic] with [the other female] and the above
[mentioned] males, along with two other unknown males, near the St.
Louis Riverfront throughout the overnight hours. The group then went
to White Castle for food which was verified by a receipt in [the
female’s] possession. She reported the group, occupying a white Kia
sedan, then proceeded to Waffle House. [She] reported the male in the
red sweatshirt . . . and the male in the blue sweatshirt, whose identity
remained unknown, approached the victims and relieved them of the
Dodge Charger.
13. [The female] said she remained in the Kia sedan. The occupants of
the Kia followed behind the Dodge Charger until reaching a gas station
in/near the City of Normandy. While at the gas station, [she] reported
the suspects discarded several backpacks from the victim’s Dodge
Charger into a green trash can . . . . Based upon the description of the
trash can, detectives believed the group stopped at a BP gas station.
14. After departing the gas station, the group separated. [The female]
entered the Dodge Charger . . . . [The other female] and the subject in
the red sweatshirt . . . were [also] passengers.

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15. Detectives responded to the BP gas station . . . and located three
backpacks containing property associated with the robbery
victims. . . . Video surveillance footage revealed three vehicles, the
Dodge Charger, white Kia and silver Chevrolet sedan arrived and
departed in tandem. The occupants of the vehicles appeared to
communicate with one another. The vehicles were last seen departing
the parking lot northbound on S. Florissant Road, toward Woodstock
Road.
16. As of writing, information gleaned from Apple’s “Find My”
application revealed the stolen Apple AirPods were still at 1022 Wylin
Court. The address in question is located a short distance from the
intersection of S. Florissant Road and Woodstock Road.
17. The vehicle hijacking . . . occurred through the use or threatened
use of deadly force during which the suspects displayed firearms in a
crime of violence. At least one suspect remains unidentified and
detectives have reason to believe that person resides at or frequents
1022 Wylin Court. As a result, detectives seek authorization to serve
this search warrant in a “no knock” manner, if deemed appropriate by
personnel assigned to the St. Louis County Police Department’s
Tactical Operations Unit.
18. Through training and experience, your affiant is aware evidence of
criminal offenses is frequently retained by the suspect and stored within
his/her residence.
19. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of
securing a search warrant, your affiant has not included each and every
fact known to me concerning this investigation. Rather, only the facts
that are believed to be necessary to establish probable cause are stated
above.
R. Doc. 1-4, at 1–3.
Based on Detective Percich’s warrant application and affidavit, a St. Louis
County judge issued a no-knock search warrant authorizing officers to search the
residence at 1022 Wylin Court for “firearms, ammunition, holsters, firearm related

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material, cellular devices, receipts, documentations, writings, clothing, video
recording devices” and “stolen/personal property belonging to the victims.” R. Doc.
1-5.
A SWAT team executed the search warrant. According to Appellants, the
officers “exited their military style van” wearing “full combat regalia” and “were
heavily armed with military style weapons.” R. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 117–19. They
“approached the house’s two exterior doors with shields in front of them and their
weapons drawn.” Id. ¶ 119. The officers knocked on the front door three times and
shouted that they were officers executing a search warrant. They ordered the
occupants to come to the front door immediately. After about 25 seconds of
knocking and shouting with no response, the officers used a battering ram to break
through Appellants’ front door.
Arlesia was in the house with three of her children. After breaking through
the door, the officers trained their guns on Arlesia. Wearing only her underwear, she
became understandably alarmed and asked what was going on. She told the officers
that she had a three-month-old baby in the house.
Briscoe and the other two children were outside of the home in his semi-truck
cab. The officers pointed firearms at Briscoe and demanded that he and the children
exit the truck.
The officers detained the entire family outside on the sidewalk for about 30
minutes while they conducted the residential search. The baby was left crying in the
home for four minutes before one of the officers brought the baby outside.
Appellants allege that the officers made them stand and told them that they could
not sit down when they requested.
Before the SWAT team arrived, the house was “in a clean [and] orderly
condition.” Id. ¶ 141. During the execution of the search warrant, the officers

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“punched a hole larger than a basketball in the bedroom drywall,” “ransacked the
drawers and turned them over,” and “left the house in disarray.” Id. ¶ 143.
The officers eventually found the AirPods. They were not in house but in the
street in front of the house. The officers concluded that Appellants had nothing to do
with the Waffle House carjacking. Unfortunately for Appellants, by that point they
had already been traumatized and embarrassed by the ordeal.
Appellants sued St. Louis County and Detective Percich in his individual
capacity. The six-count complaint alleged an unreasonable search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment based on an inaccurate affidavit, i.e., a Franks2 violation (Count
I); an unreasonable use of force based on the use of a SWAT team (Count II); an
unreasonable use of force based on the SWAT team’s conduct (Count III); an
unreasonable seizure (Count IV); an unconstitutional SWAT team raid policy (Count
V); and a violation of Missouri’s Sunshine Law (Count VI). Counts I through IV
were brought against Detective Percich, and Counts V and VI were brought against
St. Louis County. Counts I through V were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and Count VI was brought pursuant to Missouri law.
St. Louis County and Detective Percich moved to dismiss all of Appellants’
claims. The district court granted their motion. First, it concluded that Detective
Percich is entitled to qualified immunity for Counts I through III. Then, it concluded
that Count IV fails to state a claim for relief because Appellants’ seizure during the
search of their home was not unreasonable under the facts alleged. Next, the district
court explained that Count V fails because Appellants failed to identify an
unconstitutional policy or custom and because a municipal liability claim cannot
survive unless individual liability is found. None was found here. Finally, the district
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count VI, Appellants’ only
state law claim.
2Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

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Appellants appeal the district court’s judgment.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing their
claims. We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss Counts I through
V for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). O’Neil
v. Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501, 503 (8th Cir. 2009). We will accept Appellants’
factual allegations as true. Id. “Because the decision to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim[] is discretionary under § 1367 and
not jurisdictional,” we will review the district court’s dismissal of Count VI for an
abuse of discretion. Crest Const. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 359 (8th Cir. 2011).
A. Franks Violation
Appellants concede that whether Detective Percich committed a Franks
violation is a critical factor for their claims’ survival. Accordingly, we address this
issue first.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV. “For a search to be reasonable, the government generally
must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before ‘physically intruding on
constitutionally protected areas’” like homes. United States v. Wolff, 830 F.3d 755,
758 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013)). However,
as the Supreme Court explained in Franks, an officer violates an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights if he or she “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth” includes false statements in the warrant affidavit. 438 U.S.
at 155; see also Bagby v. Brondhaver, 98 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996). To
establish a Franks violation, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the affiant officer knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, included a false or misleading statement in, or
omitted information from, the affidavit in support of the warrant; and

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(2) the affidavit would not establish probable cause if the allegedly false
information is ignored or the omitted information is supplemented.
United States v. Cowling, 648 F.3d 690, 695 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation modified).
We have explained that the showing of deliberate or reckless falsehood
required to establish a Franks violation is “not lightly met.” United States v. Butler,
594 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754,
759 (8th Cir. 1987)).
The test for determining whether an affiant’s statements were made
with reckless disregard for the truth is whether, after viewing all the
evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the
information he reported.
Id. “Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.” Franks, 438
U.S. at 171.
Here, Appellants argue that Detective Percich included both material
misstatements and omissions in the affidavit supporting the search warrant.
Specifically, Appellants contend that Detective Percich’s affidavit (1) misstated the
location of the stolen AirPods, which were actually found in the street in front of the
house located at 1022 Wylin Court and not in the house; (2) omitted the unidentified
suspect’s connection to 1022 Wylin Court; (3) omitted information indicating the
imprecision of the data displayed on the Find My application; (4) omitted the time
that officers began surveilling 1022 Wylin Court; (5) and omitted relevant details
from the interviewed suspect’s interview. Appellants assert that these misstatements
and omissions are material matters that show deliberate falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth. We disagree.
Appellants’ have not sufficiently alleged that Detective Percich “knowingly
and intentionally” or “recklessly” disregarded the truth. To be sure, Appellants’
allegations of misstatements and omissions demonstrate that the affidavit could have

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been more thorough and precise. Detective Percich’s affidavit could have included
more information. He essentially concedes as much in number 19 of the affidavit.
See R. Doc. 1-4, at 3 (“Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited
purpose of securing a search warrant, your affiant has not included each and every
fact known to me concerning this investigation. Rather, only the facts that are
believed to be necessary to establish probable cause are stated above.” (emphasis
added)). But Detective Percich’s failure to include additional details is not enough
to establish a Franks violation unless the absence of those details shows reckless
disregard for the truth.
Detective Percich was tasked with investigating an armed carjacking, a
serious offense. He had been informed that the suspects used firearms, at least one
of which was equipped with a drum magazine. He also had information that the
stolen car was seen a short distance away from, and driving toward, 1022 Wylin
Court; that one of the suspects was still at large; and that the stolen AirPods appeared
to be at 1022 Wylin Court.
Appellants argue that Detective Percich materially misstated a fact in the
warrant affidavit when he stated that the stolen AirPods were at the residence of
1022 Wylin Court. They assert that Detective Percich, instead, should have been
more precise about the limited precision of the Find My application. For example,
Appellants suggest that Detective Percich could have included a screenshot from the
Find My application; explained that the AirPods were on the street in front of 1022
Wylin Court; explained that the he could not say with certainty whether the AirPods
were inside of 1022 Wylin Court; or explained that “[t]he accuracy of the [Find My]
app depends on the configuration of adjoining buildings, the location of cell towers,
Bluetooth connectivity, WiFi and GPS networks, and other factors.” Appellants’ Br.
24.
While Detective Percich could have included these more detailed
explanations, the Fourth Amendment did not require it. “[A]ffidavits ‘are normally
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical

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requirements of elaborate specificity . . . have no proper place in this area.’” Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 108 (1965)). “Even if the . . . affidavit was imperfect, perfection is not required
for a search warrant to survive appellate review.” United States v. Juneau, 73 F.4th
607, 616 (8th Cir. 2023). Appellants do not make any allegations in their complaint
establishing that Detective Percich doubted that the AirPods were at 1022 Wylin
Court.
Appellants also argue that Detective Percich made a material misstatement
when he stated that evidence of the crime, including firearms, was located at 1022
Wylin Court. However, Appellants do not make any allegations establishing that
Detective Percich doubted the accuracy of this fact. In the warrant affidavit,
Detective Percich explained that he “has led numerous complex investigations into
various . . . violent crimes” and that he “has had vast specialized training regarding
the investigation of violent crime.” R. Doc. 1-4, at 1. He explained that based on his
training and experience, he knew that criminals typically retain evidence at their
residence. And while Detective Percich did not know whether 1022 Wylin Court
was a suspect’s residence, he believed that the stolen AirPods were there. This belief
contributed to a conclusion of probable cause to search the residence. AirPods being
a valuable personal electronic device, it would not be a natural assumption that they
would be on the street. “Probable cause requires only a showing of fair probability,
not hard certainties.” United States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, Appellants argue that Detective Percich omitted material
information regarding law enforcement’s surveillance of 1022 Wylin Court.
Specifically, Appellants assert that Detective Percich should have stated whether
surveillance of their home began before or after the suspects were seen on
surveillance footage at the BP gas station. They argue that if officers began
surveillance of their home before the suspects were seen at the gas station, then the
officers would have known that none of the suspects were at 1022 Wylin Court. The
surveilling officers would have seen that none of the suspects entered the home.
Alternatively, Appellants argue that if the surveillance began after the suspects were

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seen at the gas station, then officers could not be certain whether the missing suspect
was at 1022 Wylin Court because a suspect could have entered the home before
surveillance began.
Appellants, however, misread the warrant affidavit. Detective Percich’s
affidavit never asserted that all six of the suspects were seen together on the BP
surveillance footage. Instead, he only stated that the surveillance footage showed
“three vehicles, the Dodge Charger, white Kia and silver Chevrolet sedan arrived [at
the gas station] and departed in tandem” and that “[t]he occupants of the vehicles
appeared to communicate with one another.” R. Doc. 1-4, at 2–3. The inception of
the surveillance of 1022 Wylin Court was not indispensable to a probable cause
determination when the affidavit was filed. The gas station surveillance footage
showed all three vehicles but did not show all the suspects. It stands to reason that
the AirPods arrived at Wylin Court before officers began surveilling the residence.
The unknown suspect could have done so as well. Thus, supplementing the affidavit
with the surveillance inception time would not have foreclosed probable cause to
search the residence for the AirPods.
Finally, Appellants argue that Detective Percich omitted material information
from the warrant affidavit regarding the interviewed suspect’s interview. They assert
that Detective Percich should have explained whether the suspect was asked about
the stolen AirPods, 1022 Wylin Court, and the other suspects. Detective Percich
included material information from the interview, including information that led to
the recovery of the victims’ property in a BP trash can and the BP surveillance
footage. He also explained that two of the males were “unknown” to the interviewed
suspect. Detective Percich could have included more information or even a transcript
of the interview, but again, “perfection is not required.” Juneau, 73 F.4th at 616.
Appellants have not sufficiently alleged facts establishing that Detective Percich’s
failure to include additional details about the suspect’s interview was done with
reckless disregard for the truth. “[C]hallenges to warrant affidavits may not be
conclusory . . . .” Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2000).

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To establish the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant, the
Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant affidavit includes factual statements that
are truthful. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 164–65. “This does not mean ‘truthful’ in the
sense that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct . . . . [b]ut
surely it is to be ‘truthful’ in the sense that the information put forth is believed or
appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.” Id. at 165. Here, none of Appellants’
allegations establish that Detective Percich did not believe the statements he made.
Of course, hindsight disassociates 1022 Wylin Court from the armed carjacking.
However, as unfortunate as this incident was for Appellants, “we do not evaluate
probable cause in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up.”
Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 249 (2013).
Appellants have not sufficiently alleged that Detective Percich entertained
serious doubts as to the truth or accuracy of any of the facts that he included in the
warrant affidavit. Nor have they sufficiently alleged that supplementing the affidavit
facts with the alleged material omissions would have prevented the St. Louis County
Police Department from establishing probable cause to search 1022 Wylin Court.
Thus, we conclude that Detective Percich did not commit a Franks violation and,
accordingly, affirm the district court’s dismissal of Count I.
B. Excessive Use of Force
Counts II and III both allege that Detective Percich used excessive force in
executing the search warrant. Specifically, in Count II, Appellants allege that
“[Detective] Percich employed a SWAT team,” which “was excessive because it
was not reasonably necessary in order to investigate the carjacking,” R. Doc. 1,
¶¶ 218–19, and in Count III allege that “[Detective] Percich’s SWAT team[’s] . . .
conduct was excessive because it was not reasonably necessary in order to
investigate the carjacking,” id. ¶¶ 222–23. The district court dismissed Counts II and
III, concluding that Detective Percich is entitled to qualified immunity. We agree.
“We analyze excessive force claims in the context of seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, applying its reasonableness standard.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley,

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574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009). Determining whether an officer’s use of force is
reasonable “requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)
(citation modified). “The operative question in excessive force cases is whether the
totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of search or seizure.” Cnty. of
Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 427–28 (2017) (citation modified). “[T]he
reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.
at 428 (citation modified).
“Qualified immunity shields a public official from personal liability for
constitutional violations ‘if his conduct was objectively reasonable as measured by
clearly established law.’” Powell v. Basham, 921 F.2d 165, 167 (8th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (quoting Darnell v. Ford, 903 F.2d 556, 562 (8th Cir. 1990)). “To overcome
qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff ‘must plead facts
showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that
the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Watkins v.
City of St. Louis, 102 F.4th 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Dillard v. O’Kelley,
961 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2020)). “Because qualified immunity is ‘an immunity
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
Here, Detective Percich is entitled to qualified immunity from Appellants’
excessive force claims because Appellants fail to allege facts showing that Detective
Percich violated their Fourth Amendment rights. “An officer’s decision to authorize
a SWAT team to execute a warrant can, in some cases, constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation.” Z.J. by and through Jones v. Kan. City Bd. of Police
Comm’rs, 931 F.3d 672, 688 (8th Cir. 2019). However, even if we assume that it
was Detective Percich’s decision to authorize a SWAT team to execute the search
warrant at 1022 Wylin Court, that decision was reasonable. Relying on Detective

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Percich’s affidavit, which complied with constitutional requirements, a neutral judge
issued a no-knock search warrant for 1022 Wylin Court. At the time, Detective
Percich and the judge who authorized the warrant believed that the home was
connected to individuals who used firearms, at least one of which was equipped with
a drum magazine, to carjack two teenagers; “fled at a high speed” in the stolen
vehicle when officers attempted to initiate a felony stop; then exited the vehicle and
“fled on foot,” leaving the unoccupied stolen vehicle to strike a police vehicle. R.
Doc. 1-4, at 2. Clearly, the suspects involved in the carjacking had already
demonstrated that they were armed, dangerous, and unwilling to comply with law
enforcement. Thus, it was reasonable to employ a SWAT team to execute the search
warrant as a safety precaution for officers. See Ramage v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty.
Metro Gov’t, 520 F. App’x 341, 346 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (explaining that
detectives anticipated the target to be armed which “created substantial risk for the
officers executing the warrant”).
Furthermore, Detective Percich did not violate Appellants’ Fourth
Amendment rights based on the SWAT team’s conduct while executing the search
warrant. An official can only be held liable under § 1983 for his own misconduct.
See Z.J., 931 F.3d at 688. In Z.J., we explained that the detectives who authorized a
SWAT team to execute a search warrant “only violated the Fourth Amendment if
their own actions were directly responsible for a deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.
They are not automatically responsible for all of the actions of the SWAT team
officers.” Id. There, we concluded that the detectives were entitled to qualified
immunity because there was no evidence suggesting they directed the SWAT team
or were involved in deciding how much force the SWAT team used. Id. Similarly,
here, Appellants have not alleged facts establishing that Detective Percich’s
decisions or actions produced the SWAT team’s alleged use of excessive force.
Detective Percich’s affidavit requested and obtained authorization for the use of a
no-knock warrant but the complaint insufficiently states a claim that he directed
some misuse of the force the warrant authorized.

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Appellants’ allegations calling the SWAT team “[Detective] Percich’s SWAT
team,” R. Doc. 1, ¶ 222, or contending that “[o]n inference, [Detective] Percich was
responsible for the tactical decisions made in the course of the SWAT Team Raid,”
id. ¶ 172, are insufficient to hold him liable for the SWAT team’s conduct. When
reviewing a district court’s dismissal of a claim, we are not required to accept
conclusory allegations. See Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799,
805 (8th Cir. 1999). Moreover, allegations pled on information and belief are
insufficient to state a claim for relief unless “the proof supporting the allegation is
within the sole possession and control of the defendant or . . . the belief is based on
sufficient factual material that makes the inference of culpability plausible.” Ahern
Rentals, Inc. v. EquipmentShare.com, Inc., 59 F.4th 948, 954 (8th Cir. 2023).
Here, Appellants’ allegations “on inference” are insufficient to state a claim
for relief. The proof supporting the allegations linking Detective Percich to the
SWAT team’s actions are not within the sole possession of St. Louis County or
Detective Percich. In fact, Appellants stated that St. Louis County produced body
camera footage from the SWAT team’s search. Further, without additional factual
material supporting Appellants’ allegations, it does not appear plausible that a
detective directs a SWAT team or controls how much force the SWAT team uses.
We are not required to accept conclusory allegations.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Counts II and III.
C. Unreasonable Seizure
In Count IV, Appellants allege that Detective Percich unreasonably seized
them when investigating the carjacking. Appellants assert that their seizure was not
reasonably necessary to investigate the carjacking. The district court concluded
otherwise and dismissed Count IV. The district court was correct.
As we explained above, Detective Percich cannot be held liable for the SWAT
team’s alleged constitutional violation without additional factual allegations

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establishing that he was directly responsible for their actions. This includes the
SWAT team’s decision to seize Appellants.
Moreover, even if Detective Percich could be held liable for the SWAT team’s
actions, Appellants were not unconstitutionally seized. In Michigan v. Summers, we
held that “for Fourth Amendment purposes . . . a warrant to search for contraband
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain
the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” 452 U.S. 692,
705 (1981) (footnotes omitted). Because the search warrant was valid, the seizure
that occurred incident to its execution was not unreasonable.
Here, Appellants allege that they were detained on the sidewalk without
handcuffs for 30 minutes while the SWAT team searched for contraband pursuant
to a valid search warrant. Appellants do not allege any special circumstances that
suggest that their seizure during the SWAT team’s execution of the search warrant
was unreasonable. Nor do Appellants allege that their detention was unnecessarily
prolonged beyond the time required to execute the search warrant. See Muehler v.
Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100 (2005) (concluding that the occupant’s Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated when she was detained for two to three hours in handcuffs
while officers executed a search warrant).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Count IV.
D. Municipal Liability
In Count V, Appellants allege a municipal liability claim against St. Louis
County. The district court dismissed Count V, finding that the Appellants failed to
allege facts that would support the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.
We agree.

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Municipal liability, also known as Monell3 liability, “can be found . . . under
§ 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at
issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). To establish municipal
liability, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that a “violation resulted from (1) an
official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent
failure to train or supervise.” Leftwich ex rel. Leftwich v. Cnty. of Dakota, 9 F.4th
966, 972 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695,
699 (8th Cir. 2016)). “There must be a causal connection between the municipal
policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation in order to state a valid
claim under § 1983.” Ulrich v. Pope Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013).
“Conclusory assertions that are unsupported by facts will not satisfy this pleading
standard.” Watkins, 102 F.4th at 953.
Here, Appellants’ conclusory allegation that St. Louis County has a policy “to
conduct SWAT Team Raids when not justified by the circumstances,” R. Doc. 1,
¶ 204, is insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability. See Watkins, 102 F.4th
at 954 (“Watkins’s allegations are conclusory, and she does not assert specific
instances or provide specific examples of inadequate officer training or supervising
practices that could support an inference of an unconstitutional policy or custom.”);
Calgaro v. St. Louis Cnty., 919 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Calgaro’s
conclusory assertion that the County acted based on a policy or custom is insufficient
to state a claim, and the district court correctly granted judgment on the pleadings.”);
Chambers v. St. Louis Cnty., 247 F. App’x 846, 848 (8th Cir. 2007) (unpublished
per curiam) (“[W]e hold that the district court did not err in dismissing the claims
against the County . . . because Chambers’s speculative allegations about an apparent
policy to condone and conceal police brutality were merely conclusory . . . .”).
Beyond stating that the policy exists and alleging “[o]n inference” that the purpose
of the policy is “to justify the existence of the unit, and to give the unit practice on
the public, at the expense of the public being exposed to excessive force,” R. Doc.
1, ¶ 208, Appellants do not allege any facts supporting the existence of this policy.
3Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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For example, Appellants do not allege any instances, besides the search of their own
home, where St. Louis County used a SWAT team to execute a search warrant when
it was not justified by the circumstances. “Generally, an isolated incident of alleged
police misconduct . . . cannot, as a matter of law, establish a municipal policy or
custom creating liability under § 1983.” Ulrich, 715 F.3d at 1061.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Count V.
E. Sunshine Law Violation
Lastly, in Count VI, Appellants allege that St. Louis County violated
Missouri’s Sunshine Law, which governs requests for public documents from a
governmental body. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 610.010 et seq. Appellants contend that
they made a lawful Sunshine request and never received a meaningful response from
St. Louis County, despite its obligations under § 610.026. After dismissing all of
Appellants’ federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Count VI.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), federal courts have discretion to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under state law when it has
dismissed all the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Here, after dismissing
the claims over which it has original jurisdiction (Counts I through V), the district
court exercised its discretion to dismiss Count VI, a state law claim. Because we
affirm the district court’s dismissal of the federal claims, we will not disturb its
declination to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. See
Gibson v. Weber, 431 F.3d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of
remaining state law claim after dismissing all federal claims).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of
Count VI.

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III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
_______________________

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