United States of America v. James Robert Evilsizer

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-2598
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
James Robert Evilsizer
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: April 17, 2026
Filed: May 12, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before KELLY, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
James Robert Evilsizer pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing
methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a playground, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(B), 851, and 860(a). The district court1 denied his motion for a downward
1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa.

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variance and sentenced him to 324 months in prison and eight years of supervised
release. We affirm.
Evilsizer argues that the district court failed to recognize its authority to vary
from the Guidelines range. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)
(procedural error to treat the Guidelines as mandatory). The court said it was for the
Sentencing Commission, and ultimately Congress, to decide what
methamphetamine ratio the Guidelines use and how to weigh the seriousness of
different crimes. But the district court knew the Guidelines were advisory and did
not treat them as mandatory. And although the court said it supports reconsidering
the current ice versus powder ratio, it also recognized its discretion to “vary from
the guidelines if [it] wish[ed]” and “cho[se] not to do so.” See United States v.
Webb, 70 F.4th 1038, 1045–46 (8th Cir. 2023) (“district court did not treat the
Guidelines as mandatory,” even though it “deferred to Congress and the Sentencing
Commission” on treatment of ice versus powder methamphetamine); see also United
States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 460–61 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (district court
should first calculate the applicable Guidelines range and then use its discretion to
determine whether a variance is appropriate (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 49)); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)–(b).
Evilsizer also says the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a
supervised release condition prohibiting the use or possession of alcohol and
requiring permission from a probation officer before entering a bar or tavern. See
United States v. Werkmeister, 62 F.4th 465, 472 (8th Cir. 2023) (standard of review).
He claims his decades-old convictions for underage possession of alcohol and public
intoxication are too remote to justify the ban. See United States v. Woodall, 782
F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing alcohol-related special condition where
defendant had “no history of alcohol influencing him to be a danger to society”).
But the district court also relied on Evilsizer’s recent drug abuse and found that he
had a “polysubstance problem” justifying the condition. See Werkmeister, 62 F.4th
at 472 (“Even where a defendant’s history involves abuse of drugs rather than
alcohol, . . . a district court may recognize the threat of cross-addiction and respond

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by imposing a ban on alcohol use.”). And “[w]here a defendant exhibits problems
with substance abuse, a district court generally acts within its discretion by imposing
a prohibition on the use of alcohol and the entry into alcohol-oriented
establishments.” Id.
Affirmed.
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