United States of America v. Jason Davis

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3147
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jason Davis
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: January 12, 2026
Filed: June 12, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Jason Davis challenges an enhancement to a felon-in-possession sentence for
having “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1);
see id. § 922(g)(1). Although he argues that an Arkansas conviction of second-
degree battery should not count, see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(1) (2010), we
affirm.

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The district court1 included it based on its review of a charging document, his
plea statement, and the transcript of the plea hearing. See United States v. Dawn,
685 F.3d 790, 794–95 (8th Cir. 2012) (describing the modified categorical approach
and explaining it applies to the Arkansas statute at issue here), abrogated on other
grounds by Lofton v. United States, 920 F.3d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 2019). Together,
they confirmed that Davis pleaded guilty to the version of second-degree battery
requiring him to have “purpose[ly] . . . caus[ed]” a “physical injury” that turned out
to be “serious.”2 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(1) (2010); see United States v.
Harris, 950 F.3d 1015, 1021 (8th Cir. 2020) (making the same determination from
a charging document); United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 413, 418 (8th Cir. 2019)
(same). As we have recognized before, this offense is a “crime of violence” under
the Sentencing Guidelines, Garcia, 946 F.3d at 418, which also makes it a “violent
felony,” Dawn, 685 F.3d at 797 n.5 (citation omitted) (treating the two categories
interchangeably).
Davis questions the accuracy of the charging document because it lists a
habitual-offender enhancement he never received. Cf. United States v. Thornton,
766 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir. 2014) (reversing because the charging document
reviewed by the district court was not the correct one). The plea-hearing transcript
clears up any confusion by revealing that the prosecutor dropped it in the plea deal.
See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20 (2005) (explaining that a court may
look to the “transcript of [the] plea colloquy”). For us, it means that Davis indeed
1 The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
2 Davis argues that the second-degree-battery conviction at issue here, as well
as one other, could not possibly be violent felonies because Arkansas law only
requires “causing serious physical injury,” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(1), which
does not necessarily involve the use of “physical force,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
He raises the argument solely to preserve it, however, given that our precedent
squarely forecloses it. See United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 2016).

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pleaded guilty to a “violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). We accordingly affirm
the judgment of the district court.
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