United States of America v. Walter Thornton, Jr.

24-3255Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit30 de jun. de 2026

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United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 25-1071
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Walter Thornton, Jr.
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Delta
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Submitted: January 12, 2026
Filed: June 9, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant Walter Thornton, Jr., was sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment
and 3 years of supervised release after being convicted of one count of being a felon
in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(D). After completing his term of incarceration, and after serving over two

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years of supervised release, the Government sought to have Thornton’s supervised
release revoked, alleging that Thornton violated five separate conditions. After a
hearing, the district court1 revoked Thornton’s supervised release and sentenced him
to 18 months’ imprisonment with no supervised release to follow. On appeal,
Thornton challenges both the procedural soundness and substantive reasonableness
of his revocation sentence and asserts that the written judgment conflicts with the
oral pronouncements the district court made at sentencing. Because Thornton has
been released from his term of imprisonment, we dismiss the portion of his appeal
challenging his sentence as moot. However, we modify the written judgment to
conform to the district court’s oral pronouncement at the revocation hearing.
Thornton began serving his term of supervised release in August 2022. In
October 2024, the Government filed a petition seeking revocation of supervised
release. The Government alleged that Thornton violated three conditions of his
supervised release by committing a new law violation, possessing a controlled
substance, and by leaving the jurisdiction without approval. These violations all
stemmed from a traffic stop by West Helena, Arkansas Police where Thornton was
alleged to have illegally possessed a controlled substance, fled from law enforcement
into neighboring Mississippi, failed to comply with a lawful order, and tampered
with physical evidence. Then, in January 2025, the Government filed a superseding
petition alleging that Thornton committed five supervised release violations: the
same three violations alleged in the original petition and two new violations of
failing to notify his probation officer when he moved out of his residence and when
he was terminated from his employment.
At the revocation hearing, Thornton admitted to the fleeing allegation and to
entering Mississippi while fleeing but denied that he possessed a controlled
substance or tampered with evidence. Thornton also denied the alleged violations
related to his residence and employment, asserting that he had not officially changed
1 The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.

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residences despite spending most nights at his girlfriend’s residence and that he was
on leave from work and had not been terminated. The Government declined to
pursue the alleged violation relating to his employment but put on evidence
regarding the incident involving the West Helena Police Department to prove that
Thornton possessed a controlled substance and tampered with evidence. The district
court ruled against the Government on the controlled substances violation but found
that the record sufficiently supported the fleeing allegation, and revoked Thornton’s
supervised release. The district court then calculated Thornton’s United States
Sentencing Guidelines range at 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment, with a term of
supervised release of not more than three years, minus any term of imprisonment.
The district court ultimately imposed a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment,
with no period of supervision to follow. The district court’s written judgment stated
that Thornton admitted to both leaving the jurisdiction and moving residences
without notifying his probation officer, despite Thornton’s denial of the residence
violation. Further, the judgment stated that Thorton was found guilty of both the
new law and controlled substance violations, despite the fact that the district court
ruled against the Government with respect to the controlled substance violation.
On appeal, Thornton asserts that the district court committed procedural error,
imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence, and issued a written judgment that
conflicts with the oral pronouncements at sentencing. According to Bureau of
Prisons records, Thorton was released from custody on January 2, 2026, and this
appeal was submitted on January 12, 2026. Thorton’s challenge to his revocation
sentence is thus moot. See United States v. Aden, 830 F.3d 812, 816-17 (8th Cir.
2016).
However, we may still consider Thornton’s contention that the district court’s
written judgment conflicts with the oral sentence pronounced at the revocation
hearing and that the written judgment must be amended. See United States v.
Eligwe, 627 F. Appx. 263, 264 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal of
revocation sentence as moot where defendant had been released from imprisonment

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but remanding to district court to correct clerical error in written judgment regarding
which provisions of supervised release defendant violated). “It is well settled . . .
that a district court’s oral sentence controls when it conflicts with the written
judgment.” United States v. Thomas, 757 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2014) (alteration
in original) (citation omitted). Here, the district court stated that it was finding
against the Government on its allegation that Thornton violated a mandatory
condition of supervised release by possessing a controlled substance. Further, after
Thornton denied the allegation relating to the standard condition requiring him to
notify his probation officer of a change in residence, the Government did not put on
any evidence to prove this violation, nor did the district court make any finding as
to this allegation. However, the written judgment states that Thornton admitted to
violating the condition relating to his residence and was found guilty of violating the
condition related to possession of a controlled substance. The written judgment thus
directly conflicts with the district court’s oral pronouncement of the revocation
sentence. However, “[a] remand to the district court is unnecessary when we can
‘correct the error ourselves.’” United States v. Henderson, 902 F.3d 822, 828 (8th
Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Here, remand is unnecessary, and we modify the
judgment to conform with the oral pronouncement of the sentence at the revocation
hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the portion of the appeal challenging
Thornton’s sentence as moot, but we modify the revocation judgment to accurately
reflect that Thornton admitted guilt only to knowingly leaving the authorized
residential district (Standard Condition 3) and was adjudicated guilty of only
violation of another federal, state, or local crime (Mandatory Condition 1) after
denial of guilt.
STRAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
With neither prison time nor supervised release left to serve, Thornton’s
challenge to the revocation judgment is just as moot as his challenge to the sentence,
so I would dismiss across the board. See United States v. Stanko, 762 F.3d 826, 828

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(8th Cir. 2014) (“To maintain a lawsuit, the challenger must establish ‘continuing
collateral consequences’ from the revocation.” (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.
1, 8 (1998))).
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