United States of America v. Xavier Sean Boyd

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1282
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Xavier Sean Boyd
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: March 16, 2026
Filed: June 11, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Xavier Boyd pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to three counts of
robbery of a United States postal worker, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a), and
two counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation

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of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court1 sentenced Boyd to a total term
of imprisonment of 255 months, followed by four years of supervised release. Boyd
appeals his sentence and asserts that the appeal waiver contained in his plea
agreement is unenforceable. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we enforce
the appeal waiver and dismiss the appeal.
“When pleading guilty, defendants may choose to waive appellate rights.”
United States v. Williams, 81 F.4th 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2023). “An appeal waiver
requires dismissal of an appeal if the plea agreement and waiver were entered into
knowingly and voluntarily, if the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, and if
dismissal of the appeal would not result in a miscarriage of justice.” United States
v. Hayes, 174 F.4th 1092, 1101 (8th Cir. 2026) (citation omitted). “We review the
validity and applicability of an appeal waiver de novo.” Williams, 81 F.4th at 839.
The written plea agreement between Boyd and the Government specifically
recites that Boyd “has been fully apprised by defense counsel of [his] rights
concerning appeal and fully understands the right to appeal the sentence.”
Regarding sentencing issues, the plea agreement provides that Boyd waives the right
to appeal “all sentencing issues other than Criminal History” if “the Court accepts
the plea, and after determining a Sentencing Guidelines range, sentences [Boyd]
within or below that range,” which the Court did here. Boyd does not argue that he
did not enter into the plea agreement or appeal waiver knowingly or voluntarily or
that his challenge to his sentence does not fall within the scope of the wavier.
Instead, he argues only that enforcement of the appeal wavier would result in a
miscarriage of justice.
“The miscarriage-of-justice exception ‘is a narrow one’ that ‘arise[s] in only
limited contexts.’” Williams, 81 F.4th at 840 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). We have recognized that this exception may apply where the district court
1 The Honorable Matthew T. Schelp, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri.

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imposes an illegal sentence, the district court relies on constitutionally impermissible
factors, the Government violates the plea agreement, or the defendant asserts claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.; United States v. Woods, 346 F.3d 815, 818
(8th Cir. 2003). According to Boyd, the district court did not explain why it imposed
the 255-month term of imprisonment, making it impossible to determine whether the
sentence relied on constitutionally impermissible factors. Boyd further asserts that,
because plea agreements should be strictly construed with any ambiguities resolved
in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights, see United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886,
890 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), the uncertainty about what factors the district court
may have relied on in fashioning Boyd’s sentence counsels that “Boyd’s
arguments . . . are valid and appropriate appellate issues.”
We disagree. This Court has cautioned that the miscarriage of justice
“exception is a narrow one and will not be allowed to swallow the general rule that
waivers of appellate rights are valid.” Id. at 891. Boyd claims the exception applies
because the district court may have relied on constitutionally impermissible factors.
Without more, we decline to consider his appeal as advancing a claim that the district
court did rely on constitutionally impermissible factors. Despite Boyd’s efforts to
recast his claim, he offers a routine claim of procedural error that the district court
did not sufficiently explain its chosen sentence. This is nothing more than an
attempted end run around the appeal waiver. See Williams, 81 F.4th at 841
(concluding that defendant’s speculative claim about ineffective assistance of
counsel “amounts to little more than an attempted end run around the waiver to
attack his sentence”). Accordingly, we reject Boyd’s contention that enforcement
of the appeal waiver results in a miscarriage of justice.
For the foregoing reasons, we enforce the appeal wavier and dismiss the
appeal.
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